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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Anna W. Moore 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
 
December 2016 
 
Title: A Critical Geography of the United States’ Diplomatic Footprint 
 
 
The practice of diplomacy has changed dramatically in recent decades as a result of 
technological advancements and shifting geopolitical concerns.  No longer confined to 
the cloaked and closed-door practices of elite state institutions, the diplomatic landscape 
has broadened, and been made visible, across space and scale.  Amidst this rapidly 
changing environment, it is imperative to understand how states are adjusting their 
material diplomatic infrastructure and what that means for everyday diplomatic practices.  
While many countries have adjusted to twenty-first century diplomatic realities by 
adapting to a more mobile, maneuverable diplomatic corps and fewer facilities, the 
United States remains committed to a widespread diplomatic network, the largest in the 
world.  This diplomatic footprint is the hallmark of universality, a sustained effort over 
time to acquire near total diplomatic coverage by dotting the world with embassies and 
consulates designed to look, work, and behave in a similar, if not, ageographic, manner.  
Attending to this understudied phenomenon means studying the historical and geographic 
conditions out of which this relatively even and uniform diplomatic apparatus 
materialized.  It further means analyzing the contemporary pattern of U.S. diplomatic 
infrastructure against the shifting terrain of diplomatic norms and space.   
 v 
 
Drawing empirically on interviews with elite diplomatic practitioners, substantial 
archival material, and the researcher’s own experience working within the U.S. 
diplomatic assemblage, this study has sought to examine why the United States remains 
committed to universality and what embassies and consulates actually do to secure U.S. 
foreign policy goals.  Specifically, the study—presented in this dissertation as three 
discrete original research articles—is framed by the following research questions:  
(1) What ideas and policies shaped the geographical footprint of U.S. diplomatic 
infrastructure over the course of the twentieth century?   
(2) How does the globe-girdling U.S. diplomatic assemblage reflect and influence 
geopolitical ideas and practices?   
(3) How does the grouping of diplomatic missions along regional lines reflect and 
influence U.S. foreign policy? 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Such is the strangely compelling aura of the embassy. – Zadie Smith (2013) 
On July 1, 2012, a 14-minute trailer for an obscure, amateur film produced in 
southern California—The Innocence of Muslims—was uploaded to the video-file-sharing 
site YouTube.  The English-language clip received only limited attention in Egyptian 
media outlets until a version was uploaded onto the same site dubbed in Arabic on 
September 8 (al Jazeera 2012).  Days later, beginning Tuesday, September 11, mass 
demonstrations against the film and its extremist portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed lit 
up the Muslim world, targeting U.S. and Western diplomatic installations in twenty cities 
across the Middle East, Africa, and South-Central Asia (Kirkpatrick & Santora 2012).   
In Cairo, some 2,000 protesters breached the wall of the U.S. Embassy and tore 
down the flag, replacing it with the black Salafist flag (Sydow 2012).  In Khartoum, two 
individuals were killed when 5,000 demonstrators marched on the U.S. embassy 
(Kirkpatrick & Santora 2012, BBC 2012a).  In Tunis, four died after protesters lit 
vehicles and trees on fire and burned the flag inside the embassy compound before 
looting and setting fire to the American school in the city (BBC 2012a).  In Pakistan, 19 
were killed as demonstrators clashed with police in front of the U.S. consulates in 
Karachi and Peshawar (BBC 2012b).  Further protests were held in Yemen, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Iraq, Indonesia, Kuwait, Turkey, Morocco, Afghanistan, Kashmir, 
Lebanon, and Germany (al Jazeera 2012; BBC 2012a, 2012b).  Amidst the confusion, 
anger, and chaos in the early hours of protests, the U.S. Special Diplomatic Mission in 
Benghazi, Libya, was the target of a heinous—and seemingly unrelated—attack on U.S. 
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diplomatic personnel, resulting in the death of four Americans, including U.S. 
Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens.  By Saturday, September 15, the U.S. 
Department of State had ordered a ‘draw-down’ (i.e. personnel withdrawal) of 
Department facilities in Tunisia and Sudan, mandating that all non-essential personnel 
leave the countries (Spencer 2012). 
The events of September 2012 were tragic and sobering.  They spoke to how 
quickly social media platforms can at once bring people together but can also disseminate 
hate, incite violence, and pit peoples against one another.  In the aftermath of the riots 
and violence, many questions went unanswered and the Benghazi attack became the 
subject of widespread conspiracy theories and a particularly ugly political smear 
campaign.  This dissertation, however, is not about The Innocence of Muslims or 
Benghazi.  In the context of this study, the events of September 2012 signal the 
emergence of an idea that is at the heart of this dissertation.  At the time I was a Civil 
Service employee in the U.S. Department of State’s Operations Center, the Department’s 
24/7-staffed office charged with monitoring and providing up-to-the-minute reporting on 
fast-breaking events, including, political upheaval, natural disasters, market conditions, 
sudden policy shifts, terrorist attacks, and flare-ups in violence.  While on shift during the 
tumultuous week of September 11, 2012, I began to notice a particular way U.S. embassy 
and consulate facilities were framed in news media and among my Foreign Service 
colleagues, many of who had served in those facilities during previous tours.  In reading 
through news coverage of the demonstration in Khartoum, Abdelaziz (2012) wrote, 
“Police fought demonstrators for more than an hour in front of the heavily fortified U.S. 
embassy outside Khartoum […], a vast compound comprising several buildings and tiers 
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of fences.” And from Cairo: “The U.S. Embassy is built like a fortress, with a wall 
several yards high” (CBS News 2012).  On Tunis: “Unlike the U.S. Consulate in 
Benghazi, the embassy in Tunis is a fully fortified Inman building that has security 
features in place to prevent protesters from entering” (STRATFOR 2012).  On Sana’a: 
“Young protesters… smashed windows of the security offices outside the embassy with 
stones and burned at least five cars as they broke through the main gate of the heavily 
fortified compound in eastern Sanaa [sic]” (Ghobari 2012, Figure 1). 
As evidenced by the above quotations, contemporary American diplomatic 
installations, and not just those in instability-ridden regions, are marked by an 
overwhelming concern for security.  High-profile attacks on U.S. embassies in Beirut, 
Lebanon, in 1983 and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998 prompted a 
broad restructuring of the Department and mandated radical changes to the ways in which 
officials designed embassy and consulate compounds, complete with large perimeter 
walls; narrow, bullet-proof windows; and slick façades to discourage wall-scaling to 
name a few.  The descriptors in the above quotations—“heavily fortified,” “fully 
fortified,” “compounds,” “fortress”—are now used frequently to refer to all U.S. 
diplomatic facilities, contributing to what many commentators refer to globally as 
“Fortress America.”  Further, a security-driven directive specifying that compounds be 
built on 10-acre sites (a setback buffer to prevent damage in the event of a bombing at the 
perimeter) led to the selection of new sites well outside traditional diplomatic 
neighborhoods, and even outside city limits in some cases, as evidenced the by the above 
quoted references to “outside Khartoum” and “in eastern [Sana’a].”   
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The generation of what is perceived to be out-of-the-way, hyper-secure, bleak, 
and unwelcoming embassies and consulates has been widely criticized.  Commentators 
decry the bleak and imposing nature of the structures (see, e.g., Crittenden 1981, Loeffler 
1998b, Langewiesche 2007, Ouroussoff 2010).  Thomas Friedman of The New York 
Times wrote of the American Consulate in Istanbul, “It looks just like Fort Knox— 
without the charm” (Friedman 2003).  Urban scholars Jon Coaffee (2010) and Stephen 
Graham (2010) have examined the security cordons surrounding U.S. embassy facilities 
to illustrate to ways in which state security apparatuses are transforming the urban 
landscape and inspiring a culture of fear.  In 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives 
held a hearing titled “Fortress America” to study “the ramifications of the new type of 
embassies that U.S. taxpayers are currently funding” (U.S. House 2008).  And the State 
Department’s Inspector General documented low morale in Zagreb, Croatia, a newer 
embassy site located well outside the urban core (OIG 2009).   
In the post-Benghazi era, the Department’s security-driven directives have been 
closely monitored by the news media, as detailed in reporting on the unprecedented 
closure of 22 embassies over a weekend in August 2013 and the suspension of operations 
at facilities in Damascus, Syria (2011); Tripoli, Libya (2014); Erbil and Baghdad, Iraq 
(2014); and Sana’a, Yemen (2015).  Adding to the debate, many commentators have 
suggested America’s bunker-like diplomatic posture is more a problem than a solution 
(Applebaum 2012, Grabar 2012, Worth 2012).  As foreign policy analyst Stephen Walt 
commented, “[W]e have to build embassies that resemble fortresses, and that convey an 
image of America that is at odds with our interests and our own self-image…” (Walt 
2010).   
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Research Problem 
In spite of continued threats on U.S. diplomatic installations which regularly lead 
to the suspension of operations at facilities (what appears to be the new normal), and the 
types of attacks that mandated this hyper-secure operating environment in the first place, 
the costly security features at massive new embassy compounds demonstrate the United 
States’ deep and continued commitment to a widespread diplomatic posture.  Indeed, 
today the United States maintains 285 embassies and consulates: in total some 19,000 
structures, in 169 countries (Kennedy 2011, Benen 2014).1  By way of comparison, 
Germany has 227 facilities (Federal Foreign Office 2014) and Russia 226 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia 2015).  This extensive diplomatic footprint is the hallmark of 
universality, or the universality principle: a powerful and longstanding dogma that 
suggests the United States ought to maintain as widespread and as deeply rooted a 
diplomatic footprint as possible around the world.  In practice, universality has come to 
represent a sustained effort on the part of the U.S. Department of State over time to 
acquire near total diplomatic coverage, embassies in as many capital cities (with some 
geopolitical exceptions) and consulates in as many strategic and highly populated urban 
centers as possible.   
At a finer scale, universality also implies a large degree of homogeneity across 
this vast U.S. diplomatic network; each constituent embassy and consulate is designed to 
                                                
1 A word on terminology: a diplomatic mission refers to a state’s official representation to another 
state or an international organization.  It includes an embassy, typically in a capital city, which 
houses the offices of the ambassador or chief of mission as well as other offices depending on its 
size.  The mission may also include any number of consulates, typically in larger urban areas, that 
provide consular services to citizens and local nationals, including passport, visa, and welfare and 
whereabouts requests.   
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look, work, and behave in a similar, indeed ageographic, manner.  Rarely do key 
decisionmakers question what exactly the United States and the host country need from a 
particular facility, or whether a facility is necessary at all.  Relatively little work has been 
done that helps us understand why the United States continues to value universality when 
the terrain of diplomacy has shifted so visibly in recent decades.  Against that backdrop, 
this study aims to uncover, analyze, and critique the priorities and discourse that drive 
these very entrenched ideas about material diplomatic infrastructure. 
In examining the discourse surrounding the U.S. diplomatic network, it is easy to 
point out the trap of universality, and not just in Department policies and official press 
releases.  Even Walt’s previously mentioned critique of Fortress America fails to call 
attention to the powerful pull of universality.  Notice that his quotation, illustrative of 
other critiques of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus over the years, is premised on and 
assumes the endurance of universality and its two central tenets: a worldwide network 
and singular embassy platform (i.e. same types of offices, similar design, uniform 
security features).  The trap of universality contributes to the failure of policymakers and 
commentators to think innovatively and consider alternative diplomatic postures.  For 
example, officials might consider the smaller, more maneuverable diplomatic corps as 
deployed by many European countries—several of which have closed less strategic posts 
and co-located missions within larger facilities with ambassadors-at-large accredited to 
multiple, nearby states (Avery et al. 2007).  Oliver (2016) reports that half the OECD 
states have reduced their diplomatic footprints in the last decade.  The UK closed almost 
30 traditional facilities between 2009 and 2015 and expanded an innovative science and 
technology network from 24 to 28 states in the same time period (ibid).  
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The point is that, at the end of the day, we rarely think to question the sites and 
spaces through which formal state diplomacy operates.  The United States thus remains 
wholly committed to universality, and the logistical challenges and costs of suspending 
and later resuming operations are understood as mundane processes necessary to the 
pursuit of a unique, widespread diplomatic posture: American-style global diplomacy. 
Just as this network is spread widely, its nodes are also relatively homogenous.  Most 
embassy facilities, as with most consulates, are composed of the same types of offices 
and personnel.  They further maintain similar hierarchical management structures and 
operate using the same tried-and-true practices.  The only seemingly unique large-scale 
adjustments to the facilities themselves are made to architectural design (notably the 
façade), the size of the facility, and its location relative to other fixtures in the urban 
environment.  Indeed, the Department continues to function under the assumption that a 
permanent diplomatic mission, as well as a particular type of facility, is essential in every 
state to maintain the United States’ primacy in global politics, a narrative of universality 
that has been constructed and reinforced by policymakers over time and that remains the 
primary driving force in crafting foreign policy, requisitioning funds, and (re)designing 
facilities.  My key goal is to understand why. 
Toward that end, this dissertation examines the United States’ diplomatic 
network, a seemingly uniform and universal patchwork of embassies and consulates.  The 
present study considers the value of diplomatic infrastructure—through the prism of the 
United States’ longstanding emphasis on universality—against the rapidly changing 
environment in which contemporary diplomacy operates.  At a wider scale and on a more 
practical level, this dissertation is about how to best leverage diplomatic assets, resources, 
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and tools in an increasingly complex, multifaceted, and instability-ridden world.  In 
exploring these themes, this research contributes theoretically to the body of literature 
concerned with the material dimensions of bureaucratic institutions and the myriad 
geographies of diplomacy.    
The following three research questions serve to guide this study: 
(1) What ideas and policies shaped the geographical footprint of U.S. diplomatic 
infrastructure over the course of the twentieth century?   
(2) How does the globe-girdling U.S. diplomatic assemblage reflect and influence 
geopolitical ideas and practices?   
(3) How does the grouping of diplomatic missions along regional lines reflect and 
influence U.S. foreign policy? 
These questions aim at uncovering what diplomatic facilities represent, and, perhaps 
more importantly, what they do for U.S. interests.  I derived my questions from a singular 
overarching concern for understanding what makes a U.S. embassy powerful, so 
powerful in fact that neither targeted attacks nor technological breakthroughs have turned 
policymakers away from maintaining broad-based diplomatic coverage.  In unpacking 
these and other underlying questions throughout the course of this project, I have sought 
to open up the U.S. diplomatic apparatus to critique.  This critique is grounded in an 
effort to understand the networks of power that have rendered the U.S. footprint nearly 
universal as well as the direct consequences of this very singular emphasis on 
universality for U.S. foreign policy goals.  
 
 
Literature Review 
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Changing Diplomatic Practices 
The subdiscipline of political science known as diplomatic studies was originally 
conceived to support practitioners.  As such, its foundational canon reflects an emphasis 
on practice and behavior at the scale of the state (see, e.g., the classic “how to” guides: 
Satow 1917, Nicolson 1954, Berridge 1995).  In recent decades, however, these 
‘prescriptive’ (Neumann 2012) accounts have fallen out of favor, replaced by a vast 
literature theorizing diplomacy beyond its traditional, state-centric conceptualization.  An 
‘innovative school’ (Murray 2008) of diplomacy scholars has broadly redefined 
diplomacy as a humanistic endeavor: a set of mediating practices “that develop into a 
dominant discourse for dealing with the other” (Constantinou 1996: 110).   
Recent work on constituent diplomacy (Kincaid 2002), multi-layered diplomacy 
(Hocking 1993), sub-state diplomacy (Cornago 2010), informal diplomacies (McConnell 
et al. 2012), and paradiplomacy (Duchacek 1990, Lecours 2002) all stem from this 
relational and inclusive effort to document the multiplicity of diplomacies that exist 
independent from or at least alongside the state.  Yet the emphasis on innovative trends in 
diplomacy has distanced diplomacy scholars from the arena of practitioners.  This 
distancing is reflected both in the dearth of work on everyday, embodied diplomatic 
behavior and scholars’ own assertions that the field ‘lags behind’ contemporary 
diplomatic practice (Murray et al. 2011).  Moreover, while there is a productive group of 
scholars asking questions about military processes and landscapes (e.g. Woodward 2005, 
Gregory 2010, with a few even making productive headway towards an understanding of 
adaptations to U.S. military infrastructure (Gillem 2007, Davis 2011), geographic 
analyses of diplomacy are harder to locate.   
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Simultaneously, scholars are acknowledging that diplomatic processes are 
changing more rapidly than ever before (Murray et al. 2011).  The emergence of a vast, 
globe-girdling telecommunications infrastructure has enabled diplomats to be in near 
constant communication with decision makers at home, quickening the pace of 
diplomatic negotiations.  Secure video, telephone, cellular, and internet capabilities have 
transformed how diplomats report sensitive information and meet for bilateral exchanges.  
In November 2013, the prime ministers of Finland and Estonia, at their respective desks 
in Helsinki and Tallinn, used ID cards and a software program to sign the first digital 
international agreement (Friedman 2013).  The increasing use and popularity of social 
media outlets too—the tools of public diplomacy—have allowed diplomats to gauge their 
state’s reputation abroad; to communicate with the general public, particularly in places 
where governments inhibit the flow of information; and to collect on-the-ground, up-to-
the-minute information during crises, as occurred during the so-called Arab Spring and 
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.   
The distribution of diplomatic information across this wide telecommunications 
network has also created vulnerabilities, many of which were exposed during the 
WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden scandals.  The ensuing diplomatic spats and calls for 
transparency led governments to consider making their diplomatic practices and 
negotiating positions more visible.  In July 2014, for example, the Kremlin released data 
on President Putin’s official calls and meetings with world leaders since February to 
discuss the crisis in Ukraine (Karaian 2014).  And in the wake of the Malaysian Airlines 
downing over Ukraine, many commentators were shocked when Malaysian Prime 
Minister Najib communicated directly with Ukrainian rebel leaders on his personal cell 
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phone, successfully negotiated access to the plane’s wreckage, and briefed media outlets 
on the content of the call (Bradsher et al. 2014).  
Contemporary diplomacy has undergone a seismic shift in the way it is practiced 
and structured; as such, there is a compelling need for serious academic engagement to 
understand how the United States justifies its vast presence around the world.  In this new 
diplomatic climate of transparency, maneuverability, and insecurity, it is further 
imperative to critique the even-ness of America’s diplomatic network of tried-and-true 
embassy and consulate design. 
 
Towards the More-Than-Human and More-Than-Representational   
A range of geographic work in the past decade has demonstrated the centrality of 
material infrastructure to everyday life and the power relations inherent in all human 
interaction.  These efforts are driven by a redirection of inquiry towards non-human 
actors: animals, objects, and technological agents that shape our world and ways of 
knowing (see, e.g., Bakker 2005, Whatmore 2006, McFarlane 2011, Shaw & Meehan 
2013).  This so-called material turn has been aided by efforts to look beyond the 
longstanding ‘landscape-as-text’ approach to cultural geography and instead privilege the 
more-than-representational quality of space and place (Lorimer 2005, Cadman 2009).  
Nigel Thrift’s non-representational theory is marked by an analytical shift from discourse 
to practice in an effort to shed light on how human and non-human processes are formed 
and performed, rather than being simply produced (Thrift 2000).  These points of 
departure have widely influenced how political geographers make sense of the state as a 
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collection of social practices that simultaneously coerce and build consensus to reify 
power arrangements (Mitchell 1991, Painter 1995, Mountz 2003).   
Similarly, diplomacy and its variegated actors, objects, processes, and practices 
can be examined through this framework.  The norms that I seek to study—those 
assumptions that drive U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic behavior—distill down to a set 
of concrete ideas surrounding the placement, structure, and, more broadly, value of 
material diplomatic infrastructure.  Previously, scholars have looked at these facilities 
with a view toward commenting on their monumental characteristics, their appeal as “that 
most emblematic of emblematic architectures” (Boddy 2008: 282).  But embassies and 
consulates are not merely representative of power and the reach of the state; they do work 
for the state by existing as nodes for consular operations, information gathering, and 
bilateral negotiation and communication.  The proposed research examines the material 
and more-than-representational characteristics of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure to 
understand how its constitutive elements work to sustain the very particular worldview 
that drives American foreign policy. 
 
Bureaucracies, Networked Infrastructure, and Path Dependency 
Organizations fundamentally shape and are shaped by global politics, whether in 
the form of government bureaucracies, think tanks, multi- and supra-national institutions, 
or social movements (Müller 2012, Monstadt 2009).  Recent analyses of these 
bureaucratic organizations themselves, what Dale (2005: 671) calls a “material 
reconstruction of the workplace,” expose the myriad connections linking networked 
infrastructure, in this case the physical components of diplomacy, to broader political 
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processes.  While conventional studies of political processes reduce the importance of 
infrastructure, recent work in economic and urban geography and in political ecology 
examines how infrastructure is integral to, and works in tandem with, state-making, city 
planning, and economic development processes (Graham & Marvin 2001, McFarlane 
2008).  Drawing on this work, the concept of path dependency is helpful in 
conceptualizing the vast U.S. diplomatic network.  A path dependent network is one in 
which growth has followed a particular trajectory over time, predetermined and 
normalized due to certain driving characteristics (Batty 2007).  The networked system is 
therefore locked onto a specific “growth path” (ibid: 29); where path dependent networks 
exist, radical innovation to that network is limited (Smith et al. 2005, Monstadt 2009).   
The United States’ established network of permanent diplomatic infrastructure 
has, for the most part, been in place for half a century, ahead of most of the development 
of the vast bureaucracy that oversees it in Washington.  It is a network that is large, 
entrenched, unwieldy, and whose path is resistant to reform (Loeffler 1998a).  Even in 
the aftermath of the catastrophic bombings in 1983 and 1998, a plan was in place almost 
immediately to rebuild the facilities, albeit with significantly enhanced security features 
(Loeffler 2005).  There were never any indications that the United States would remove 
itself entirely from its diplomatic ‘responsibilities’ in Beirut, Dar es Salaam, and Nairobi.  
Whereas the U.S. Department of Defense has undergone comprehensive reviews of 
policy and resources in regular, four-year intervals since 1997 to adjust to a changing 
geopolitical climate, the State Department only began the ‘quadrennial’ review process in 
2009.  Further, the global pattern of U.S. military installations has been a topic of public 
debate for some time, notably evidenced in a February 2015 New York Times editorial: 
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“The Pentagon’s excess space” (Editorial Board 2015).  This research brings similar 
attention to U.S. diplomatic installations in an effort to explain how U.S. diplomacy has 
adapted in the absence of more comprehensive reform efforts, as well as to examine the 
interplay between the Department’s networked infrastructure and contemporary 
diplomatic practices.  Taking the U.S. diplomatic institution seriously as the sum of its 
parts, a multitude of actors, objects, material infrastructure, and the networks that bind 
them, this project sheds light on the organizational character of contemporary diplomacy, 
that which needs “to be coordinated and brought together to make an organization 
capable of acting” (Müller 2012: 379). 
 
Explanation of the Dissertation Format 
 This dissertation is composed of a chapter on the methodology employed in the 
present study followed by three discrete chapters in article format.  The first of these 
articles, titled “Towards a Historical Geography of the United States’ Diplomatic 
Footprint,” draws primarily on archival data to outline the ideas and motivations that 
have led U.S. policymakers to build the largest diplomatic apparatus in the world.  In 
particular, the paper traces the emergence of the universality principle in line with 
shifting attitudes related to America’s growing role in global affairs throughout the 
twentieth century.  This paper ultimately addresses the first research question driving this 
dissertation research.   
 The second article is entitled, “Rethinking the U.S. diplomatic assemblage: 
Representation, institutional processes, and the impacts of universality.”  This piece 
examines how the universality principle facilitates the United States’ role as a global 
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power.  The paper examines (1) why, according to policymakers, contemporary embassy 
and consulate installations exist, and (2) what work the facilities do to advance U.S. 
foreign policy objectives.  Making use of interview data with high-level Department of 
State personnel, the paper identifies the primary drivers of continued U.S. diplomatic 
presence and considers these alongside a critique of the United States’ global power 
ambitions and geostrategic objectives throughout the course of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries.  This second article speaks primarily to the second research question of the 
study, highlighting the factors that contribute to the continued enhancement of the U.S. 
diplomatic apparatus. 
The third and final article, “Regional Bureaus and the Privileging of the State in 
the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,” moves the lens away from U.S. diplomatic 
installations abroad to consider the ways in which diplomats and policymakers view, 
order, and understand the world from headquarters at ‘Main State’ in Washington, DC.   
This article focuses on often-unacknowledged geographical assumptions that work in 
tandem with the universality principle.  I examine the hierarchical ‘bureau system’ 
schema in place at the Department of State, and, in particular, the political-geographic 
breakdown of the Department’s regional bureaus.  The paper thus calls attention to the 
ways in which Department operatives, whether knowingly or not, are forced to encounter 
a world obscured by deeply entrenched, yet arbitrary, operational divisions which both 
reveal and hide geographic phenomena in potentially problematic ways.  The data for this 
paper is drawn primarily from my own experiences working at Main State and is 
complemented by archival data. 
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Key Findings 
 A more in-depth explanation of the present study, including methods employed, 
data analysis, specific empirical findings, theoretical contributions, and results, are 
presented in the following chapters.  This final section of the introduction provides a 
summary of the primary broad conclusions and key themes that emerge from this project. 
(1) The universality principle--the longstanding idea that U.S. diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities ought to be as widespread (i.e. nearly universal) and as 
entrenched in local society as possible—is a significant driving force in the 
continued maintenance of the U.S. diplomatic footprint, even though it is 
curiously absent from policy documentation, administrative records, historical 
accounts, and the academic literature.  This "phantom" concept of universality is 
built into the very fabric of the U.S. diplomatic institution; high-level diplomats 
regularly speak to the need to be "everywhere at once" to promote U.S. values and 
America's vision for the world. 
(2) Attention to diplomatic representation is critical to understanding the United 
States' ambitions in the global arena.  As sites through which diplomats collect 
information and seek to exert influence over peoples and places around the world, 
embassy and consulate facilities are active, material participants in rendering the 
globe legible for key decision makers in Washington.  Contributing here to the 
theoretical literature on diplomatic representation, this study illustrates why it is 
important to consider diplomatic installations for their material properties, the 
"work" they do, and their representational characteristics to understand how such 
sites and spaces shape, and are shaped by, foreign policy aims. 
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(3) Scholars and practitioners should pay more attention to the conduits that exist to 
bridge formal and informal diplomatic practices, actors, and spaces.  Over the 
course of this project, I found that while globalizing forces and technological 
advancements have radically changed how contemporary formal diplomatic 
arrangements operate around the world, it is exceedingly hard and time 
consuming to reform large and unwieldy state diplomatic institutions.  As such, 
formal diplomatic practitioners often operate in outdated spaces employing 
outdated tools and ideas.  It is important both to consider the ways in which 
diplomats have created innovative solutions to solve some of these problems and 
encourage more cross-fertilization of ideas between the Academy and 
practitioners to instill innovation and creating problem-solving. 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to open up thinking about the geographical 
expression of the U.S. diplomatic network.  Using the framework provided by the 
research questions, the value of this study lies in assessing:  
(1) The genealogy, to use Foucault’s term, it provides of the universality concept; 
(2)  The ways in which the material expression of the universality concept reflects 
and influences diplomatic practice; and 
(3) The impacts the functional (and metageographical) parsing of that diplomatic 
network (into regions) has on diplomatic practice (i.e. privileging certain ideas 
and issues over others).  
The keys findings of this study coalesce around a broader critique of the U.S. diplomatic 
network and its guiding universality principle.  Data and findings suggest U.S. foreign 
policy directives are intrinsically linked to and, in many cases, primarily motivated by the 
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presence of U.S. official government operatives in nearly every state.  The failure of U.S. 
policymakers to reconsider broad-based diplomatic coverage thus implies a broader lack 
of imagination in designing foreign policy.  In the concluding chapter I lay out the 
dangers policymakers face in neglecting to consider alternative diplomatic postures, 
particularly in the case of anti-American sentiments abroad, and present and alternative 
path forward.  
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FIGURE 1.  Protesters scale the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen, on 
September 13, 2012 (Ybarra 2015). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. The new normal.  Construction on the new U.S. embassy in Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, in a sparsely populated new diplomatic enclave.  Note the large lot and 
setback space; perimeter walls with flood lights; and fortress-like structure with narrow, 
likely bullet-proof windows (Caddell Construction ND). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This project draws on institutional ethnographic techniques to examine the U.S. 
diplomatic network.  Ethnography has emerged as a useful tool for addressing themes in 
contemporary political geography, including attention to the everyday, previously 
marginalized voices, and small-scale phenomena at finer scales.  As a methodological 
approach, institutional ethnographies focus on linking lower-order daily lived experiences 
to national and global institutional processes, highlighting the role institutions play in 
shaping human processes across space and scale (Del Casino et al. 2000, Taber 2010).  
This methodology is appropriate for the proposed study, particularly as recent work in 
political geography has sought to uncover how “infrastructure itself plays a role in 
cultivating or delimiting state power” (Meehan 2013: 215, emphasis in original; see also 
Müller 2012, 2015).   
Political geographer Alison Mountz contends that institutional ethnography 
“offers a more nuanced rendition of state practices by seeking to understand and locate 
the operation of power in the daily work done by civil servants” (2004: 326).  It is 
productive to extend this epistemology to address how diplomatic infrastructure works to 
reinforce the institutions of American foreign policy at the national and global scales, 
even as it influences the work and daily lives of American diplomats living around the 
world.  Though the aim of many past analyses of foreign policy institutions has been to 
study the institution from above (Allison 1971, Heyman & Smart 1999) or below (Brower 
& Abolafia 1997), this research project placed me inside the diplomatic establishment to 
flesh out more fully its complex materialities and linkages across space and scale, 
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imitating Merje Kuus’ (2013) “studying up” approach (though she explicitly avoids 
referring to her work as an ethnography) and Iver Neumann’s work aimed at uncovering, 
“what diplomats actually do, and how they think about what they’re doing” (2012: 3).2  
Further, this project incorporated elite policymakers in heeding Criekemans’ (2011: 718) 
call for “[m]ore integrated research designs […] to better capture how both foreign policy 
and diplomatic elites work together.”  
Over the course of several years, and through a mix of humanistic methods, I 
sought to uncover the significance of diplomatic installations for members of America’s 
diplomatic corps, the practices and material things that constitute contemporary 
diplomatic processes, and the spaces that house and support these myriad people, things, 
and flows.  The purpose of this chapter is to detail the research design of the present 
study.  I first detail the research procedures employed in the present study of the United 
States’ diplomatic network.  I outline each method and comment on the types of data 
collected as well as the analytical tools employed during the study.  Three primary 
methods were utilized to collect data, which were then triangulated and analyzed 
collectively to address the three driving research questions.   These methods are: (1) 
informal anecdotes, memories, and commentary from my own experiences working 
within and contributing to the diplomatic network; (2) interview data from high-level 
U.S. diplomatic practitioners; and (3) extensive archival records on the expansion of the 
U.S. diplomatic footprint largely over the course of the twentieth century.  I finish this 
chapter with a commentary on my positionality and the challenges and ethical 
                                                
2 Kuus (2013) contends a rigorous and robust ethnography of foreign policy institutions is not possible 
unless the researcher is able to work from within and claim herself as an “insider”.  She cites the work of 
Iver Neumann (2012) whose research project placed him as a paid speechwriter within the Norwegian 
foreign ministry as a successful example. 
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considerations of studying the U.S. diplomatic establishment from within.  The 
subsequent articles-as-chapters present the methods in more detail. 
 
Methodological Framework 
Between June 2013 and December 2015, I spent over nine months in Washington, 
DC, working to understand the contours of the U.S. diplomatic establishment and its 
complicated geography around the world.  Two trips, in summer 2013 and fall 2014, 
were preliminary in nature; I returned to the employ of the State Department to work in 
the Operations Center while refining the research questions and parameters of my 
dissertation study.  These three-month-long stints provided me with an opportunity to 
reflect on my positionality as a researcher-cum-civil servant and my own role 
contributing to the maintenance of the U.S. diplomatic footprint, to discuss my project 
informally with colleagues, and to assess the feasibility of certain methods.  A three-
month stay in the District over summer 2015 represented the primary data collection 
period.  Fieldwork included substantial archival research as well as interviews with high-
level Department personnel.  This primary data was necessarily supported by a large 
amount of secondary material.  Sources included a plethora of academic work from 
across the social sciences, notably geography and diplomacy studies, as well as 
Department reports, newspaper articles (including a catalog of all New York Times and 
Washington Post articles that mention attacks on U.S. diplomatic installations from a 
previous research project), think tank publications, and even fiction (Giles Foden’s 
(2002) Zanzibar, Zadie Smith’s (2013) The Embassy of Cambodia).  Lastly, as a 
geographer generally interested in exploring the world around me as well as an avid 
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“urban hiker,” I took every opportunity to wander and observe the everyday, often 
overlooked diplomatic landscapes of Washington (Figure 3).  As is the case in many 
urban environments, diplomatic facilities are spread widely but unevenly across the city’s 
northwest neighborhoods, with some facilities more prominent than others.  Walking past 
the rundown Bolivian embassy, for example, and noting the “#MAR PARA BOLIVIA” 
installation (Figure 4), helped me understand the ways in which the material, urban, and 
banal diplomatic landscape is intimately and intrinsically connected to wider geopolitical 
processes.    
The primary methods utilized in this study are discussed below and in more detail 
in the following articles.  First, however, recall the research questions that have driven 
the present study and informed its methodology: (1) How have policies on U.S. 
diplomatic infrastructure developed over the course of the twentieth century?  (2) What 
factors influence decision making surrounding U.S. embassy and consulate placement?  
(3) In what ways does the universal character of each facility prove alternately productive 
and counterproductive for U.S. foreign policy aims? 
 
Archival Research  
Contrary to the original research design, which stressed interviews as the principal 
method of this study, archival material has come to represent the bulk of my primary data 
and therefore the most significant evidentiary foundation for this project.  This historical 
material, collected over summer 2015, has been used to construct a genealogy of the U.S. 
diplomatic footprint (research question 1), with an emphasis on the emergence of the 
discourse of universality at the turn of the twentieth century and the continued growth of 
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the diplomatic network throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries 
(research questions 2 and 3).  State Department records are stored at the U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) massive and highly secure Annex II 
facility in College Park, Maryland.  Throughout the summer I thumbed through and 
tracked the documents stored in 82 boxes of material related to embassy and consulate 
facilities from 1910 through 1963 of the State Department Central Files (RG-59, Figure 
5).   
A historical geographic approach was critical to this research “to re-evaluate 
taken-for-granted concepts and to develop a comparative perspective so that as 
geographers we might more fully appreciate what is distinctive about today's world and 
how we understand it in disciplinary terms” (Roche 2010: 175; Mayhew 2003).  
Following standards in historiography, I was mindful to evaluate all archival documents 
for their authenticity, accuracy, and purpose, as well as the underlying motivation, 
background, and ideology of the person(s) who constructed them and the context within 
which the documents were created and archived (Baker 1997, Black 2006).  All archival 
materials were collated, organized, and entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, which 
served as a database and reference guide for data analysis purposes.  Data were coded 
within the database (see Data Analysis below).  In addition, I maintained field notes 
related to “source criticism”—the process of ‘interrogating’ primary archival data—and 
took photographs of most records of interest.  Drawing on the guidance of Professor 
Marsha Weisiger (undated) of the University of Oregon’s Department of History and her 
“How to Analyze a Primary Source” guidelines, I remained wary of accepting a 
document at face value.  Instead, I carefully noted the reasons the sourced documents 
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were drafted as well as the potential positionality of the drafter(s).  The following 
questions from Dr. Weisiger served as a helpful guide: “Why would this document lie to 
me?  Is it an original document?  How did this document originate?  Was it required or 
coerced?  Was it created at the moment of the event, or produced shortly thereafter, or 
later from memory?  What was the author’s motivation for producing the source?  Can 
that person be trusted?” 
While the empirical data collected through archival means was rich in content 
related to this project, this method was certainly not without its limitations.  First, I 
greatly underestimated the amount of time and energy if would take to get into the 
archives, identify, and “pull” the records I needed.  The NARA facility staff pull 
documents on the hour, and not every hour.  Further, the material I needed was not 
organized neatly and separately.  RG-59 is catalogued predominantly by country, 
meaning that it is organized into categories that represent the U.S. bilateral relationship to 
X country, Y country, and Z country respectively.  As such, documents related to 
individual missions and their maintenance were scattered across the Central Files.  It was 
impossible to pull each and every record related to individual U.S. diplomatic properties; 
instead, and per the advice of several archivists, I focused on the Department’s broader 
policies towards embassies and consulates that were easier to locate among the slough of 
records.  Among the data I collected were records on legislation and Congressional 
reports related to facilities; policies on U.S. diplomatic representation by region, 
particularly in times/zones of conflict or during budgetary crises; documents by 
Department officials justifying facilities in particular sites; documents showing changes 
in status (i.e. raising the status of a legation to an embassy); and information on other 
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states’ diplomatic postures.  See Figure 6 for a sample document.  Lastly, as a result of 
the time-intensive cataloging process at government agencies prior to sending records to 
NARA, the records I had access to were limited to 1963 and before.  The interview data 
served to fill that post-1963 hole in the data set. 
 
Elite Interviews 
When beginning this research project, I was under the assumption that the 
interview method would elicit a robust and rich data set that would allow me to address 
the stated research objectives and to assess specifically why the United States continues 
to value an exceedingly widespread and deeply rooted diplomatic footprint.  It was my 
understanding that interviews with a wide range of diplomatic practitioners at the highest 
echelons of the Department would yield a diversity of opinions regarding the 
appropriateness of this diplomatic posture.  In reality, I had conducted only a few 
interviews before realizing that each participant was telling me the same thing, a variation 
of, “Of course we should have as many embassies and consulates as possible, we’re the 
United States of America!”  At the same time, it became clear during the principal data 
collection period that the historical record was yielding far ‘meatier’ data from a variety 
of sources, time periods, and voices than the interviews.  Nevertheless, these interviews 
with elite diplomatic practitioners proved instrumental in identifying several factors that 
have led high-level policymakers to maintain the United States’ widespread diplomatic 
posture as well as to understand better the mindset of the Foreign Service.  As a result, 
this data helped address all three research questions.   
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All interviews were conducted between May and September 2015.  In keeping 
with the original design of this research study, I initially sought to interview four types of 
diplomatic subjects while in Washington—retired senior-level Foreign Service Officers 
(FSOs); entry- and mid-level FSOs; elite, senior policymakers; and foreign diplomats 
posted in Washington—but I only ended up meeting with a mixture of the first and third 
classes I had identified.  Participants had on average three decades of experience working 
in the Department as career FSOs.  One participant was a political appointee.  All, save 
the appointee, had moved up the ranks to at least one ambassadorial role during their 
tenure, and most had served multiple ambassadorships (Table 1).  Many of the 
participants had served in further high-level roles at Main State, including Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Director General for Human Resources, and 
Assistant Secretary.  I further made sure that I had participants who served 
ambassadorships and principal officer assignments at embassies and consulates in all of 
the Department’s geographic regions—Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe, Near East 
Asia and Northern Africa, South-Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific—including in 
U.S. missions to international organizations.  Table 2 lists all those countries as well as 
other high-level positions.   
I began each interview with a brief yet comprehensive explanation of the research 
study as well as an overview of my own positionality as a Department employee.  
Following in-depth, informal interview techniques, the questions asked, as well as their 
wording and sequence, were not established prior to the interviews to encourage a 
conversational and flexible tone.  Aberbach and Rockman (2002) found that this open-
ended interviewing format allows participants to better “organize their answers within 
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their own frameworks” and is well suited for elite interview subjects (Ibid: 674).  I 
developed a unique checklist of topics at the outset of each interview, customizing topics 
for each individual depending on that person’s position, experiences, and expertise.  This 
flexibility allowed me to interact more fully with interviewees, put them at ease, and 
respond to promising leads and unanticipated topics as they arose.   
The following themes and questions were used to guide the direction of each 
semi-structured conversation:   
• The future of U.S. diplomacy:  How do you see U.S. diplomatic practice changing 
and/or evolving in the short and long term?  Has 21st century diplomacy moved 
beyond the need for a robust, universal presence?   
• Remote facilities:  Could a bilateral relationship survive the withdrawal of a 
diplomatic mission?  What might a laptop embassy look like in the case of the 
United States?  Is it possible to pursue this direction?  Does it have to have a flag?  
Does it have to be permanent?  What does it mean to be present and what would 
happen if the U.S. left?   
• Universality/presence:  What is the value of U.S. diplomatic presence?  How is 
that calculated?  What role does symbolism alone play?  Why is ‘continuity of 
presence’ so important?   
• Constituent posts:  How are constituent posts different from embassies with 
respect to their perceived value by policymakers?   
• Facility size/security features:  Do embassies need to be that big?  How do 
restrictions on movement of U.S. personnel beyond the embassy compound 
change day-to-day practices? 
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Recognizing that interviews are at least partially “structured by the spatial context 
in which they are conducted” (Sin 2003: 306, see also Elwood & Martin 2000), I ‘placed’ 
them, as much as possible, outside the confines of U.S. government and diplomatic 
facilities to promote candor, participant anonymity, and authenticity.  Only one interview 
took place at the Department of State; that was with an individual who was still serving in 
the Department.  All other interviews were conducted in the DC metropolitan area: 
Arlington, Virginia; Capitol Hill and downtown and northwest Washington, DC; and 
Bethesda, Maryland.  I allowed each respondent to choose a convenient location for the 
interview.  In most cases this meant coffee shops, however I met with a few participants 
in their offices (lobbying firms, law offices, think tanks) and with one at his home.  In 
one instance, a particularly animated participant asked that I meet her for breakfast at the 
members-only Army/Navy Club in downtown Washington.  Given the elegant setting of 
the meeting—white tablecloths, fine china—I did not attempt to record the interview and 
instead treated it as an informal conversation (particularly since she insisted on buying 
me breakfast!).    
I further made every effort during the conversations to avoid exhibiting any 
personal bias, whether that be my thoughts regarding the extent of the U.S. diplomatic 
network or any feelings regarding particular Department policies.  I did, however, find 
myself in several instances trying to ingratiate myself to a participant so as to establish 
more trust and elicit a more candid and conversational tone.  I did not, to my knowledge, 
encounter any other ethical dilemmas.  Despite the fact that ethical issues are more 
starkly apparent in methodological approaches that require the investigator to interact at 
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length with members of a community, in this case, the power imbalance between the 
researcher and researched overwhelmingly favored the participants.  
Interviews typically lasted between one and two hours and all but one were 
recorded (with the oral or written consent of participants).  In addition, I took 
comprehensive notes during each interview to capture tone, visual cues, expressiveness, 
and other items of note that would not be translated through the interview transcripts.  
Paying attention to Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) recommendation that fieldwork, 
transcription, and preliminary coding be performed as close together as possible, I made 
every effort to transcribe as much as possible in the field and was able to finish 
transcribing in fall 2015.  In line with standard practice, I decided not to reveal names or 
any identifying information (even when respondents were perfectly comfortable with my 
using their names).  (In reflection, this has been more difficult than I anticipated given the 
small world of the Foreign Service; should I discuss an interviewee who served in a high-
level capacity at a particular embassy, it would be fairly simple to identify three or four 
people who might meet that description.)  The shortest interviews were transcribed word-
for-word, and I chose to selectively transcribe the longer conversations by removing filler 
words, ignoring the exchange of pleasantries at the beginning and end, and choosing not 
to transcribe certain long-winded anecdotes and diatribes that veered off course.  Each 
transcription included at the beginning a detailed write-up of the notes I jotted down 
during the interview, including background information; notes on the participant’s 
behavior, tone, and congeniality; and noteworthy words, sentences, or stories that I 
wanted to highlight for later use.   
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Geodatabase 
The lack of publicly available data surrounding U.S. diplomatic infrastructure 
presented a methodological challenge at the onset of this research project.  I initially 
sought to understand more about the location of U.S. diplomatic facilities relative to host 
government buildings and diplomatic missions of third-party states at a fine urban scale.  
The lack of data surrounding the exact coordinates of U.S. facilities, while 
understandable considering security concerns, made that analysis challenging.  As a 
result, and even as the project changed course towards understanding more about the 
institutional development of the U.S. diplomatic network at a larger scale, I sought to 
create a publicly available geodatabase.  This data set represents the only quantitative 
data collected during the study.  It was compiled with the help of Research Assistant 
Melody Charles from existing open source information, in most cases the addresses of 
U.S. embassies and consulates pulled from their public websites.  The database catalogs 
the location, year of establishment, and type of compound for all U.S. diplomatic 
structures.  No information on security features and/or personnel was included among the 
variables to ensure the protection of sensitive information related to U.S. diplomatic 
infrastructure, particularly in the wake of the 2012 attack in Benghazi.  Currently no 
database of this nature exists outside the Department, though the information is readily 
available in various open-source fora.   
It is my hope that this geodatabase will be of use to other researchers, especially 
for cartographic purposes.  Maps are “a primary part of the geographer’s technology, 
methodology and language” (Bradshaw & Williams 1999: 250), yet have been relatively 
ignored within critical political geographic scholarship, which uses maps, if at all, in 
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efforts simply to situate rather than to examine geopolitical phenomena (Moore and 
Perdue 2014).  As interest in diplomatic themes grows among geographers, I anticipate 
this product will serve to engender more enthusiasm for cartographic analysis of U.S. 
diplomatic sites, spaces, and practices from different perspectives and at smaller scales.  
See Appendix A for this data. 
 
Data analysis  
Upon my return to Oregon in fall 2015, and following the self-transcription of all 
interview data, I commenced the data analysis phase of this research project.  In order to 
pull away as much as possible from the preconceptions my positionality imposed (see 
below, Robinson 2014), I employed a ‘grounded theory’ approach to the data analysis 
phase of the research.  Following the guidance of grounded theory, I allowed themes and 
concepts related to my research questions and objectives to emerge from data and inform 
theoretical hypotheses (Charmaz 2008, Cope 2010).  Further, I examined all the empirical 
data collected—interviews, archives, newspaper articles, secondary textual material, 
supplemented by field notes and preliminary research—in concert to better inform 
generated hypotheses.  Triangulation has been documented as a rigorous approach to 
multi-methods qualitative analysis, allowing the researcher to test the credibility of the 
data (Baxter & Eyles 1997).  Data were coded according to four broad code families as 
anticipated in my research design: functionality, data shedding light on the myriad roles 
embassies and consulates serve according to different actors and foreign policy priorities; 
symbolism, data restricting these facilities to their representational potential as symbols of 
U.S. power abroad; operational ability, the day-to-day practices and human, material, and 
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economic costs of sustaining the facilities and the network writ large; and adaptation, the 
centripetal forces working to keep the network together coupled with the centrifugal 
forces challenging the stability and integrity of the network.  Table 3 identifies all the 
coding variables used for data analysis.   
 
Positionality 
In the spirit of academic rigor and reflexivity, I have made every effort over the 
course of conducting this research to call attention to the wide range of entities, factors, 
and subjectivities that contribute to my research design, data, and findings (Crang 2005).  
As such, it is important to reflect on my positionality as a scholar-civil servant and the 
role my background has played in facilitating and influencing this project.  I have worked 
for the U.S. Department of State on and off since late 2007, when I began as a college 
intern; I later returned from 2007-2010 in a full-time capacity while concurrently 
pursuing my Master’s degree.  During that time, I worked in the Office of the 
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs on the consular portfolio.  In August 2010, I transitioned 
to the Operations Center, the command-and-control arm of the Department.  I left the 
Department in summer 2011 to move to Oregon, but I have since returned to ‘Ops’ 
annually for a few weeks or months while enrolled in the University of Oregon’s 
geography doctoral program.  These professional experiences led to and informed the 
direction of this study.  They also have allowed me to pursue this research from a 
particularly unique position within the diplomatic establishment. 
As my initial anecdote in the introduction chapter details, a particularly eventful 
and tragic week in September 2012 was the catalyst that propelled me to study the 
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‘siting’ of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure.  As the seeds of this initial idea were sown in 
my brain, I leaned heavily on colleagues, managers, and my own experiences to draw out 
the nuances of diplomatic infrastructure and refine the parameters of the study.  In fact, I 
could not have conceived of this research without the intimate knowledge of the 
Department I gleaned over the past decade as an “insider” (Dwyer & Buckle 2009).  My 
knowledge of the inner-workings of the Department shaped my questions, informed my 
findings, and, I believe, was critical to the overall success of this project.  I have an 
extensive network of contacts, in the form of FSO colleagues, managers, acquaintances, 
and friends, and the network gave me access to a set of knowledgeable people with whom 
I could discuss aspects of this project.   
What is more, my in-depth knowledge of the Department personnel and ‘corridor 
politics,’ so-to-speak, allowed me to develop an easy rapport with all of my interview 
participants.  By way of example, most of my conversations contained some form of the 
following quotations: 
• “I should start, and it should be no surprise to you, that I believe it is important to 
have a strong, well-formed, well-educated, well-led, well-resourced U.S. Foreign 
Service” (Interview O, emphasis added). 
• “We saw ourselves, as you know from having been in the Ops Center at that time, 
we had all those meetings to put on—Istanbul, Bonn and Chicago, Tokyo” 
(Interview L, emphasis added). 
• “The amount of information in the State Department is overwhelming. I mean, 
people don’t read cables anymore, they probably told you, right?” (Interview H). 
• “You know we don’t give out the numbers, as you know” (Interview H). 
 35 
 
I therefore see my positionality as a strength; however, I simultaneously have 
understood the myriad ways it could prove a liability.  For instance, I have been aware 
throughout the course of this project how my background and experience within the 
Department could potentially alter my analysis of the primary and secondary data and/or 
the critique I set forth regarding the U.S. footprint.  After all, I am as much product of the 
system as my interview participants.  In an effort to avoid this pitfall, I have made a 
conscious effort to routinely step back from my personal relationship to the Department 
of State and consider how the data informs my hypotheses.  Furthermore, I have 
tremendous respect for my colleagues and the work they do every day to advance U.S. 
interests abroad.  That respect has driven me to pursue this research project honestly, 
openly, and with great care.  I will continue to safeguard the anonymity of human 
subjects and the classification of government information, preserve the integrity of 
primary materials, question the power relations inherent in all data, acknowledge the 
uncertainties of my data and analysis, and distribute my findings in as transparent and 
inclusive a manner as possible.  In turn, I have made every effort to call attention to my 
positionality as a “boundary dweller” in research findings and publications (Mountz 
2002, Butz 2010). 
In conclusion, I believe the ethnographic approach adopted over the course of the 
study was useful in illuminating the origins of the universality principle and its continued 
traction in the Department of State today.  Given more time and/or resources, however, I 
might have approached this project differently.  Over the course of this research, I looked 
almost exclusively at elite policymakers through interviews and in archival material.  
These data were critical to understand the historical trajectory of universality and the 
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diplomatic network.  However, more attention to mid- and low-level diplomats might 
have shed light on the future of the U.S. diplomatic landscape and the enduring legacy of 
universality.  It would have been further helpful to introduce comparative studies in the 
form of other states’ diplomatic networks, although that direction would have required 
much more time and substantial resources.  Lastly, I also made difficult choices regarding 
what would and would not appear in this dissertation.  I amassed a significant amount of 
data, particularly archival material, that did not make it into the manuscript.  I hope to 
draw on these data for additional publications in this research direction in the future.   
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FIGURE 3. Washington’s banal diplomatic landscape.  An empty lot, “Property of the 
Embassy of the Republic of Benin,” and the mailbox of a Kazakhstan embassy property, 
likely the Ambassador’s residence.  Source: Author. 
  
FIGURE 4. Embassy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and its #Mar Para Bolivia (Sea 
for Bolivia) display.  Source: Author. 
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FIGURE 5. Boxes of archival records at NARA II.  Source: Author. 
.    
FIGURE 6. Sample document from the State Department Central Files.  Source: Author. 
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TABLE 1.  List of interviews (18) conducted over spring/summer/fall 2015. 
 
*Represents the number of discrete embassy and/or consulate posts each individual 
served at during their careers overseas.  Does not include assignments in Washington 
which typically occur every third tour, nor does it count repeat tours.  A typical Foreign 
Service tour lasts three years. 
**Represents the number of high-level positions held, by which I mean the head of a 
facility (i.e. Principal Officer, PO) or higher in the Department’s hierarchy (Long-term 
Chargé, Ambassador, (Principal) Deputy Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, or 
Under Secretary). 
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TABLE 2.  Identifying where each interview participant served as Principal Officer: 
Ambassador, Chargé d’Affaires, or Consul General. 
 
 
 
*Ambassadors are dual-accredited to these states from nearby missions; the United States 
did not mission an embassy in country when the interviewee served as Ambassador-at-
large.  
**The United States maintained a consulate in Tabriz, Iran, through much of the 
twentieth century until the 1979 hostage crisis. 
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 TABLE 3.  Code families and sub-family code variables, many of which fall under more 
than one code families as the chart details. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TOWARDS A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE 
UNITED STATES’ DIPLOMATIC FOOTPRINT 
 
Introduction 
 
The only real sign that the embassy is an embassy at all is the little brass 
plaque on the door (which reads, “THE EMBASSY OF CAMBODIA”) 
and the national flag of Cambodia (we assume that’s what it is—what else 
could it be?) flying from the red tiled roof (Smith 2013). 
 
In her The Embassy of Cambodia, Zadie Smith uses the mysteriousness of the 
walled Cambodian Embassy compound as a theme to explore class, ethnicity and 
othering in London’s northwest suburbs.  Smith’s titular embassy draws out, on the one 
hand, the seemingly mundane ways diplomatic properties blend into urban landscapes, 
often going unnoticed by passersby.  On the other hand, Smith’s protagonist is 
preoccupied by the out-of-place-ness of the embassy in London’s middle class suburbs, 
which she finds mimics her own foreign-ness as a recent emigrant.  Although the story is 
not about the embassy per se, Smith’s writing is indicative of how many of us understand 
diplomatic facilities—as essential to the everyday conduct of foreign policy and 
diplomacy—without full knowledge of what exactly happens on the inside of these 
compounds day in and day out or how their placement in the urban landscape reflects and 
makes possible myriad geopolitical and geo-economic processes.  Embassies, consulates 
and other diplomatic properties are just buildings, after all.  But they also stand separate 
and apart, as profound, meaningful structures that knit the world closer together.  
Embassies are both imagined and real spaces that at once represent the power and reach 
of state territory while also doing work to build and maintain diplomatic relationships 
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through the reproduction of seemingly banal everyday diplomatic practices (i.e. 
conducting visa interviews, attending staff meetings, drafting cables and press releases). 
The embassies, consulates, and exceptional diplomatic facilities that constitute the 
United States’ diplomatic network are illustrative of this litany of everyday processes as 
well as the symbolic reach of the state.  Architectural historian Jane Loeffler (1998: 3) 
writes,  
Embassies are symbolically charged buildings uniquely defined by 
domestic politics, foreign affairs, and a complex set of representational 
requirements.  As office buildings, they differ from ordinary projects not 
only in terms of their unusual programs and locations, but also in terms of 
their clients; they have not one, as is usual, but many.  
 
American embassies have long been prominent symbols in foreign capitals.  Loeffler’s 
(1998) seminal text on U.S. embassy and consulate design traces the history of the State 
Department’s building program, and particularly the “confident years following World 
War II” (p. 3) which saw prominent architects—among them Eero Saarinen, Wallace K. 
Harrison, I.M. Pei, Walter Gropius, Marcel Breuer, and Paul Rudolph—commissioned to 
build modernist, grandiose structures in line with “America’s larger effort to define its 
world role” (ibid).   
Regardless of whether diplomatic structures are hidden among middle class 
neighborhoods as in Smith’s novella or stand apart as imposing manifestations of state 
power as is most often the case with U.S. facilities, what remains little studied are our 
assumptions regarding the presence of embassies and consulates in the contemporary 
urban landscape.  It is easy, for example, to grow accustomed to the fact that a U.S. 
embassy is present in (nearly) every capital city.  The U.S. diplomatic network, when 
compared to other states, is unusually universal.  This assumption is rarely given much 
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thought by practitioners, scholars, and the public at large, despite the fact that diplomacy 
operates very differently in the twenty-first century than it did in the past where logistical 
and communication challenges made diplomatic envoys to host states an essential 
component of international relations.  In fact, today, the U.S. Department of State 
prioritizes the maintenance of the largest diplomatic network in the world, and there is 
little evidence to suggest policymakers have seriously considered what a different 
diplomatic posture could look like or could do for America’s relationship to the wider 
world.   
Against that backdrop, this article seeks to understand why diplomatic sites 
continue to be seen as essential components of the urban fabric.  This paper takes as its 
case study the U.S. diplomatic establishment’s embrace of the concept of universality—
that is, the long running narrative that the United States ought to have a widespread, 
robust diplomatic presence in the form of permanent embassy and constituent facilities in 
as many states as possible.  The origin of universality is challenging to pinpoint, as it is 
difficult to trace it to a particular individual, committee meeting, policy document, or 
even moment in time.  In fact, to my knowledge, the term “universality,” in the sense 
used here, does not appear in print or in the State Department’s archival records.  The 
concept may be discussed informally in conversation among policymakers and high-level 
diplomats, but there is little overt consideration of it.  The concept is, however, 
manifested in the diplomatic landscape.  Universality is a powerful set of ideas, a dogma 
that has led to the endurance of an entrenched U.S. diplomatic network.  As I demonstrate 
in this article, there was no clear-cut policy shift that paved the way for universality; 
instead there was a gradual embrace of the concept over the last 100 years in line with 
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emerging geo-political and -economic scenarios that shifted U.S. interests and priorities 
towards a more expansive, if not obligatory, role in world affairs.  In studying this 
previously unexamined concept, I highlight how the material diplomatic network both 
reflects and continues to shape powerful geopolitical ideas.  Further, I detail the 
continued pull of universality; that is, I consider why it would be exceedingly difficult to 
dismantle this robust, decades-long diplomatic apparatus.   
For the purposes of tracing the universality principle, this article pieces together a 
historical geography of U.S. diplomatic presence.  The following sections divide the last 
250 years into four distinct, albeit somewhat arbitrary and fuzzy, eras defined by the 
principal narratives driving embassy and consulate placement.  The first, from 1780 when 
the first American facility was established through the first decade of the twentieth 
century, documents the spread of small consulates around the world.  These early years 
saw a push for U.S. representatives in as many cities as possible, largely to provide 
consular and commercial assistance as the new state sought access to global markets.  
The second period, from 1911 through the World War II era, highlights the changing role 
of embassy and consulate properties as symbolic of the United States’ growing role in 
global affairs in tandem with the emergence of a professional Foreign Service.  As the 
United States grew into a more formidable diplomatic actor in the early to mid-twentieth 
century, policymakers recognized the importance of large, symbolic embassy structures 
and began the work of establishing facilities in capital cities.  The third era, from 1945 
through 1992, chronicles the geopolitical drivers that gave rise to near-universal 
coverage.  The year 1992 marks the installation of several new posts following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Lastly, the period from 1993 through to the present 
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marks a changed world order and the increasing security concerns that have come to 
dominate internal and public debates over diplomatic representation and the safety of 
American personnel abroad.  This last era calls into question the continued pull of 
universality.  Twenty-first century diplomatic practices are marked by new technologies, 
increased travel by high-level officials, and a globe-girdling telecommunications 
infrastructure that have closed the distance between Washington and capital cities on the 
other side of the world.  Despite this radically different operating environment, the legacy 
of universality looms large and remains a guiding principle for U.S. policymakers.   
 
On Diplomacy and Representation 
Diplomatic processes are inherently geographical.  Modern diplomatic 
engagement is premised upon a long-normative tradition of sending envoys abroad to 
represent the interests of the state.  Longstanding diplomatic processes are therefore 
typically considered the terrain of a small group of elite, privileged practitioners working 
within an institution charged with the nonviolent conduct of external relations (van der 
Wusten & Mamadouh 2010).  Yet contemporary diplomatic activities include a wide 
range of processes across space, place, and scale that blur the lines between formality and 
informality.  In the social media era, diplomacy is no longer confined to shadowy 
embassy conference rooms or cloaked foreign ministry negotiating tables.  The language 
of statist diplomacy no longer privileges exclusivity.  Indeed, to the ‘old-school’ 
vocabulary—“cable,” “chargé d’affaires,” “démarche,” “persona non grata,” 
“chancery”—one might add “tweet,” “YouTube,” “meme,” and “Facebook.”  Post-
structuralist critiques of the statist approach have urged a more inclusive 
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conceptualization of diplomacy to incorporate the myriad ways formal diplomatic 
avenues are representative of broader humanistic processes of mediation and 
engagement.  At its most broad, diplomacy becomes “any channel of contact” between 
two parties (Gilboa 2002: 83, McConnell et al. 2012: 804).  Theorists in this vein see 
diplomacy as “an ensemble of practices, power struggles, and truth contestations that 
develop into a dominant discourse for dealing with the other” (Constantinou 1996: 110) 
and, as suggested by Sharp (1999: 81), a set of liminal practices, with diplomats 
“between worlds” and “belonging to one place but located in another.”  Hoffman even 
proposes that diplomacy, “functions much more fully and consistently in a stateless 
context than in a state centered one” (p. 525).  Diplomacy could therefore be considered a 
set of institutions, practices, and forces that decenter and unhinge politics and 
territoriality; whereas politics defines boundaries, administers a population, and centers 
power relations, diplomacy negotiates and mediates estrangement, alienation, and 
otherness (Der Derian 1987, Sofer 1997, Sharp 1999).   
In the context of this reorientation, contemporary scholarship on diplomacy and 
diplomatic representation generally emphasizes praxis and process and, to a far lesser 
degree, the spatial parameters of these phenomena (for recent examples see Marsden et 
al. 2016, Pouliot 2016, Trager 2016).  Diplomatic representation refers broadly to a set of 
practices and processes that construct and reinforce a relationship between state and non-
state actors, whereas states send envoys to host governments to represent their interests 
(Rijks & Whitman 2007: 35).  Indeed, very little time and attention has been devoted to 
uncovering the myriad ways space, place, site, and scale give shape to and materialize 
diplomatic representation, despite the definitions above that account for “otherness” and 
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“place” and “worlds.”  Neumayer (2008) provides perhaps the best synthesis of this 
literature, noting that “anecdotal” analysis of diplomatic representation has left large gaps 
in our understanding of “why states choose to set up diplomatic representation in some 
states, and not in others” (pp. 2-3, see e.g. Vogeler 1995 and Xierali & Liu 2006).  
Taking a holistic approach to the problem, Neumayer (2008) attributes states’ diplomatic 
footprints to a simple cost-benefit analysis.  In weighing the benefits of representation 
(stronger relations, reciprocal representation, path-dependency (McRae 1989)) to the 
obstacles (lack of political will, cost), he finds that governments are more likely to place 
an embassy in states with close geographic proximity and like-minded political and 
economic ideologies (Neumayer 2008).  
While Neumayer’s piece also finds that power plays a large role in dictating 
diplomatic representation, what is less understood is how the physical sites themselves—
the networked architecture that connects embassy and consulate sites to the state’s 
broader diplomatic assemblage—render diplomatic representation possible.  
Representation cannot exist independently of the spatial conditions through which it is 
constructed.  By way of example, contemporary statist diplomacy and its constituent 
processes operate radically differently in the context of a consulate than an embassy, or in 
the context of an embassy versus a roving ambassador with roots to one site but who is 
accredited to multiple states.    
At the other end of the spectrum, work posited towards understanding more about 
the sites and spaces of geography often neglects the powerful role representation plays in 
everyday diplomatic processes.  Work in this vein, typically from architects and 
architectural historians, draws on diplomatic representation primarily to qualify the 
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symbolism rife in embassy and consulate facilities (Gournay & Loeffler 2002, Isenstadt 
1997).  The way scholarship surrounding diplomatic representation is divided is perfectly 
illustrated in the University of Oregon’s library system, where books and other resources 
related to diplomatic representation broadly are located in the main Knight Library 
whereas material on diplomatic sites and spaces is housed in the separate Architecture 
and Allied Arts Library.  This paper seeks a marriage of the two research trajectories in 
line with Shimazu’s (2012: 335) call to “[re-contextualize] the ‘diplomatic stage’ from 
the abstract sphere of high politics to the concrete sphere of the local milieu in which the 
performance takes place.”  The explicit ‘localization’ of diplomacy by privileging the 
place where diplomacy physically takes place allows insight into the different layers of 
meanings that would otherwise elude traditional approaches to the study of diplomacy 
(ibid). 
Towards that end, this article is part of a wider study into the myriad geographies 
of diplomatic representation through an examination of the sites and spaces that make up 
the U.S. diplomatic network.  This paper specifically seeks to understand the linkages 
between the expansion of the U.S. diplomatic network and the emergence of the United 
States as a world power.  By my estimation, the United States maintains the largest 
diplomatic apparatus of any state, between 285 and 294 facilities at any one time.3  This 
network is unusually universal, and attention to its emergence, as well as the patterns and 
ideas that have led to its expansion, can contribute to a more robust understanding of 
                                                
3 I use this range (285-294) to account for the number of facilities at any time that are temporarily “off line” 
(i.e. closed or evacuated with suspended operations or a ghost facility, e.g., Damascus, Beirut, Mogadishu) 
as well as geopolitically sensitive facilities (the former mission in Benghazi) and ‘one-man’ American 
Presence Post operations.  By way of comparison, China has 228 missions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China ND), Germany has 227 facilities (Federal Foreign Office 2014), and Russia 
226 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 2015).   
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shifting attitudes towards diplomatic representation as well as, at a finer scale, how 
policymakers have envisioned the role of the United States in the world over time.  The 
morphology of the diplomatic network, to borrow a phrase from van der Wusten and 
Mamadouh (2016), includes a patchwork of nodal embassies, consulates, and exceptional 
diplomatic facilities.4  These are knit together and further connected to host government 
foreign ministries and other government entities, “Main State” headquarters and other 
government facilities in Washington, international organizations and third-country 
diplomatic installations, as well as chambers of commerce, local businesses, and 
individuals seeking access to consular services (ibid).  The constitutive elements of these 
apparatuses are well known to scholars, yet little studied in academia despite the fact that 
the diplomatic network is instrumental to the majority of processes that fall under the 
umbrella of “diplomatic representation.”  
 
Methodology 
Empirical data for this project were collected primarily through extensive archival 
research at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration’s annex in College 
Park, Maryland, which houses the State Department’s Central Files.  Over summer 2015, 
I catalogued and analyzed 82 boxes of Departmental records related to Post management, 
budgetary concerns, legislation, Department operations, and personnel files.  The focus of 
the archival data collection period was to uncover the “nuts and bolts” of the U.S. 
                                                
4 These include missions to international organizations, as in the U.S. Mission to NATO or the U.S. 
Mission to the Organization of American States; geopolitically sensitive facilities as in the U.S. Consulate 
in Jerusalem (which reports to State Department headquarters instead of the embassy in Tel Aviv), the 
American Institute in Taipei, what was called the Special Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi, or, prior to the 
re-establishment of ties, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana; and American Presence Posts (lower order 
consulate facilities). 
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diplomatic footprint—that is, the everyday, seemingly banal administrative processes that 
allowed for the maintenance and further expansion of the U.S. network.  Material from 
the mid-century “Committee on New Foreign Service Posts” was particularly insightful 
towards this end.   
Given that Post management records were limited to 1963 and earlier,5 this 
research has additionally benefitted from substantial secondary material in the form of 
Department reports and press statements, literature on Department history, as well as the 
author’s experience working within the Department in various capacities between 2007 
and 2015.  Archival data were further supplemented with unstructured interviews with 
retired, high-level diplomats and policymakers, many with over four decades of service 
as Foreign Service Officers at U.S. posts abroad.  Interview participants were approached 
through snowball sampling, initially drawing on the author’s network at the State 
Department.  Participants then provided contact information for additional individuals 
who they thought would be eager to contribute to this project.  
 
A Historical Geography of the United States’ Diplomatic Footprint 
 Despite what it looks like on a map—that the United States simply has a 
diplomatic facility in every significant urban center—the contemporary U.S. diplomatic 
footprint is the product of a precise and deliberate geographical strategy.  The 
universality principle, its emergence and adoption over time, is the key to understanding 
this network and its unusually widespread pattern of embassies and consulates around the 
                                                
5 Records were limited past 1963 as a result of the Department’s classification and NARA archival 
procedures.  Following the compulsory 25-year (in most cases) classification period, records undergo a 
declassification review and then are transferred to NARA archivists who catalog and prepare the materials 
before they are made available to public researchers. 
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world.  And this dogma reflects a U.S. foreign policy establishment driven by concrete 
objectives and global power ambitions.  This thesis draws on the conceptual framework 
Neil Smith (2003, 2004) employs in his work on the American empire.  In particular, he 
calls attention to the false presumption of the American Century as that which overcame 
the bounds of geography (“beyond geography,” 2004: xviii).  Documenting the declining 
significance of geographical inquiry in the twentieth century, Smith argues the political 
and economic processes borne from the so-called American century were inherently 
geographical and propelled forward with an imperialistic agenda.  This intervention 
commands us to consider the agency and to critique the motivations of U.S. policymakers 
in constructing global structures that served and continue to serve American geopolitical 
ambitions and economic interests.   
 The U.S. diplomatic network is a byproduct of these neo-imperial ambitions and 
decisions made by policymakers over time to render the entire globe legible in 
conjunction with specific—and inherently geographical—political and economic 
processes.  In order to explore these themes in more detail, I have identified four broad, 
temporally uneven periods highlight distinct patterns related to Post operations and the 
expanding presence and role of U.S. diplomats in the world.  These periods lend support 
to what Smith (2003) identifies as the three defining moments of U.S. global ambition—
1919, 1945, and the present—as the number of U.S. facilities jumps dramatically 
following the World Wars and is unusually widespread at present.  I draw on empirical 
data to reflect further on how U.S. policymakers imagined, installed, and managed 
Department facilities since the State Department’s founding through to the present.  
While the following discussions reflect back on the United States’ earliest diplomatic 
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efforts, empirical data largely focuses on the twentieth century, the American Century, 
and the burgeoning of the contemporary diplomatic footprint as the United States sought 
to remake the global political order.  
 
Ministers, lone consuls, and U.S. commercial interests, 1780-1910 
The period between 1780, which marks the founding of the Department of State, 
and 1910 covers 130 raucous years.  This huge span saw the emergent United States send 
its first envoys abroad—to France and Spain in 1779, Great Britain in 1785, Portugal in 
1791, and the Netherlands in 1792—and build a seemingly robust organization in 
Washington to manage foreign affairs (Loeffler 1998: 13, Office of the Historian ND).  
For the purposes of this paper, however, this period of time is the least relevant for 
understanding the contemporary diplomatic footprint because the United States did not 
seek to engage broadly in diplomatic activities between the late eighteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Commercial interests and economic opportunities rather than 
political embroilments led the first U.S. envoys abroad.  Recall George Washington’s 
famous words of caution in his farewell address: 
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in 
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political 
connexion [sic] as possible.  So far as we have already formed 
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.  Here let us 
stop (Washington 1796). 
 
In realizing those instructions, Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State, intentionally 
sent diplomats at the “lowest grades admissible” abroad so as to lower the financial 
burden for the fledgling republic.  These envoys lived off a small salary and housing 
allowance, and some individuals who were offered positions refused to serve given the 
financial strains of the placement (Loeffler 1998).  Further, the founding fathers 
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eschewed the aristocratic-sounding title of ‘ambassador’ in favor of the more appropriate 
title of ‘minister.’  Ministers were lower-ranking and served in facilities called legations.  
Indeed, the United States did not maintain proper embassies (to which an ambassador 
would be accredited) until the late nineteenth century.  And the United States did not own 
diplomatic property abroad until the Sultan of Morocco gifted the country with its first 
facility in 1821 (ibid).   
Despite this modest beginning, the number of American diplomats sent abroad 
grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century—largely in line with the emergent 
political map of independent states.  Between 1797 and 1840, envoys had been 
dispatched to a patchwork of political entities around the world including, in approximate 
chronological order: Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Denmark, Mexico, Peru, the combined organization of Central American States, the two 
Sicilies, Belgium, Austria, Turkey, and even the independent state of Texas in 1837.  The 
officials sent to these (often faraway) places were expected to have the means (i.e. 
independent incomes) to rent a modest residence and pay for entertainment, travel, and 
other expenses out of pocket (Loeffler, pp. 13-15). 
It is important to note here that diplomats and consuls (as well as their respective 
facilities) at the time, and up until 1924, rarely interacted with one another.  Diplomats, 
of which there were few, were occupied with representational concerns while consuls 
handled passports, visas, and commercial matters.  By 1840, 20 diplomatic posts and 145 
consular posts were in operation, whereas by 1860 those numbers had climbed 
disproportionally to 33 and 275 respectively (Office of the Historian ND).6  Consular 
activities were largely led by lone, enterprising American businessmen, often in ports 
                                                
6 Some cities had both a diplomatic facility (i.e. legation) and consulate.  
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cities, to take advantage of commercial opportunities (Loeffler 1998).7  It is therefore 
important to bear in mind that the consular network at the time, while robust and far 
flung, was much more of a haphazard collection of one-man, independent operations than 
the connected and ordered network that would be put in place in the next century.  
Contrary to the present diplomatic footprint with large, fortified facilities rife with 
symbolism, during this period the individual who served as consul was the consulate.  
And they were everywhere!  Figure 7 compares the extent of U.S. consulate operations in 
Central America, by way of example, in the early twentieth century and at present.  The 
region today is covered by seven embassy facilities, one in each state, whereas in 1911 
only three legations provided diplomatic coverage and nine additional consulates existed 
to aid American commercial activities.  Only the former consulate in Belmopan, Belize 
(formerly British Honduras), still exists (now as an embassy) today. 
By the late nineteenth century Washington’s farewell address and his preference 
for a neutral, if not quite isolationist, stance no longer held sway in the burgeoning U.S. 
foreign policy establishment.  As the country itself was expanding through land 
acquisitions, so too were the scope of policymakers’ interests abroad, beginning with the 
Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and America’s commitment to an “independent” Latin 
America.  Diplomatic activities began to mimic the United States’ nascent involvement in 
global politics.  William Robertson’s (1915) extensive history of the establishment of 
American legations in Latin America is telling of this trend.  He makes clear that 
President Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams worked to establish 
U.S. legations in the five newly independent states of South American almost 
                                                
7 Men occupied all official diplomatic posts until 1922 when the Foreign Service began admitting female 
applicants.  The first female chief of mission was named to Denmark and Iceland in 1933 and the first 
female ambassador was appointed, also to Denmark, in 1949 (Resource Management Bureau 2006). 
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immediately after the countries were officially recognized by Congress.  As Robertson 
notes, “[t]he recognition of the independence of the other nations of Spanish America 
was consummated by the appointment of envoys to those countries” (p. 193). 
The first U.S. Ambassador was named, appropriately, to Great Britain in 1893, 
which made London the site of the first U.S. Embassy.  Later that year, embassies were 
“stood up” in Paris, Berlin, and Rome, though the accredited ambassadors were still 
expected to rent or buy premises for their homes and offices.  This meant, of course, that 
only the rich and independently wealthy could afford to participate in the diplomatic 
corps (Loeffler, pp. 14-15).   
 
The Professional Foreign Service, 1911-1944 
 
The policy of this Government has been to establish diplomatic 
representation in foreign countries commensurate with the needs of 
international intercourse and promotion and protection of American 
interest.  The growth of diplomatic representation throughout the world is 
largely due to the closer relations among nations (Johnson 1928). 
 
The second decade of the twentieth century serves as a critical turning point in 
U.S. diplomatic history.  The above quotation is representative of the general eagerness 
during these first decades of the century to broaden and deepen the reach of America’s 
diplomats.  The 1890s saw the emergence of a vigorous debate between the Executive 
branch and Congress over the revitalization of the country’s diplomatic presence.  Many 
within the Department had lobbied hard for a professional foreign service and for U.S. 
representatives abroad to be housed in adequate facilities; many were wondering why 
only the wealthiest could pursue a career in the diplomatic corps.  The minister of the 
American Legation in Teheran pleaded with the Secretary in a 1912 letter illustrative of 
these wider calls for change: 
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The rest of the world will continue to fight us in foreign capitals with an 
expert force of chief and subordinate diplomatic agencies…  In any event, 
the improvement of our foreign service is a question that cannot well be 
ignored by any administration, now that we have more numerous and very 
important points of contact with ambitious and enterprising foreign 
powers, and have no longer a sparsely settled country crying out for hands 
to develop it (Russell 1912). 
 
Despite the United States’ rapidly expanding commercial interests and the needs of 
American businessmen abroad, by 1910 the country only owned diplomatic property in 
four cities: Constantinople, Peking, Tokyo, and Bangkok (Loeffler, p. 16).  Beginning in 
1911 with the Lowden Act, officially the Embassy and Legation Building Bill, the U.S. 
government worked to build facilities appropriate to the growing influence and weight of 
the United States in the global arena.  Following the passage of the act, a diplomat posted 
to the legation in La Paz urged the Department to consider a pre-fabricated legation 
design—built from American manufactured products, of course—in an effort to install as 
many new facilities as economically and efficiently as possible in spaces where renting 
suitable facilities had proven difficult, namely Latin America (Krowley 1911).  The 
building legislation was accompanied by the 1924 Hill-Rogers Act, which began the 
work of instituting a professionalization of the country’s diplomatic corps, a venerable 
institution known as the Foreign Service (Loeffler 1998).   
By the numbers alone, this period saw a sea change in the makeup and size of the 
diplomatic network.  In 1924, at the time when the Rogers’ bill was under consideration, 
the United States maintained embassies primarily in Europe and South America; the rest 
of the world was represented through legation facilities and consulates (Office of the 
Secretary 1924).  By 1925, a letter by an assistant secretary noted, “[p]laced at strategic 
places throughout the world are roughly 300 Consulates General or Consulates, 15 Vice 
 58 
 
Consulates, and 90 Consular Agencies, or a total of more than 400 offices” (Carr 1925).  
That same record indicated the Foreign Service had only 54 principal officers posted in 
capitals abroad, which implies most of the 400 offices were small consular platforms.  
However, by 1939 according to a letter from a Division of Foreign Service 
Administration official, the United States maintained 57 diplomatic missions globally, 
“comprising of 18 embassies (of which 5 perform consular as well as diplomatic duties) 
and 39 legations (of which 21 perform consular as well as diplomatic duties)” (Davis 
1939).  This trend highlights the primary shift that took place inside the U.S. foreign 
policy establishment during this period—a shift away from the informal diplomacy 
favored by the founding fathers and towards modern, formal diplomatic relationships and 
more engagement generally in global affairs.   
 This shift was accompanied by a new emphasis on larger, more prominent 
legation and embassy structures and away from the informal consulate landscape that 
marked nineteenth century diplomatic efforts.  Budgetary constraints in the early 1930s 
played a role in this transition, with decreasing appropriations placing stress on far-flung 
consulate operations.  A late 1932 memorandum from the Consul General (CG) in Berlin 
lays out an argument in support of “combining the establishments of the Department, the 
Chancery8 and the Consulate, in capitals, both administratively and physically,” what he 
refers to as the “unification of government establishments in capitals” as a way to 
decrease expenditures.  He further comments on the direction other states are moving and 
on the trials of moving a government bureaucracy in a new direction:  
This consolidation of the establishments of the State Department in 
capitals is a measure which all thinking persons interested in our foreign 
relations approve… The delay [in moving in this direction] has largely 
                                                
8 The building that houses the offices of the embassy. 
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been due to the traditional slowness to change anything which affects our 
foreign practice, but it is a step which some of the smaller and larger 
countries have already taken and find in every way satisfactory and a great 
improvement (Messersmith 1932, passage highlighted in the archival 
record, see Figure 8).  
 
This memo is particularly telling of emergent early-to-mid-century narratives regarding 
diplomatic representation.  The CG is careful to note the Department’s practice, “to 
maintain in practically every capital both a diplomatic and a consular establishment…” 
(ibid).  This prevailing attitude was evident in the collective imagination of the 
diplomatic establishment as early as World War I, as belligerent powers entrusted the 
United States to protect their diplomatic interests during the conflict.  Secretary of State 
William Jennings Bryan, in a 1914 letter to the chair of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, wrote a compelling case for increased appropriations by noting, “Great and 
increasing responsibilities have devolved upon the representatives of the United States 
abroad…” (Bryan 1914, emphasis added).  This discourse of duty towards the world 
justified a broad push to raise the status of many of the country’s diplomatic posts, in 
effect a move to professionalize the missions themselves.  By way of example, a 1943 
telegram was issued from Department headquarters at the President’s request to U.S 
facilities in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and 
Haiti.  The note requested the chiefs of mission present a demarche, a formal request on 
behalf of the U.S. government, to their host governments to reciprocally raise the status 
of the respective diplomatic missions from legations to embassies (Hull 1943). 
Early twentieth-century efforts led not to a widening but rather a deepening of the 
U.S. diplomatic network footprint; one-person operations gave way to fixed, permanent 
facilities imbued with the kind of prominent symbolism designed to capture the United 
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States’ emergent role as a global power.  American Foreign Service Officers played more 
high-profile roles in diplomatic circles, and the narrative of responsibility served to 
strengthen the claim that U.S. diplomats needed stronger institutions to support their 
work abroad.  The passage of key legislation during this period institutionalized the 
parameters of a near-universal (i.e. representation in every state) diplomatic footprint.  It 
became clear that, in spite of the budget shortfalls of the day, the Department was loath to 
pull back from this diplomatic posture.  To this end a 1932 press release noted: 
[T]he Department has made no list of the diplomatic missions or 
consulates which might be dispensed with in the event that the 
suggestions, which were very reluctantly made by the Secretary, should 
have to be carried out through lack of appropriations (Office of the 
Secretary 1932, emphasis added). 
 
 
(Near-) universal representation, 1945-1992 
 Two important patterns appear in the archival records in the second half of the 
twentieth century that further empowered the diplomatic apparatus.  First, from the 
immediate post-WWII era through the early years of the Cold War, policymakers 
expressed an eagerness to broaden the footprint and build more facilities around the 
world.  This goal was institutionalized through the creation of the “Committee on New 
Foreign Service Posts” in 1957 (Campbell 1958).  The Committee worked to streamline 
the process through which the Department’s regional bureaus requested new posts.  As to 
the second trend, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, and largely as a result of budgetary 
crises, Department operatives faced the tough decision of justifying post placement and 
offering up facilities (mostly consulates) for closure.  As such, the second half of the 
twentieth century—the Cold War era—saw forces both encouraging and limiting the 
enlargement of the diplomatic network.  Against this pressure, policymakers redefined 
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what was considered to be the appropriate extent of the U.S. diplomatic network.  The 
Department moved away from supporting small consulate operations, and even sought to 
expand the role of existing consulates, towards the centralization of U.S. diplomatic 
interests in larger embassy compounds.  Such facilities in capital cities would be 
commensurate with reciprocity and the needs of the bilateral relationship—with 
constituent posts as warranted only in major populations centers.  This is documented 
through various attempts by Department offices and bureaus beginning in the 1960s to 
classify, rank, and order posts according to their contribution(s) to U.S. geostrategic 
goals.   
   The Second World War led many in the foreign policy establishment to consider 
anew the country’s diplomatic posture and the ways it might be perceived abroad.  When 
Secretary of State Stettinius returned from the peacebuilding conferences at Yalta and 
Mexico City, “he expressed great interest in effecting an improvement in the physical 
appearance of our Foreign Service establishments” (Office of the Secretary 1945).  The 
1945 memorandum continued, “He commented particularly on the poor impression made 
on visitors by the reception facilities of some of our offices and the low standard of 
neatness and order observed in general” (ibid).  Long gone were the days of one-man 
consular posts and small legations of economy and efficiency; grandiosity became the 
order of the day as policymakers considered not just placing a diplomatic facility but 
what that facility needed to symbolize and how it might bolster America’s appeal abroad 
(see generally Loeffler 1998).   Against that backdrop, in Europe and Asia the 
Department sought to catalog and rebuild war weary posts.  One report lists 47 
Department properties slated for refurbishment in East Asia.  The properties were 
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catalogued under the following groups: “(a) property totally destroyed, lost, or sold by 
the enemy; (b) property believed to be intact but condition assumed to be poor; or (c) no 
reliable information available” (Foreign Building Office 1945).    
Around 1957, the Department established the Committee on New Foreign Service 
Posts to approve or deny recommendations by regional bureaus and/or “field posts” for 
new embassies, consulates, and consular agencies (lower order consulate platforms).  By 
1958, the Committee had prepared a detailed set of criteria in the form of a lengthy 
questionnaire to streamline the process for opening new posts.  The 23-page 
questionnaire (see Appendix B for the questionnaire in full) included the following 
sections (U.S. Department of State 1958): 
I. Area vital statistics 
II. Precedents (“History of previous American establishments in area, 
including reasons for opening and closing” and “Representation 
maintained by other governments in the locality…”)  
III. Consular needs 
IV. Political considerations  
V. Economic considerations 
VI. Assistance programs 
VII. Commercial interests 
VIII. Military considerations 
IX. Information and cultural exchange potential 
X. Other agency requirements  
XI. Personnel 
XII. Building needs 
XIII. Operating facilities  
XIV. Estimated financial plan 
 
Note the interest in third party states’ diplomatic missions (section II) and the need to 
provide political and economic justifications to support the application for presence 
(sections IV and V).  To address each submission, the Committee used a checklist (Tab 3, 
see Appendix B) to rank each section as “pro,” “con,” or “not pertinent” before finalizing 
their approval or denial of the requested new post.  The bottom of the checklist includes 
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an area for the Committee to note, “Priority rating in relation to other proposals now 
before the committee” (ibid).   
 The committee sent its recommendations to the Under Secretary of State for 
Administration in batches for approval.  Late 1957 and 1958 saw 15 new facilities 
approved in this way: in one batch, Tananarive, Madagascar; Freetown, Sierra Leone; 
Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa; Adelaide and Brisbane, Australia; Cebu, 
Philippines; Kaduna, Nigeria; Cochabamba, Bolivia; Lusaka; Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland; Marrakech, Morocco; and Bratislava, Czechoslovakia; and in another batch, 
Peshawar, Pakistan; Poznan, Poland; Lomé, French Togoland; and Mandalay, Burma.  
The first batch, approved by deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson, included 
the following stipulation in Henderson’s handwriting, “Provided funds and personnel 
slots available” (Committee on New Foreign Service Posts 1957, Dec. 2).  
Curiously, the Department began to experience significant budgetary constraints 
well before this committee was established.  In 1953, with Republicans in control of the 
Presidency as well as both houses of Congress, austerity loomed large across the federal 
government for the first time since the early 1930s.  Resources were especially tight for 
the Department of State, already limping after having borne the brunt of McCarthy’s 
“countersubversive crusade” (Dean 1998: 33, Loeffler 1998).  A 1953 memorandum lists 
facilities slated for potential closure as a result of impending budget cuts: six in Latin 
America, three in East Asia, at least ten in the Middle East (the Near East Bureau 
declined to list out its posts), and thirty-three in Europe and Canada (Nordbeck 1953).  
The consulates in Victoria and Hamilton, Canada; Bergen, Norway; Adelaide, Australia; 
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and Malaga, Spain, all closed in 1953 as a result (ibid, Committee on New Foreign 
Service Posts 1957, Mar. 27).   
Further concerns related to appropriations mandated additional facility closures 
beginning in fiscal year 1957.  Commenting on a request to open anew the consulate in 
Peshawar, Deputy Under Secretary Henderson approved with the comment, “Note – As it 
becomes apparent that Congress will sharply cut 1957 supplemental and our 1958 budget 
this matter should be reconsidered before we become involved in additional 
expenditures” (ibid).  In response, the Department’s regional bureaus were tasked with 
(a) “prepar[ing] a list of all the consular posts in its jurisdiction ranked in descending 
order of importance to the United States” and (b) “submit[ing] separate justifications for 
maintaining each of the consulates which appear as the last five posts on the list” 
(Gallman 1960).  Table 4 presents the ranked list of posts from the East Asian bureau by 
way of example.  As a brief aside, contrary to what was requested of them by the 
Department, the Bureau of European Affairs instead proposed a mathematical formula for 
representing post utility, beginning with a base assumption that, “In every country with 
which we have diplomatic relations there is a United States mission—for present 
purposes, at least, each as important as the other” (ibid).  Appendix C details this 
experiment in full. 
The emergence of the Committee on New Foreign Service Posts in tandem with 
significant budget constraints and, less than five years later, the mandate that bureaus 
must provide sound justification for all consulate posts in their regional-geographic 
jurisdictions provides strong evidence in support of the inertia of universality.  Only 
consulates were considered for closure, despite the fact that the Department continued to 
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open new chancery embassy facilities as new states emerged following decolonization.  
Diplomatic representation was seen as essential to the United States’ “unipolar moment” 
and its continued and expanding weight in global affairs.  The Committee in particular 
provides a concrete and material institutionalization of the dogma of universality.  
Despite coinciding with a time of significant austerity for the Department, the 
establishment of the Committee to streamline new post placement highlights the 
importance of diplomatic presence to policymakers in an era that saw the United States 
place embassies and consulates widely, lastly in the newly independent states of the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
Universality Revisited: 1992 and Beyond 
 
Universality: noun, (1) the character or state of being universal; existence or prevalence 
everywhere.  (2) relation, extension, or applicability to all.  (3) universal character of 
range of knowledge, interests, etc. (dictionary.com). 
 
 As the previous sections detail, the United States’ diplomatic footprint is the 
product of an amalgamation of ever-changing ideas and assumptions about the United 
States’ role in global affairs.  Taken together, the disparate consulates and embassies that 
dot the world produce a pattern that is at once material and representational.  It is easy, 
for instance, to catalog the number of visas issued annually or press statements released 
from a particular facility to identify how each node both contributes to the wider network 
and enacts foreign policy at finer scales.  However, just as each facility does work for the 
State Department, and by extension the U.S. government, this broader pattern also 
represents U.S. policymakers’ longstanding commitment to a robust and far-flung foreign 
presence.  After all, each facility is punctuated by a crisp, “waved” flag (Billig 1995).  A 
careful reading of the history of this dynamic diplomatic landscape helps illuminate its 
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significance to policymakers and the endurance of diplomatic landscapes in urban centers 
all around the world. 
In weaving together archival material related to the placement of U.S. diplomatic 
facilities, this paper identifies a common theme in universality.  The universality 
principle suggests the United States ought to have as widespread and robust a diplomatic 
posture as possible.  Curiously, universality does not appear in any historical record nor 
any official policy pronouncement; rather, it identifies a longstanding mindset, collection 
of ideas and practices, dogma even surrounding how best the United States ought to 
position itself in the global arena.  At the same time, universality also becomes a product 
of greater U.S. involvement in world affairs, with more and more facilities needed to 
support the country’s emerging superpower status.  This cyclical, self-perpetuating and 
reinforcing process, with universality both contributing to and emerging as a product of 
U.S. foreign policy practices, is powerful, and important to highlight.  The cementing of 
universality in policymakers’ minds has allowed its foundational ideas to become so 
ingrained in the foreign policy establishment that the placement or refurbishment of 
contemporary U.S. facilities is rarely questioned, even in the wake of large-scale attacks 
on diplomatic infrastructure as occurred in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983; Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998; and, most recently, Benghazi, Libya, in 2012.   
Over the course of this study, many of those high-level U.S. diplomatic 
practitioners interviewed for this study found it odd to be asked about the value of 
embassies and consulates.  To paraphrase a common sentiment: “Well, of course we 
should be everywhere; we’re the United States of America.”  Indeed, most interview 
respondents were vehemently opposed to even the suggestion that the United States could 
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pursue the same level of foreign policy engagement around the world with a smaller, 
perhaps more mobile and maneuverable, diplomatic footprint.   
Most of those elite practitioners are familiar with the term universality, and 
presume the mindset to have developed in tandem with the United States’ role in the 
post-war era, the Pax Americana.  My research, however, suggests that the ideas of 
universality were planted much earlier in policymakers’ minds.  In fact, as the empirical 
data highlight, this geopolitical imagination accounts for the placement of facilities well 
before the middle of the twentieth century—setting in motion a way of thinking about the 
United States’ diplomatic footprint that is still with us today.  The universality principle 
came to be embedded in the practices, activities, and actions of elite diplomatic 
practitioners and foreign policy operatives.  Traces of universality can be seen beginning 
with the first official U.S. diplomatic facilities at the tail end of the eighteenth century 
and later through efforts to dot the world with small and informal lone-man consulates—
largely in port cities—to expand American access to global economic markets.  As Figure 
7 illustrates for just one geographic region, the United States had many more facilities 
spread around the world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than at 
present.  The number of these facilities ties hand-in-hand to the inroads the United States 
was making in the global arena at the time.  During the second period, where I highlight 
the professionalization of the U.S. diplomatic corps, as the United States assumed a larger 
share of the peacemaking burden in the wake of the World Wars, this broad-scale 
universal diplomatic network shifted to favor a more ‘high-brow’ footprint, manifested in 
larger, more symbolic and architecturally profound embassy facilities located on 
prominent street corners close to host country foreign ministries and parliamentary 
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buildings.  By way of example, Eero Saarinen’s famous London embassy building—
opened in 1960 near Hyde Park—features a looming bald eagle atop the modernist 
structure (Figure 9).  And despite the fact that the U.S. embassy in London is relocating 
to a (much) larger, more secure and removed, and “greener” facility in 2017, many are 
calling for the 1960 facility to remain as a historical marker (“Saarinen’s Embassy Must 
Not Be Razed,” Pearman 2008).   
If the early twentieth century paved the way for more formalized embassy 
compounds (as opposed to legation facilities) to match the United States’ commitment to 
the global arena, the second half of the century mechanized that shift.  As further waves 
of decolonization led to new states in much of the developing world, the State 
Department placed embassies in emergent capital cities, often raising the status of a 
legation or consulate to an embassy on the date of independence.  It was in this era that 
the Committee on New Foreign Service Posts streamlined the process whereby new 
facilities were proposed and realized.  Even budgetary constraints in the 1960s favored 
universality as the Department’s regional bureaus were tasked with closing consulates 
only, not embassies, to provide some budgetary flexibility.  Faced with growing security 
concerns in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the Department chose not to step 
away from its commitment to universality but instead to alter individual features of the 
diplomatic footprint, notably enhancing security features at discrete facilities and 
ushering in a flurry of building activity criticized for introducing the world to the 
“fortress embassy.”   
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Conclusion 
Far from the immense coverage developed at the onset of the nineteenth century, 
with several hundred small, one-person consulates, the contemporary map is one that 
privileges U.S. diplomatic presence in capital cities and other powerful urban sites.  The 
enduring legacy and continued relevance of universality is particularly noteworthy in the 
context of three dramatic shifts in diplomatic practice as the twentieth century gave way 
to the twenty-first.  The first, as terrorist attacks on diplomatic facilities have tested the 
inviolability of embassy facilities, policymakers have been forced to adapt building 
requirements, security features, and personnel numbers to suit local needs at each discrete 
facility.  Second, advancements in technology, especially telecommunications 
mechanisms, have closed the spatio-temporal gap between Washington and the wider 
world.  One of the interviewees participated in regular secure video teleconferences from 
his office with the President and his national security team.  Lastly, a spate of non-state 
actors have emerged as key players in global political currents in recent years, including 
terrorist actors like ISIS, al-Qaida, and al-Shahaab; informal networks of mass 
demonstrators connected through social media as in the so-called Arab Spring or Occupy 
Wall Street; aspiring states like Tibet or Palestine whose informal diplomatic practices 
have bled into the formal arena with recognition at multi-lateral institutions; and multi-
national corporations that wield enormous influence over regional and global political 
processes.  As these developments redefine the realm of international politics, many 
states, predominantly EU member states, are working to adjust, by shifting to smaller, 
more maneuverable and mobile diplomatic networks (van der Wusten & Mamadouh 
2016).  Several have even co-located embassy premises with other like-minded states in 
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third country capitals, notably the Scandinavian states and those of the former British 
dominion.  The United States, however, does not appear to be moving in this direction.  
The State Department is adapting policy and investing in personnel rather than its 
infrastructure which suggests, as my interviews confirmed, that the Department’s current 
crop of policymakers are just as enamored and entranced, whether they know it or not, by 
universality as previous generations.    
Following Smith again, universality is no one single thing, policy, or even idea.  
Rather, it encapsulates a particular neo-imperial Weltanschauung that has shifted over 
time as economic forces gave way to political ambitions further reinforcing its collective 
practices.  This dogma mandates that the United States have as widespread and robust a 
permanent diplomatic presence as possible both because the United States is a world 
power and because it desires to continue to be a world power.  The ideas and assumptions 
that contribute to this mindset have adapted and shifted as the global political arena has 
transformed over the last century.  
In 1992, Secretary of State James Baker mandated the placement of an embassy in 
each of the newly established states of the former Soviet Union within a 90-day window.  
Several interviewees commented on how natural it was to “stand up” these facilities in 
accordance with the emergence of new states.  What was remarkable in this mandate, 
however, was how quickly Baker wanted it accomplished (and it was).  The exceedingly 
fast window to install embassy premises speaks to how valuable representation and 
presence was for policymakers in order to ensure the United States had access to 
emergent democratic systems and to the new markets of the former Socialist Republics. 
Universality remains today a powerful force in shaping how we think about diplomatic 
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landscapes, particularly in the case of the United States.  We rarely think to question the 
immensity of the U.S. diplomatic network, even as the world becomes more 
interconnected and diplomatic processes more virtual well into the twenty-first century.  
Yet, as this study finds, the universality principle and the network it created are built into 
the very fabric of the U.S. foreign policy establishment so much so that you cannot 
imagine one without the other.  As the archival data illuminated, the American embassies 
and consulates that dot the global urban landscape are legacies of the United States’ 
commitment to specific political and economic ideologies over the course of the last 100 
years.  It remains unclear what sort of developments would push U.S. policymakers to 
consider a departure from this longstanding universal footprint. 
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FIGURE 7.  U.S. diplomatic facilities in Central America in 1911, 2016 with 
contemporary political boundaries for reference. Map by author (Kendall 1913). 
 
 
FIGURE 8.  1932 Memorandum prepared by the American Consul General in Berlin, 
George Messersmith, for the attention of the Secretary of State (Messersmith 1932). 
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FIGURE 9.  The U.S. Embassy in London.  Construction on a new facility is ongoing in a 
former industrial neighborhood across the Thames.  The new embassy is slated to open in 
2017 (Hipwell 2012). 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.  Ranking of all East Asian U.S. constituent posts (i.e. not embassies) in 
descending order of importance for austerity budgeting purposes, 1960.  In addition to 
ranking their constituent facilities, each of the Department’s geographic bureaus had to 
prepare a report to justify each of the posts that occupied the last five spots on the list, 
here outlined in black (Gallman 1960). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RETHINKING THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC ASSEMBLAGE: REPRESENTATION, 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, AND THE IMPACTS OF UNIVERSALITY  
 
Introduction 
 
During the summer of 2015, I often walked past the Cuban Interests Section of 
the Embassy of Switzerland on my way to and from the apartment I was renting in 
northwest Washington’s Mount Pleasant neighborhood.9  As I went by the property in 
June and early July, it was easy to see that the facility was undergoing a ‘makeover’ in 
anticipation of the re-establishment of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic ties after a 54-year break.  
Gardeners were working on the grounds, security systems were being upgraded, and a 
fresh coat of paint was being applied to the façade.  While walking by the facility a few 
days prior to the official restoration of diplomatic relations, I noticed a new flagpole, sans 
the flag (that would come later).  I wandered by the facility again on the afternoon of July 
20, on the heels of the high-level ceremony officially renewing the relationship.  A crisp 
Cuban flag was now high atop the new flagpole (See Figure 1).  News media trucks were 
parked haphazardly at the intersection of 16th and Fuller streets, their antennas extended 
for transmission.  As I passed I heard a cameraman remark to a colleague: “It doesn’t 
look like there are any Cubans here.”  
As part of the splashy coverage leading up to the restoration of bilateral ties, 
many commentators and media reports remarked on the “re-opening” and “re-
                                                
9 The facility did not stand out much on 16th Street NW, a four-lane artery extending into Maryland.  I was 
only aware of CUBINT, as the U.S. government refers to the property, through my work in the State 
Department’s Office of Cuban Affairs, where I regularly visited the premises from 2008 through 2010 to 
exchange consular documents with Cuban officials.  The consular section of the property is across the street 
from the former Interests Section in a run-down, single-story structure. 
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establishment” of the embassies in Havana and Washington.  These vague narratives 
seem to imply these facilities had existed in some liminal or nonexistent space for fifty 
years.  One journalist wrote of the flag-raising ceremony in Havana on August 14, “The 
crowd awaited entrance to the six-story modern building, designed… back in 1953, that 
will once again serve as the United States Embassy in Cuba.”  The piece continued, 
“Secretary of State John Kerry… spoke of the positive future the reestablishment of the 
old building would bring” (Contreras 2015).  This and similar reports often failed to 
touch on a critical component of the story: leading up to the restoration of ties, and for 
decades prior, these facilities, operating as ‘Interests Sections’ of a third-party ‘protecting 
power’ (in this case Switzerland), were occupied by American and Cuban diplomats 
conducting essentially the same day-to-day activities as their colleagues in many other 
embassies and consulates around the world, albeit with certain restrictions.  Contrary to 
what many in the public were led to assume, the buildings weren’t vacant, shuttered 
properties waiting for the day when the diplomatic relationship would be repaired.  And 
despite the pomp and circumstance of the respective flag-raising ceremonies in 
Washington on July 20 and Havana on August 14, the everyday operations of the 
facilities and the work conducted inside remains largely the same: reporting on political 
and economic trends, visa processing, services to American citizens, etc.   
As this brief anecdote shows, we pay very little attention to the spaces in which 
diplomats operate and through which diplomatic processes are negotiated.  This paper is 
part of a larger project that seeks to unmoor diplomatic studies from its emphasis on 
praxis and instead focus attention on grounded diplomatic infrastructure and material 
sites and spaces.  Embassies, consulates, and special diplomatic missions are essential to 
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a variety of functions that fall under the umbrella of ‘twenty-first century diplomacy’: 
citizen services, liaising with government and civil society contacts, reporting on state 
and civil society activities, and, increasingly, communicating broadly with the public 
through a variety of social media platforms—that is, public diplomacy.10  While the role 
of diplomatic representation is often under-examined or misrepresented in the academic 
literature, I argue that an understanding of the work embassy and consulate facilities do is 
central to any study of diplomatic processes and relationships.  Far from existing only as 
far-reaching symbols of state power—as they have been commonly theorized in the 
past—diplomatic facilities serve as critical nodes of a vast assemblage; embassies and 
consulates are “force-full” (Meehan 2013) spaces through which material things, 
officials, host country authorities, civil society representatives, third-party diplomats, 
citizens, and local nationals intersect and interact.  Against that backdrop, this paper has 
two objectives: (1) to study why the United States maintains such a widespread 
diplomatic network, and (2) to document what work each discrete individual facility does 
to further the goals of the broader assemblage.  
The U.S. diplomatic network is representative of one such assemblage.  The State 
Department today manages a robust platform of 285 diplomatic facilities, inclusive of 
some 19,000 structures in 169 countries around the world (See Figure 2, Kennedy 2011, 
Benen 2014).11  By way of comparison, according to the Lowy Institute’s fantastic 
                                                
10 A note on terminology: All the diplomatic facilities that constitute a state’s official representation to a 
country are referred to as the diplomatic mission.  The mission typically includes an embassy in a capital 
city.  The chancery building of the embassy houses the offices of the ambassador or chief of mission as 
well as other offices depending on its size.  A consulate is typically attached to the chancery to provide 
consular services at the embassy site.  The wider mission may also include any number of additional 
consulates, typically in larger urban areas, to provide services to citizens and local nationals, including 
passport, visa, and welfare and whereabouts requests.  
11 The exact number is, perhaps surprisingly, hard to pin down.  At any one time, a number of U.S. facilities 
are drawn down (i.e. non-essential employees and family members removed) or fully shuttered as a result 
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Global Diplomacy Index, France maintains 267, China 258, Russia 243, and the UK 236 
(Lowy Institute for International Policy 2016).  The extraordinary expansion of the U.S. 
diplomatic network can be traced to a twentieth century emphasis on universality, in 
effect installing U.S. diplomats in nearly every independent state (Isenstadt 1997, 
Loeffler 1998, Robin 1992). 12  The universality principle, as Department insiders refer to 
it, led the United States to take renewed interest in previously marginalized peripheral 
regions in line with its growing economic and political role in global affairs (Moore 
forthcoming).  Additional factors encouraged the expansion of America’s diplomatic 
reach throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first: the emergence of newly 
independent states in the wake of decolonization, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
foreign policy priorities aimed at advancing neoliberal economic agendas, U.S.-led 
military incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq that required simultaneous surges of U.S. 
diplomatic personnel, and increasing numbers of American citizens traveling abroad who 
required consular services.  Further, a second dimension of universality as I see it, all 
embassy facilities contain the same building blocks: front office; political and economic 
sections; defense attaché; public affairs/diplomacy officers; consulate; a large 
management, procurement, and accounting staff; cafeteria and post exchange; as well as a 
smattering of personnel from up to 27 other U.S. government agencies.  As such, all U.S. 
diplomatic properties resemble each other both in layout and organizational process and 
hierarchy, rendering them easy to navigate for the roving diplomatic corps.  The universal 
                                                                                                                                            
of deteriorating security conditions, natural disasters, or, on rare occasions, a break in diplomatic ties.  As 
of January 2016, the United States maintains but does not have official Chief-of-Mission personnel in 
Tripoli, Libya; Damascus, Syria; Sana’a, Yemen; and Bangui, Central African Republic.  In addition, the 
United States does not maintain facilities in Iran or North Korea.  Instead the Department relies on third-
party protecting powers, Switzerland and Sweden notably, to manage American interests in both states.   
12 Every independent state within reason, that is.  The United States, for example, does not maintain an 
embassy in every Pacific island state; rather, the Department operates five strategically placed missions 
throughout the Pacific with ambassadors accredited to multiple states in the region. 
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facility also makes for large staffs on site, often with hundreds of local nationals working 
on site to support twenty or thirty official American employees.  Given these two 
dimensions of universality—both the network’s widespread scope as well as its 
commitment to large facilities and staff—the United States’ global diplomatic footprint is 
now by far the largest in the world.  
This article draws predominantly on the lived experiences of U.S. diplomatic 
practitioners to explore, empirically, the discourse driving the maintenance of the U.S. 
network as well as, theoretically, the myriad ways diplomatic infrastructure contributes to 
a wider foreign policy assemblage.  Data from interviews with high-level U.S. 
Department of State (hereinafter: ‘State Department’ or ‘Department’) personnel, many 
with over four decades of experience as Foreign Service Officers, helps to build a broader 
understanding for why policymakers value permanent diplomatic representation.  Two 
key arguments emerge in this essay.  First, as an overarching theme, diplomatic processes 
cannot be fully understood without attention to the sites and spaces through which they 
play out.  Second, the United States’ emphasis on a universal physical presence, by which 
I mean permanent, official diplomatic representation in as many states as possible, is an 
essential component of the uniquely American diplomatic assemblage.  A key U.S. 
foreign policy goal has long been to have a hand in the outcome of political events across 
space and scale; as I demonstrate in another piece, that is a fundamental driver of 
universality (Moore forthcoming).  Policymakers see diplomatic presence in country as 
the best possible manner in which to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes.  But it is 
not enough merely to look to one or two nodes of the U.S. diplomatic network to see the 
endurance of this grounded, ‘finger-in-every-pie’ foreign policy.  To really understand 
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the United States’ unflinching commitment to universality, it is necessary to examine 
how the network works together as a whole.  The inertia of this wider assemblage 
demonstrates the continued pull and reinforcement of universality as well as the force-full 
characteristics of local diplomatic installations.   
 
Assembling and Empowering a Network 
 A transition in the last several decades has seen work in political geography 
unmoored from traditional top-down, state-centric, and anthropocentric conceptual 
models as scholars have embraced more micro-scale, relational and more-than-human 
approaches to state power and its diffusion.  This trajectory reflects an embrace by 
scholars interested in diplomacy and international relations of Deleuzean notions of 
“smooth space and de-territorialization” (Legg 2011: 128) and of a “world constantly 
becoming” (Dittmer 2013: 493) (see, e.g. Armstrong 1998, Acuto & Curtis 2014, Dittmer 
2015, Page & Dittmer 2015).  Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of the assemblage 
has proven particularly influential. As Dittmer (2013: 495) writes:  
[E]ach participating body, object, and discourse enrolled in an assemblage 
simultaneously achiev[es] greater co-agency with all the other parts of the 
assemblage and also [is] being reworked by the affective experience of 
participation.  Bodies, objects, and discourses can be embedded in several 
assemblages at once, and can themselves be the result of processes of 
assemblage themselves. 
 
Whereas the maddeningly abstract concept of the “state” has proven problematic for 
scholars, assemblage thinking introduces a hybridity of components and emphasizes the, 
“creative capacities of matter and energy, and the processes that instantiate them in their 
great variety of forms…” (Acuto & Curtis, p. 2).  Just as Deleuze’s assemblage 
empowers objects and their more-than-representational characteristics, it recognizes that 
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such things are part-and-parcel of a broader set of practices and ideas in constant motion.  
And if objects are capable of acting, facilities too are rendered “force-full” components of 
the assemblage (Meehan 2013).   
 To conceptualize the U.S. diplomatic network as an assemblage is to call attention 
to the infinity of constituent parts of the network that ‘do work’ for the whole in utterly 
unique and crucial capacities.  Each component—from the visa stamp and the lawn of the 
embassy to the ambassador and the directive from Washington—is essential in crafting 
desired foreign policy outcomes and affecting institutional change.  Further, diplomatic 
installations, a microcosm of bodies, objects, and discourses working in concert, are, 
crucially, examples of nested assemblages.  The “organismal” subject-bodies are 
assemblages nested within the wider assemblage of the diplomatic facility, itself a node 
of a much wider assemblage charged with designing and implementing a foreign policy 
strategy: the entire diplomatic network--in the case of the United States, 285 linked 
installations (Whatmore 1997, Dittmer 2014).   
 Assemblage theory therefore lends itself well to an analysis of why diplomatic 
facilities exist and what exactly they do to further the state’s objectives and obligations in 
the global arena.  That each constituent node of the network is constantly shaping and 
being shaped by elements within and outside its network is key to my conceptualization 
of the U.S. diplomatic footprint, where officers move around in three-to-four-year tours, 
rarely in the same region, and where on-goings at the U.S. Embassy in, for example, 
Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, have the potential to impact similar practices at the U.S. 
Consulate in Yekaterinburg, Russia.  
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Methods 
This article is part of a broader research project examining the complex 
materialities of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure, the first, to my knowledge, to focus 
considerable attention on the universality principle.  The study has sought to uncover and 
analyze the ideas and assumptions that have driven the placement of U.S. diplomatic 
facilities over the last century, as well as to examine the work the facilities do to address 
foreign policy goals.  Towards that end, the project triangulates data from multiple 
qualitative methods, including an informal (auto)institutional ethnography drawing on the 
author’s experiences working for the Department on and off from 2007 through 
December 2015.  Extensive archival research was conducted over the summer of 2015 at 
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration’s annex facility in College Park, 
Maryland, which houses the State Department’s Central Files.  The archival data serves 
to reconstruct the emergence of the U.S. diplomatic network and trace the discourse 
surrounding the universality principle. 
This paper draws primarily from the third method utilized in the study: interviews 
with retired, high-level Department personnel. In an effort to cultivate a group of research 
participants who had both actively crafted and implemented broad policies but also 
managed everyday personnel and budgetary concerns, I parameterized this group as (1) 
career FSOs who (2) served in at least one ambassadorial position abroad or (3) at the 
level of Assistant Secretary or above within the Department.13  I employed a snowball 
                                                
13 Assistant Secretaries manage the individual bureaus that make up the organizational structure of the 
Department.  Bureaus are regional (e.g. Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs) or functional (e.g. Bureau 
of International Security and Nonproliferation).  Assistant Secretaries maintain regular contact with the six 
Under Secretaries of State as well as the Secretary of State and his/her deputies.  
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sampling approach with the intention of reaching individuals with broad regional and 
functional expertise.  Drawing on Aberbach and Rockman’s (2002) work studying 
bureaucratic elites, I opted for open-ended, unstructured interviews to allow respondents 
to better “organize their answers within their own frameworks” (p. 674).  The themes and 
questions discussed were therefore unique to each interview.  Many of resulting group of 
research participants served in multiple high-level positions throughout their careers and 
drew extensively on those experiences during interviews.  Interviewees included former 
Ambassadors, Consuls General, and Principal Officers from 31 missions and three 
international organizations.  Further, among those interviewed were personnel who 
formerly held high-ranking positions at the Department, including former Under 
Secretaries as well as former Assistant Secretaries and Special Representatives.  
Collectively the interviewees have served at U.S. facilities in over 50 states as well as 
myriad positions at Main State headquarters in Washington throughout their careers.  
Table 2 of the methodology chapter details the geographic extent of where participants 
served as the principal officer at ‘post’ (i.e. installation).   
As much as I allowed each interview participant to steer the conversation, explore 
tangential themes, and offer anecdotes, the primary motivation for each meeting was to 
understand why U.S. policymakers have adopted and maintained a widespread, if not 
universal, diplomatic presence.  Against that backdrop, the conversations I had with 
participants largely revolved around the meta-theme of presence.  Interviewees on the 
whole unanimously favored maintaining a broad (i.e. widespread) and robust (i.e. well-
staffed) U.S. diplomatic presence abroad.  Further all participants were well versed in and 
supportive of the universality principle, though how a universal diplomatic presence 
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ought to be manifested differed from participant to participant (e.g., “Do we really need 
to have embassies in Togo and Benin?  They’re 10 miles apart.  You can see Accra from 
Lomé.”).   
 Finally, every effort was made to safeguard the anonymity of interviewees.  As 
such, I do not distinguish between interviewees who had served as ambassadors and those 
in high-level positions in Washington (though most served in both capacities).  As a final 
note, any mention of states, positions, and/or international organizations in the following 
paragraphs is merely coincidental and does not necessarily reflect any individual’s 
specific career trajectory.  
 
The U.S. Diplomatic Network 
The architecture of the vast, entrenched U.S. diplomatic apparatus includes 
embassies, consulates, American presence posts (APPs), virtual presence posts (VPPs), 
and special diplomatic missions encompassing over 58,000 human agents and countless 
more-than-human objects.14  It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider each of these 
in turn; instead I focus on the role of embassies and consulates, as together these 
structures comprise the majority of U.S. diplomatic facilities.  Foreign Service Officers 
(FSOs), Foreign Service Specialists, Locally Employed Nationals (LCNs), Eligible 
Family Members (EFMs), employees of other U.S. government (USG) agencies, and 
perhaps contractors constitute the typical workforce of a contemporary U.S. embassy.  
FSOs serve in five distinct capacities, or cones, as: political officers, economic officers, 
public diplomacy officers, management officers, and consular officers.  Political 
                                                
14 This number includes some 13,000 Foreign Service Offices and over 45,000 locally employed nationals.  
In addition, 11,000 civil servants work in the United States to support the Department’s mission (U.S. 
Department of State). 
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Specialists are just that, working as IT specialists, human resources specialists, office 
managers, and medical personnel, to name but a few.  While LCNs serve in more 
administrative capacities, assisting FSOs and specialists—serving as accountants, 
administrative assistants, groundskeepers, and security personnel among others—they 
represent a hugely important component of the embassy ecosystem.  LCNs’ intimate 
knowledge of country politics and economic nuance is unrivaled and they maintain the 
institutional memory of the embassy as nearly everyone else transitions to onward 
assignments after a three- to four-year “tour.”  Finally, twenty-seven USG agencies are 
represented at U.S. diplomatic posts abroad, most often members of the intelligence 
community and Department of Defense.  This last group also typically includes a small 
Marine guard detachment charged with safeguarding classified materials.  Total 
employment, however, differs widely.  At the high end, according to one of my 
interviews, the embassy in Kabul at the height of U.S. intervention efforts employed 
1,245 people.  On the lower end, a small Pacific island embassy might employ only 
twenty or thirty.  A typical mid-size post might have forty official Americans (i.e. FSOs, 
Specialists, and non-State USG personnel), sixty LCNs, and perhaps a small contingent 
of EFMs.  
 Consulates are distinct from embassies in that they are primarily charged with 
consular processes and house consular officers as well as EFMs and LCNs to support 
heavy visa adjudication loads.  A consulate is primarily responsible for providing 
services to Americans traveling and living abroad, whether that is assistance with lost or 
stolen passports, legal assistance, evacuation during crises, or repatriation of remains.  
The bulk of consular work, however, concerns the adjudication of immigrant and non-
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immigrant visas to travel, work, or otherwise migrate to the United States.  Given the 
systematic nature of this work, consulates tend to exist in their own universe.  In fact, the 
Department of State is only one of two USG agencies independently funded by passport 
and visa processing fees (the other is the Postal Service).   
While every embassy chancery building has an accompanying consulate, many of 
the most vital consulates—in some of the most heavily populated and/or politically and 
economically significant urban systems around the world—are not in capital cities and 
thus stand alone (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paolo, Mumbai, Shanghai, Sydney, Vancouver, 
Amsterdam, and St. Petersburg).  Table 1 details the highest visa-processing consulates, a 
number of which are standalone facilities (Bureau of Consular Affairs 2016).  These 
larger consulate facilities often play a key political role as well and therefore house a 
number of non-consular officers and other USG personnel.  One of my interviewees 
reflected on serving in Rio de Janeiro during his career.  He noted the facility had a large 
consular staff but also employed three public affairs officers (i.e. public diplomacy cone), 
one political officer, and a Department of Defense attaché, in addition to the Consul 
General and a deputy.  This composition reflects the geographic situation of Rio de 
Janeiro as one of Brazil’s political, cultural, and economic hubs, along with São Paolo.  
The interviewee noted that most Brazilian civil servants commuted from Rio to Brasilia 
for the workweek.  As such, it was critical to maintain a non-consular presence to report 
on and meet with government and civil society leaders in Rio.   
However critical consular work is to the Department’s mission and operational 
capabilities, as well as for individuals in need of American visas and passports more 
generally, this paper tables a lengthier discussion of consular matters.  Instead, I explore 
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the more hidden but still tangible drivers—material and immaterial—of U.S. diplomatic 
representation as a way to measure the work embassy and consulate facilities do on 
behalf of the wider assemblage.  While consulates are undisputedly necessary and will 
remain a mainstay of diplomatic practice as long as the modern state system exists, 
several of my respondents argued that consular priorities take a back seat to political 
concerns when considering the opening and closing of facilities.  As one ambassador 
noted, “The consideration of where to put a consulate flows… from two considerations.  
The secondary one is consular services…  [T]he main decision for putting a consulate or 
some other embassy office… is political or to provide a platform for other agencies.” 
 
The Drivers of Diplomatic Presence 
 Three key findings emerged from the interview data, shedding light on why U.S. 
diplomatic installations exist, all 285 of them, and what value policymakers see in the 
work they do.  These three motivations are: information gathering; influence and 
persuasion; and commitment, reciprocity, and precedence.  In describing each of these, I 
demonstrate how processes enabled through material diplomatic infrastructure contribute 
to the wider Department mandate and U.S. foreign policy broadly and thus mandate the 
continued maintenance of this vast networked assemblage.  Firstly, embassies are used 
predominantly as sites through which FSOs as well as individuals from myriad USG 
agencies regularly collect, synthesize, and send information to Washington for the 
attention of key decision makers.  Second, exerting influence over and persuading the 
“influencers” in societies around the world to act towards a particular outcome is a 
hugely important role for FSOs stationed abroad and necessitates a permanent diplomatic 
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presence in country.  Finally, embassy and consulate facilities serve as real and material 
symbols of the United States’ commitment to states, governments, and peoples around 
the world.  Many interviewees mentioned the importance of precedence and reciprocity 
and how difficult it would be to “draw back” (i.e. abandon) certain embassy and 
consulate facilities in favor of a smaller, perhaps more mobile diplomatic footprint.  Once 
a facility is “stood up,” it is very difficult to dismantle without doing significant damage 
to the bilateral relationship.   
In practice it is difficult to distinguish between these discrete themes as I have 
identified them; instead they blur and overlap.  When a political officer meets with a 
Foreign Ministry official, she is both presenting the United States’ position and perhaps 
encouraging the host government to act in a particular way, but she is also receiving 
information on the host government’s policy positions and the attitudes of its decision 
makers for transmission to Washington.  However, drawing out each of these themes in 
turn can facilitate a better understanding of diplomatic representation from the mindset of 
U.S. policymakers more fully.  As a final comment, for the purposes of streamlining the 
narrative as well as avoiding repetition, I refer to my interview subjects below alternately 
as respondent, ambassador, interviewee, and participant.   
 
Information gathering 
 
You can say, ‘Yeah but the intelligence community covers all that stuff 
and they have fifty analysts reading German political newspapers and 
following people…’  And that’s true but they have a hard time getting 
their information to the right people at the right time.  Ambassadors are 
the fastest and most effective channel to get anything to the top levels of 
government.  An ambassador says, ‘Houston, we have a problem,’ 
everybody listens (emphasis added).  
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 A principal theme to emerge from the interviews is that diplomatic representation 
is necessary as a means to collect information across space and scale.  I use the term 
‘information-gathering’ here because ‘information’ was used regularly by respondents.  
The term also serves to differentiate what reporting officers do on a daily basis from the 
work of intelligence community partners at facilities abroad.  Political and economic 
FSOs meet routinely in official fora with contacts and report on-goings in the form of 
cables back to Washington.  Without large quantities of information flowing back and 
forth to provide a nuanced understanding of the world, policymakers in Washington are 
unable to critically evaluate the world around them.  Diplomats are therefore used to cull 
data from their vast networks abroad and on-the-ground observations.   
The collecting and synthesizing of information also signals the most tangible and 
realized driver for longstanding, permanent presence in country.  The collection and 
dissemination of vast swaths of information is measurable whereas other themes I cite 
below (i.e. influence, reciprocity) are most decidedly not.  For example, the WikiLeaks 
scandal in late 2010 dumped “A cache of a quarter-million confidential American 
diplomatic cables, most of them from the past three years,” into the hands of journalists 
and the public for broad dissemination (Shane & Lehren 2010).  A headache for the 
foreign policy establishment, the cables exposed the Department’s internal information-
gathering efforts.  Barring exceptions, cables document most every meeting, even 
informal get-togethers, between U.S. Officers and host-country nationals or third party 
diplomats.  Cable writing is a long-valued tradition within the Department, with officers 
receiving training on cable tradecraft and monetary awards for the best cables written 
within a given year.  The millions of cables transmitted back and forth between Post and 
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Washington represent a critical component of the networked architecture of the U.S. 
diplomatic system. 
 Most of the interviewees spoke about the need for ‘ground-truthing,’ what one 
called “ferreting out a little bit more what’s really going on” in the context of 
information-gathering.  While certainly in the Information Age it is possible to 
understand broad patterns of social, political, and economic change from afar, one 
respondent dryly noted that such a position would render diplomats “fundamentally 
ignorant.”  Another put it more empirically: “It’s one thing to speculate what’s going on 
in Israel from Washington; it’s another thing to talk to Israelis, to walk around in Israel, 
to really know the key players and what the key players are thinking.”  Further, there is 
an underlying concern for the context and nuanced insight that Washington craves.  
While diplomatic facilities cannot beat CNN and the BBC to breaking news, FSOs will 
quickly be able to write up the context surrounding the development as well as its 
implications for Washington.  As one respondent said, the work of a diplomat is not to 
figure “why did this happen?” but to flesh out “what can we do about it?”  
 
Influence and persuasion 
An essential component of physical diplomatic representation, echoed by almost 
all participants, is the ability to influence events on the ground and around the world 
more generally.  Inclusive of this goal are efforts to persuade host government officials, 
civil society leaders, and “ordinary people,”—as one ambassador put it, to act in 
particular ways.  The only way to do this, many respondents argued, was through 
“contact work”—that is, putting in the time and energy to meet with contacts in 
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government and civil society “on their turf” and even “mingle” with folks about town.15  
Many respondents referred to these contacts as the “influencers in society,” those 
individuals in positions of power.  In large part, this type of networking involves the 
tricky task of cultivating and nurturing a long-term relationship between the individual 
and the Department as diplomats come and go.  One ambassador fancied himself 
particularly good at spotting “up-and-comers” in the political arena.  He told a story of 
drafting a cable on Joachim Gauck at an economic conference early in his Foreign 
Service career, noting that Gauck was an individual the United States should pay 
attention to; he was going places.  And he did, eventually becoming the President of 
Germany.    
At a fine scale, influence and persuasion imply contact work and communication.  
Demarches—a routine diplomatic practice whereby embassy officials visit the Foreign 
Ministry to present an official position for the host government’s consideration—are a 
common manifestation of grounded, material efforts to influence.  But, in looking at the 
wider assemblage, the Department seeks to influence public opinion on U.S. foreign 
policy, persuading the public at large that the United States plays an important, if not 
vital, role in the world.  One ambassador made reference to both of these multi-scalar 
manifestations in the same disquisition.  He initially started at the broadest scope: 
I think if [presence is] ceremonial and symbolic, then why bother? It 
seems to me that post-9/11 not engaging in the world has fatal 
consequences.  We have to be out telling a story.  And we have to tell a 
story about our own country, our own values and not in any finger-
wagging way, but people should have the opportunity to see and hear and 
know representatives of the United States of America.  And we play a 
                                                
15 Today, most activities of this nature are chronicled over social media; every U.S. diplomatic post has a 
robust social media presence including You Tube content, a Twitter feed, and a Facebook page.  I asked 
many respondents over the course of the research whether social media efforts could be practiced from 
Washington; most scoffed at that suggestion by way of response. 
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huge role in this world, commercially, economically, politically, socially, 
culturally.  I mean what’s it for? 
 
He then answered his own question by zeroing in on how to tell that story in practice on 
the ground: 
The unique value of the State Department is, if I send you to be the 
ambassador to France, what do I expect of you?  I expect a lot of things 
from you, but what I really expect from you is when it comes times for us 
to have to persuade people in France to do it our way, I need you to have 
the contacts, the language, the social-cultural skills [to do that].  The thing 
that is unique about you is, ‘I can do that because I know about this.  I live 
here.  I’m persuasive.’   
 
For many, networking with influencers and relationship building tended to be 
thankless and dull, though utterly important.  One respondent commented on having to 
attend myriad political functions as a member of the diplomatic corps, even heading to 
the airport at a moment’s notice to greet a returning head of state.  He noted dryly, “A lot 
of times you’re the décor.”  Yet presence at such functions matters.  He added, “I’ve been 
told several times in my career, ‘We really appreciate you because you come.’  And of 
course, over time if you develop a pattern of coming to things that [is] noticed.”  Another 
respondent was more cut-and-dry, noting, “This is the most important thing you do…  
Look, as an ambassador... it’s a 100-hour workweek.  How many goddamn people do you 
have to see in those 100 hours?”  He then went down a list of officials and legislators, 
before continuing, “It’s watering the grass, but it’s important watering the grass.”  All 
respondents when prompted were quick to note the vital importance of maintaining 
positive relationships on behalf of the United States in order to call on those individuals 
to support a particular U.S. position when the time came. 
Interestingly, most of this relationship building through contact meetings does not 
occur on embassy premises.  According to participants there are several reasons for this 
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state of affairs, not least the cumbersome security measures at U.S. facilities rendering 
host government officials uncomfortable or even indignant upon entering facilities.  
Respondents also said it was important to meet contacts on their turf, away from the 
imposing symbolism of U.S. diplomatic properties.  This allows U.S. diplomats to get out 
and “poke around” while also building relationships with key informants as well as 
stumbling upon new contacts: “That’s why you got guys out in the political section who 
are hanging around the parliament, or hanging around the parties, or hanging around the 
institutions.”  And “getting out” also implies leaving the capital city and other large 
population centers all together.  Former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium Howard Gutman 
wrote about his efforts, particularly with frequent trips outside Brussels, to repair 
ordinary Belgians’ mistrust of the United States and its policies in the Middle East.  He 
learned French and Dutch, made an effort to engage with students, and visited every 
Belgian municipality during his four-year tenure, all 589 of them (Gutman 2015).   
In my early conversations with ambassadors, I had trouble reconciling this 
emphasis on contact and influence with what I saw as a sizeable number of U.S. facilities 
in states hostile to the U.S. government and/or states with security challenges that 
prohibit diplomats from traveling frequently and openly outside embassy and consulate 
compounds, including Asmara, Eritrea (hostile government), and Peshawar, Pakistan 
(security concerns).  I asked my respondents: why should the United States maintain a 
presence in places where our diplomats cannot get out and engage with people?  Why is a 
facility needed in such a space?  Their collective answer was simple: despite the 
challenges, any little bit helps.  One interviewee noted his attempts to engage with 
foreign officials in a particularly unreceptive Foreign Ministry: 
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You typically… don’t overlap with your predecessor so he or she will leave you a 
note.  And my predecessor left me a note; it had 6 [officials who would talk] … 
And so it was a different way to work but it was changing when I got there.  
When I left, I probably left 17 names for my successor… [T]he foreign ministry 
became open.  We still couldn’t get in except with great difficulty… but we could 
do… [the] defense ministry, think tanks, things like that, and [host government 
officials] became much more open.  
 
He notes here the challenges of trying to engage with closed governments but also the 
rewards of making a small dent in that hostility, in this case increasing the number of 
contacts who would meet with a U.S. embassy representative.  And every opportunity, 
however narrow, to communicate the U.S. government’s position on a particular issue 
was seen as a net positive.  Many of my respondents served as ambassadors in high-
profile states with tenuous relationships to the United States.  They talked of failures to 
build relationships with key influencers and the long-lasting implication of these failures.  
One respondent spoke generally of the Department’s exposure to Iraqi officials in our 
conversation: 
Respondent: Abadi we missed.  Maliki we missed.  Jafari we didn’t 
miss… The last two prime ministers we did miss; we gave them no 
attention until suddenly they were prime minister.  
 
Author:  And you could see a consequence of that?  You didn’t have [their ear]?  
  
Respondent: More with Maliki than with Abadi, but I would say [yes]… 
Maliki was the more crucial one and as he had less exposure to the West.  
If we had spent more time with him earlier… it would have made a 
difference.  
 
The ability to influence and persuade key individuals across all aspects of 
society was identified by my respondents as one of the most fundamental aspects 
of U.S. diplomatic tradecraft and an essential component of the work done 
everyday at an embassy.  This entails both identifying and cultivating host 
nationals who stand to achieve positions of power and influence as well as to 
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encourage broad social support for a particular U.S. government position.  Both of 
these tasks require longstanding, permanent diplomatic presence in country to 
build relationships and trust, especially given that most U.S. diplomats move 
assignments after a posting of only three or four years.  
 
Commitment, reciprocity, and precedence  
 
Once you establish an embassy… and we’ve had them since these 
countries became independent from France or England… If you take it 
away, it’s seen as a political statement.  And there’s no way you’re [going 
to] make it seem like a budgetary [issue] because then they’ll say, ‘Well 
why didn’t you close Juba instead of [Lomé]?  You [could] cover [South 
Sudan] out of Khartoum or Nairobi.’ … We can’t, our hands are tied from 
closing existing places.  
 
A concern for how states, host governments, and the public at large would react 
should the United States ever decide to pull back from its commitment to universality 
emerged as a secondary theme throughout several interviews.  One respondent referred to 
the powerful pull of “continuity of presence,” the idea that a longstanding commitment to 
a particular state, in the form of a permanent diplomatic mission, cements the foundation 
of the bilateral relationship.  Closing a diplomatic facility, by contrast, would be 
perceived as the sender state losing faith in the host government (see, e.g. Bell & Molloy 
2013).  Interviewees noted the very important symbolic aspect of a longstanding facility 
in a country emblazoned with the U.S. seal and flag (see also Loeffler 1998).  Another 
interviewee noted the role of status, image, and perception in the diplomatic relationship: 
And the definition of status in the world: there are a couple of them, one is 
a seat at the United Nations and the other is an American embassy.  
Having recognition, having… formal relations with the United States, 
having your own ambassador in Washington who can claim to meet the 
president if only once to present her or his credentials.  And vice versa, to 
have an American show up at your president's or king's or prince's palace 
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and be photographed… shows the United States knows you exist and 
cares. 
 
Yet another respondent noted the “reservoir of good” those embassy personnel might 
draw on should they ever need an appointment with a host country official or an aircraft 
clearance at a moment’s notice.  Others added this goodwill is reciprocal; diplomacy is 
about quid pro quos: “They want a presidential visit?  They want a picture of the 
president to put up on their mantle?  Okay.” 
Or consider this exchange in response to the Department’s decision to name a 
U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, despite the fact that the U.S. does not maintain an official 
embassy presence in Mogadishu at present:  
Author: So when they talk about naming an ambassador, it’s just the 
symbolism- 
 
Respondent: -Well it’s the symbolism.  In the ideal world, the ambassador 
will move to Mogadishu at some point in time.  But initially the person is 
going to Nairobi.   
 
Author: I wonder why they do that before they’re ready to put the facility 
back ‘online’. 
 
Respondent: Well it’s sending a message.  It’s trying to underscore 
support for the Somali government.  And it’s a little bit of a charade; 
we’ve had a special envoy for Somalia, also resident in Nairobi for a long 
time.  And this upgrades the title, but beyond that it doesn’t really change 
much. 
 
Following Senate confirmation, Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken swore in 
U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Stephen Schwartz on June 27, 2016.  In his remarks, 
Blinken notes: 
[T]he importance of the step forward we’re taking today… to support a 
functioning central government, defeat a deadly terrorist threat, rebuild a 
shattered economy, and pave the way for Somalis to claim an inclusive 
and democratic future (emphasis added). 
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Near the end of his remarks, Blinken references the last flag to fly over the functioning 
U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu before the facility was abandoned in 1991.  He says, “While 
we work to transition or [sic] mission from Kenya back to Somalia, it is our sincere hope, 
Steve, that you will have the opportunity to raise this flag in Mogadishu once again” 
(ibid).   
The representational aspect is significant then, even in the absence of a physical 
facility as the Mogadishu case demonstrates.  It is significant precisely because 
Department operatives seek to stress the commitment of the United States to a particular 
state, government, and people.  And, as others noted, this commitment is tangible in the 
form of security assistance and foreign aid but a longstanding, permanent embassy or 
consulate node may be considered just as measurable.  One particularly colorful 
ambassador noted the very real sense of insecurity in many national governments around 
the world:  
These people have—partially for their own fault, partially because of the 
world they live in—put much of their security in our hands.  And so you 
abandon Nepal or you abandon Vietnam, they’re wondering whether 
you’re going to abandon [Germany] or Iraq or Afghanistan or India or 
what you’re going to abandon next… So therefore our principle has been 
we don’t abandon anybody.  We’re all in this together—one for all, all for 
one—even stupid, little, useless countries with absolutely horrid 
leadership (emphasis added, see below). 
 
However impolitic and offensive, note his use of the verb ‘abandon’--a word, along with 
‘evacuate,’ carefully avoided by the Department during ‘draw down’ events (i.e. when 
USG personnel are ordered to leave the country for security concerns).  He used this 
word intentionally to speak to the damage post closure incurs on the bilateral relationship, 
notably the souring of relationships to interlocutors and thus a break in on-site 
information-gathering activities and political and economic reporting.  
 97 
 
In addition to commitment and reciprocity, precedence was a final recurring 
theme. I regularly asked participants, apart from consular needs, why physical, 
permanent, and large-staffed embassy facilities are necessary in the ‘Parises’ and 
‘Londons’ and ‘Ottawas’ of the world—capital cities of democratic, advanced-industrial 
states with longstanding, positive bilateral relationships with the United States.  One 
ambassador shared an interesting anecdote, noting that he had argued (“partly in jest”) to 
close the entire U.S. mission to Canada at one point—the embassy in Ottawa and five 
additional consulates; “It costs $200,000-300,000 a year to keep people in Ottawa.”  
Instead, he argued, why not fly personnel out of Washington’s Reagan National airport 
each morning?  Another respondent argued the Department could potentially staff the 
Ottawa facility from Albany, New York, saving millions on housing and other amenities 
entitled to FSOs while serving abroad (though that is still a significant distance).  Of 
course, as participants acknowledged, these suggestions would never be taken seriously.  
The United States underscores its commitment to its northern neighbor through extensive 
diplomatic representation, and to turn away from that posture and the precedent set would 
do significant damage to the bilateral relationship even services remained the same, albeit 
at a distance or through a smaller downgraded diplomatic platform. 
Many respondents further used as an example Secretary of State James Baker’s 
1992 order, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to “stand up” embassy 
facilities in all of the former Soviet Socialist Republics during a 90-day window 
(Hastings 2012).  While it is remarkable that the Department, with its immense 
bureaucracy, was able to meet Baker’s seemingly short deadline, the fast-paced 
establishment of these facilities illustrates the seriousness with which high-level officials 
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treat diplomatic presence.  (To be fair, there were a number of small consular facilities in 
place at the time of Baker’s ultimatum not fully staffed but fulfilling the mandate still 
required a tremendous amount of work, unlike the Cuba example at the start of the 
paper.)  Speaking of Baker’s mandate, one ambassador remarked, “[The United States is] 
a great power… [W]e basically have a physical presence in almost every recognized 
country in the world; it would be odd not to do it” (emphasis added).  
 
The Force-full U.S. Diplomatic Assemblage 
Diplomatic presence is valued far beyond ceremony.  The U.S. diplomatic 
network and its constituent posts support the broader U.S. foreign policy assemblage in 
powerful ways, notably through information-gathering, influencing foreign actors, and 
demonstrating a real and material commitment to stand alongside peoples around the 
world.  These three activities, made possible by an amalgamation of diplomatic bodies 
and more-than-human things in diplomatic facilities, are highly valued by policymakers, 
as evidenced in my interviews with elite U.S. diplomatic practitioners.  More importantly, 
the practices I have called attention to in this article suggest the endurance of the 
universal diplomatic posture, and a networked infrastructure that allows information, 
peoples, and goods to travel between Post and Washington.  I asked all interview 
participants whether the Department could theoretically pursue the same goals with a 
smaller diplomatic network.  The following are exemplary responses from four 
ambassadors: 
My motto is ‘United States is a superpower and we should act like one’. 
… We shouldn’t find ways to cut our presence overseas; we should find 
ways to enhance it. 
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I’m a strong believer in universal diplomatic presence for the United 
States.  I mean, as the truly global power, uh, we should have the contacts, 
the knowledge, that comes from having professionals on the ground. 
 
[With voice rising] Of course we should be everywhere.  As long as this 
American moment continues and we are primus inter pares in the world, 
the most powerful nation economically, politically, militarily, 
sociologically, of course we should.  That’s how you connect with people.  
The question actually I would flip and say, ‘Are we dispersed widely 
enough? 
 
[L]et me put it this way, in a budget-cutting exercise, one of the last things 
I would cut would be our representatives in as many countries as I would 
reasonably put them around the world. 
 
And while some of my respondents contended that there are limits to U.S. power abroad 
(“Our goal should not be to be everywhere at once to piss people off”), most, as shown 
by the above statements, were resolutely committed to universality as a way of ensuring 
U.S. global primacy, a running theme throughout the interviews.  By way of example, 
consider this inspired monologue (the same individual from the third quotation above): 
And, you know, my answer to that is, are we the United States of America 
or not?  Do we or do we not have three million people overseas?  Are we 
or are we not living in a globalized world?  Are we or are we not the, you 
know, primus inter pares state in the world?  We not only founded or fund 
the UN system more than any other nation, we host it!  Here in the United 
States.  There’s a reason for that. [Continues with an impassioned tone]  
We’re the United States of America.  We’re of the world.  We are the 
most powerful nation in the world.  We have a set of principles second to 
none.  We’re the oldest continuously functioning republic on this globe!   
 
A near-universal diplomatic assemblage is so powerful, so important to policymakers, 
that diplomatic practitioners are unable to consider a different posture; they have never 
been asked to imagine what an innovative, economical, or mobile diplomatic network 
might look like.   
As the above excerpts illustrate, the question has become not whether the United 
States ought to preserve universality, that is a given, but in what form each discrete 
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embassy and consulate facility should take (e.g. site, design, architecture, security 
conditions).  One respondent noted the enormous implications for such questions on 
politics: 
Given that [the] United States’ adheres to the principle of universality, 
we’re gonna keep an embassy in the capital of every country…  That 
normally is in and of itself not controversial… but the issue of where the 
embassy should be, how big the embassy should be, how ostentatious the 
embassy should be, eh, the issue of how obvious the security of the 
embassy.  These are all important political as well as administrative issues.  
 
Further, this respondent is careful to note that the decision to place a new embassy or 
consulate facility is not merely ceremonial or administrative.  The constitutive power of 
these “big things” (Jacobs 2006) is generated not principally through the flag, as many 
would lead us to believe, but rather through myriad processes that do not begin and end 
on the premises of the facility, processes I have described throughout this piece.  Drawing 
on the archival data collected over the course of this research project, Table 2 details the 
“functional areas of responsibility” of the State Department (and by extension embassies) 
as outlined in a 1961 letter (Hays 1961).  This table well illustrates the slew of diplomatic 
practices (all of which remain important to this day) that operate through U.S. posts to 
support the broader foreign policy establishment.  In failing to call attention to this 
assemblage, we fail to grasp the true power of each diplomatic node, each working to 
sustain the bigger whole.  
 
Conclusion 
Diplomatic processes cannot be fully understood without attention to the sites and 
spaces through which they play out.  The United States remains committed to a 
widespread diplomatic footprint just as many other countries have made drastic changes 
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to their diplomatic networks.  Many European states, for example, have closed less 
strategic posts and co-located several missions within larger facilities with ambassadors-
at-large accredited to multiple nearby states.  The Scandinavian countries have 
consolidated their respective diplomatic missions into one regional mission in many parts 
of the world, including Washington, DC.  While security concerns continue to dominate 
the discourse on U.S. diplomatic infrastructure, particularly in the wake of the most 
recent large-scale evacuation of a U.S. embassy in Tripoli, Libya, in July 2014, these 
discussions do not appear to be turning the tide towards the European posture in favor of 
a smaller and more maneuverable diplomatic corps.  Instead, the Department continues to 
function under the assumption that a permanent diplomatic mission is essential in every 
state to maintain the United States’ primacy in global politics, a narrative that has been 
constructed and reinforced by policymakers over time and that remains the primary 
driving force in crafting foreign policy, requisitioning funds, and designing new or 
renovated facilities.   
To fully comprehend the United States’ unwavering commitment to universality, 
we have to understand how the network works together as a whole; it is not enough to 
study one or two facilities.  Nor can we only look to the work human subjects do in 
furthering diplomatic aims.  Contrary to how U.S. embassies and consulates appear in 
contemporary urban landscapes—“big things” (Jacobs 2006) with large, impenetrable 
perimeter walls, fortress-like façades, and barbed-wire-adorned guard posts—they are not 
stand-alone facilities, however imposing they may look.  Nor are they just representative 
of U.S. power abroad, as symbolized by the waved flag atop each facility (Billig 1995).  
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Embassy and consulate properties do tangible, measurable work on behalf of the 
Department towards particular foreign policy goals (e.g. Table 6).   
We often fail to consider the day-to-day, mundane practices, objects, bodies, and 
discourses at work to maintain the diplomatic apparatus and, as a result, the United 
States’ countless diplomatic relationships to peoples, states, informal bodies, and 
multilateral organizations, but they have enormous geopolitical consequences.  The high-
level negotiations which led to the restoration of the U.S.-Cuban bilateral relationship and 
the “re-opening” of the U.S. Embassy in Havana did not happen overnight.  On the U.S. 
end, the talks were the result of the tireless work of dozens of diplomats across the 
Department’s hierarchy and officials across the U.S. government apparatus.  Thousands 
of e-mails were sent from State and other agencies in Washington to the Interests Section 
in Havana.  ‘Action Memos’ had to be prepared for the attention of high-level decision 
makers as well as briefing binders for the negotiating delegation and press releases for 
public dissemination.  The existing diplomatic facility in Havana was instrumental during 
this process, as were its links to the people and things and sites that constitute the broader 
diplomatic network.  As this paper has detailed, an in-depth study of the contours of the 
diplomatic network, nested assemblages linking and empowering peoples, things, ideas, 
and practices, lends insight into why facilities continue to exist and be valued by 
policymakers.  Drawing on the assemblage as a conceptual model further illuminates the 
concrete work facilities support, enable, and empower to secure diplomatic objectives.   
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FIGURE 10.  Cuban Embassy, July 20, 2015.  Source: author. 
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FIGURE 11.  U.S. Department of State facilities, 2014.  Source: U.S. Department of 
State. 
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TABLE 5.  The largest non-immigrant-visa-processing (NIVs) posts by volume (with 
over 100,000 NIVs issued) during fiscal year 2015.  No post in Africa exhibited a volume 
over 100,000 NIVs; as such, Lagos represents the largest post by NIV volume in the 
region.  Shaded posts represent stand-alone consulate facilities (Bureau of Consular 
Affairs 2016). 
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TABLE 6.  The State Department’s “Broad Functional Areas of Responsibility,” 1961.  
Table mimics, as close as possible, the formatting of the original document (Hays 1961). 
Economic 
a. Promotion of U.S. economic foreign 
policies. 
b. Participation in negotiations for 
furtherance of U.S. economic 
objectives. 
c. Observing, analyzing, and reporting 
on economic and commercial 
matters. 
d. Promotional activities on behalf of 
U.S. trade. 
e. Planning, advising on, and revising 
economic activities and policies. 
Political 
a. Political representation of U.S. 
policy. 
b. Participation in negotiations for 
furtherance of U.S. political 
objectives. 
c. Observing, analyzing, and reporting 
on political development of internal 
and international significance. 
d. Planning, advising on, and reviewing 
political activities and policies. 
Consular 
a. Visa services. 
b. Citizenship and passport services. 
c. Protection and welfare services for 
American citizens, property, and 
interest. 
d. Notarials, public documents, and 
quasi-legal services. 
e. Services for ships, seamen, and 
airmen. 
f. Special services for other Federal 
and State agencies. 
g. Planning advising on, and reviewing 
consular activities. 
Administrative 
a. Administrative management of the 
post. 
b. Budget preparation and allocation of 
funds. 
c. Centralized fiscal operations, 
personnel, security, and general 
administrative services. 
d. Negotiation with foreign 
government officials on problems of 
imports and exports and personnel 
accreditation. 
e. Arrangements for visits of 
Congressional groups and U.S. 
Government officials and other 
important visitors. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
REGIONAL BUREAUS AND THE PRIVILEGING OF THE STATE IN THE U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT  
 
Introduction 
 
Taken together, the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the State 
Department’s second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), also 
published in 2015, describe a world confronting growing security concerns.16  President 
Obama’s cover letter to the NSS cites, “violent extremism and an evolving terrorist 
threat[,]… escalating challenges to cybersecurity…, the accelerating impacts of climate 
change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases” among the greatest threats facing U.S. 
national security (NSS 2015).  Amid a list of goals the administration hopes to tackle, the 
President highlights the global campaign to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), the economic opportunities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the importance 
of foreign direct investment to Africa.  Similarly, State’s QDDR outlines four grand 
strategic priorities: ‘countering violent extremism,’ ‘open democratic societies,’ 
‘inclusive economic growth,’ and ‘climate change’ (QDDR 2015).  Even a hurried 
reading of these two broad foreign policy manifestos signals the extent to which regional 
and global patterns have eclipsed traditional state-centric developments as the dominant 
forces shaping the contemporary global arena.  By way of example, President’s Obama’s 
remarks at the beginning of the NSS mention only seven states—Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Russia, China, Syria, Cuba, and Iran—emphasizing instead regional patterns and trends, 
                                                
16 The QDDR process was initiated during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State and modeled after 
the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review. 
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whereas President Clinton’s cover letter for his administration’s final NSS in 2000 
mentions 15 distinct countries in conflict.17   
As the NSS and QDDR demonstrate, many of the threats facing U.S. national 
security are not neatly reducible to the map of states.  People, communities, and networks 
are increasingly knit together in ways that are difficult to explain through the prism of the 
modern state system.  Yet, given the amount of attention U.S. policymakers give to pan-
regional and global issues—agenda items like climate change, violent extremism, and 
migration—large-scale (read: meta-, macro-, meso-scale) policymaking and 
programming efforts have long been stymied by the bureaucratic system itself.   In this 
paper, I call attention to the entrenched territorial norms within the U.S. Department of 
State, where broad, sweeping issues are more often than not framed through the lens of 
the modern state system.  This is epitomized in the internal organizational structure of the 
Department, where geographic regions and functional operations are delineated by 
“bureau.”  The Department’s longstanding bureau organizational model includes six 
“regional bureaus,” made up of collections of countries—African Affairs, Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South and 
Central Asian Affairs, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs—and forty “functional 
bureaus,” which serve functional-thematic roles (see Figures 12 and 13 for the 
Department’s organizational model and regional bureau map respectively).  Regional and 
functional bureaus work in tandem to design policy and manage the United States’ 
relationships abroad, but I suggest regional bureaus are far more powerful within the 
Department than their functional counterparts.  The longtime privileging of regional 
                                                
17 Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, China, Taiwan, Greece, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Northern 
Ireland (UK), Peru, Ecuador, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. 
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bureaus over functional bureaus, and indeed the use of regional-geographic containers in 
the first place, confines policymakers’ treatment of complex geographic phenomena 
across space and scale, leading officials to approach macro-scale phenomena at the scale 
of state and, in the process, hampering their ability to craft innovative, and perhaps more 
effective, solutions.   
This article concerns itself with the bureau system and, in particular, how the 
geographic extent of regional bureaus has come to be defined over time, by whom, and to 
what effect.  In an effort to make sense of how this contemporary bureau system impacts 
the geopolitical imagination of policymakers and the United States’ situation in the world 
more broadly, this paper draws on political geography’s treatment of organizations as 
geopolitical actors.  In particular, I heed Müller’s call to, “[open] the black box of the 
organization” and “[lay] bare the manifold socio-material processes or ordering by which 
organizations are assembled and become more or less coherent entities” (2012: 379).   
This commitment to a critical geopolitical and organizational perspective allows me to 
approach the oft-debated concept of the region quite differently.  Instead of “debating the 
analytical contribution of regionalism as a theoretical lens,” I follow Ciutӑ’s (2008) 
suggestion for further study into, “the political use of regional framing” (2008: 122) as 
well as Murphy’s (2013) call for geographers to engage more decisively on the 
widespread “grand regional narratives” that shape our world and way of knowing.    
The first section of the paper explores geography’s treatment of bureaucratic 
institutions and macro-regional formations.  I next dive into a case study of the U.S. 
Department of State’s bureau system to problematize the historic privileging of the 
regional bureau against the backdrop of contemporary efforts at building broad, issue-
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driven platforms.  I highlight how the bureau system emerged, the impact of the system 
on how Department operatives make sense of the world, as well as the implications of the 
Department’s ordering, reducing, and bounding the political world into meta-regional 
constructs.  The concluding section argues for an overhaul in the Department’s 
organizational structure.  I seek to rectify the imbalance between regional and functional 
bureaus by empowering functional bureaus to take a larger policy role.  The overarching 
goal of the paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate on how best to leverage U.S. 
diplomats and soft power resources in an ever-changing global environment. 
 
The Power and Pull of the Bureaucracy 
A modern society is a bureaucratized society, and so the study of our time 
is bound up with the analysis of bureaucratic processes and institutions 
(Kuus 2015: 432). 
 
The inside lives of organizations exhibit a significant degree of messiness 
and are characterized by constant attempts to create temporary order out of 
chaos (Müller 2012: 382). 
 
In her recent Progress in Human Geography piece, Merje Kuus (2015) calls 
attention to significant gaps in our understanding of bureaucratic processes, which she 
refers to as “studying the obvious” (ibid, see above quotation).  She contends that while 
human geographers have been working on studies of bureaucracies and policy formation 
for some time, relatively few scholars have focused their empirical lens on bureaucratic 
institutions themselves.  As such, we know much about the effects of bureaucratic 
processes on social life but very little about the formation of bureaucracies and the 
production of knowledge claims within them (ibid).  Müller (2012) echoes this claim, 
noting that much contemporary scholarship neglects to consider bureaucracies’ 
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underlying processes and materialities, “a plethora of humans and things [that] need to be 
coordinated and brought together to make an organization capable of acting” (p. 379).   
Far from being static and immobile, institutions are “precarious entities” that 
require constant attention and stabilization from a variety of sources.  Their agency 
derives not from the state but from a complex, ever-changing assemblage of human and 
non-human elements that work together towards particular organizational objectives 
(ibid).  These socio-material processes give life to, shape, and empower the institution.  
By equal measure, however, they handicap it.  An organization is only as powerful as its 
constitutive elements that provide a framework to guide decision-making.  As such, 
reform is difficult, particularly in unwieldy government bureaucracies where innovation 
is hindered by the “stickiness” of institutional values and ideas (Cox 2004).  Per Hall and 
Taylor (1996: 940), “Institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they 
structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make.”  In the 
context of the U.S. Department of State, the so-called “path dependent” nature of the 
longstanding bureau system makes it so that employees are often unable to think beyond 
the distinct regional spheres that constitute the Department’s organizational model.  As 
the empirical section of this paper details, these indelible regional constructs have 
become powerful forces in their own right, often dictating how the Department of State 
scripts the world and designs policy to address the fundamental challenges of our time. 
 
Meta-Regional Constructs in a Territorial World 
Geographers have long debated the usefulness of the ‘region’ to make sense of the 
world around them.  While the concept has seen both widespread use and abandonment 
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over the past century, it remains one of the “central objects of study” in our discipline 
(Allen et al. 1998, Derrick 2014).  Initially employed by a cadre of scholars interested in 
delimiting spaces on Earth’s surface according to observable phenomena, the region was 
used as a mechanism for organizing and bounding homogeneity.  Rigorous academic 
debate in the last several decades notably has seen the rigidity of the regional concept 
unfurl as scholars embrace the idea of relational regionalism and critique popular regional 
narratives (Lewis & Wigen 1997, Pike 2007, Murphy 2013).  Yet the concept of the 
region still resonates with much of society, and especially as a tool to order and describe 
the world around us.  Indeed, the use of meso-regions abounds in the mainstream media, 
the political arena (particularly in this 2016 election with plans to defeat ISIS in the 
Middle East); popular culture; education; and governmental, corporate, and not-for-profit 
organizations.  Many multinational corporations—for example, Intel—use “theaters of 
operations” to describe global activities, the U.S. military has distinct geographic 
“Combatant Commands” (which, it turns out, do not overlay neatly against the State 
Department’s geographic bureaus), and regional studies departments are prominent in 
universities across the United States and beyond.   
To the critical eye, such constructed regional framings perpetuate the trap of 
territoriality that pervades everyday life (Agnew 1994).  While they differ to some degree 
in size and shape, the popular meso-regional constructs I identify above all make use of 
bounded, territorial space and are often treated as “given (statistical, administrative) 
unit[s],”—to use Paasi’s (2010: 2297, see also 2002) turn of phrase.  Such units frame 
geographic phenomena and “harmonize spatial thinking” (ibid) by, for example, 
reinforcing the idea that the ‘Southern Cone’ includes all of Argentina and Chile—also 
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Uruguay and sometimes Paraguay—but not Brazil, even though nearly a third of the 
country is situated at the same latitude as Chile’s northern extent.  At the same time, they 
rely on underlying social constructions that affix regional administrative units onto the 
earth’s surface (see, e.g. Lewis and Wigen on continents).  In limiting the scope of spatial 
thinking to particular groupings of states, bounded into immovable regional units, we 
limit how we think about the processes and phenomena that transect space. 
That is not to say that commonly understood regions, as in regional groupings of 
states, aren’t useful or have no place in public debate.  In fact, metageographical 
formations and meso-regions can be important tools, as in the Department’s bureau 
system.  However, they also potentially frame and structure how we look at, analyze, and 
ultimately understand global processes (Said 1987, Murphy 2013).  Against that 
backdrop, this paper analyzes and critiques the U.S. Department of State’s bureau system 
and what I see as the systematic privileging of geographic-regional bureaus over 
thematic-functional bureaus among the organizational hierarchy.  I argue that such 
privileging too often frames global processes within regional containers at the scale of the 
state and at the expense of a more nuanced understanding of a particular issue.  I ask: (a) 
why and how did the Department’s contemporary regional-geographic areas come to be 
defined, (b) how has regional bureau expertise eclipsed that of the seemingly lower-order 
functional bureaus, and (c) what are the potentially consequences of privileging regional 
bureaus.  The next section addresses the first concern.  It draws almost exclusively on a 
Departmental history curated by Department of State’s Office of the Historian to outline 
the emergence of the bureau system and reform efforts over time.  While there is a 
comprehensive secondary literature on the State Department’s history (see, e.g., 
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Kissinger 1994, Loeffler 1998, Plischke 1999), much of this literature focuses on 
Department personalities, events, and policies with far less attention paid to Departmental 
organization and hierarchy.  
  
Constructing the Department’s Meso-Regional World  
With newly vested powers under the amended Constitution of 1789, the United 
States Congress established the Department of State at the request of James Madison.18  
Thomas Jefferson, serving as the first Secretary of State under the Constitution, managed 
the newly established Department and a $56,600 budget with a five-person team 
consisting of a chief clerk in charge of diplomatic correspondence, three other clerks, a 
translator, and a messenger.  While the Department maintained only five diplomatic 
missions at the time—in England, France, Holland, Spain, and Portugal—that number 
was to grow considerably in the coming years as was the domestic staff and budget to 
manage foreign affairs.  An overworked Secretary of State John Quincy Adams ordered 
the first reorganization of the Department in 1818.  As he wrote to his wife, “Unless 
everything is disposed of just as it occurs, it escapes from the memory and runs into the 
account of arrears” (Office of the Historian ND) By Executive Order, Secretary Adams 
soon oversaw a bureaucratic system with a Chief Clerk who operated directly under him 
and as many as ten clerks with discrete duties and subject areas who reported upward to 
the Chief Clerk (ibid).   
Despite concerted efforts to manage the growth of what was quickly becoming a 
far-flung and robust bureaucracy, a new problem emerged in the form of a cadre of lazy, 
                                                
18 The Department was initially to house both “foreign” and “home” affairs, hence the ‘Department of 
State’ vice ‘Department of Foreign Affairs’ as Madison had proposed (Ibid.). 
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unprofessional, disdainful, and amateurish diplomats (Office of the Historian ND).  (In 
one amusing, though likely apocryphal, tale, John Randolph of Virginia addressed the 
Russian Tsar in 1830, “Howya, Emperor?  And how’s the madam?”)  Overworked and 
exasperated by the “emphatically useless”19 diplomatic corps, President Jackson’s two 
secretaries of state introduced the “bureau system” in a departmental reorganization.  
From 1833 to 1836, Secretaries Louis McLane and John Forsyth oversaw a restructuring 
of Department personnel into the following six bureaus, organized by functional duties: 
(1) diplomatic matters; (2) consular matters; (3) domestic and administrative matters, 
archives, laws, and commissions; (4) domestic correspondence, Presidential parsons, 
remissions, and copyrights; (5) disbursing and superintending; and (6) translating and 
other miscellaneous tasks (in support of the diplomatic and consular bureaus).  Of the six 
bureaus, the diplomatic and consular bureaus were by far the most important according to 
the Office of the Historian.  Both were structured similarly, with three clerks managing 
overseas correspondence.  One clerk oversaw England, France, Russia, and the 
Netherlands while the other was responsible for the rest of the world: the Mediterranean, 
Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the rest of Europe.  With the support of this new 
bureaucratic structure, the number of overseas missions increased to 33 in 1860, with the 
majority of them located in Europe and Latin America (Office of the Historian ND). 
The Department was not shuffled again until the 1870s, when Secretary of State 
Hamilton Fish led a reorganization of the bureau system to cope with a rapidly changing 
world.  Fish created two diplomatic bureaus and two consular bureaus, each with 
geographic areas of concern delineated by state boundaries.  The First Diplomatic Bureau 
                                                
19 Representative Benjamin W. Stanton of Ohio’s 1859 opinion of the diplomatic corps (Office of the 
Historian ND) 
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and First Consular Bureau were concerned with the major European States, as well as 
Japan and China, while the second pair of bureaus had geographic responsibilities for the 
rest of the world including Latin America, the Mediterranean, Russia, Hawaii, and 
Liberia.  In addition, several functional bureaus were created or renamed: the Law 
Bureau, Bureaus of Accounts, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, the Statistical Bureau, 
Bureau of Pardons and Commissions, the Passport Bureau, and the Domestic Records 
Bureau.  By 1909, following sizeable increases in personnel and expenditures, further 
restructuring was necessary.20  Reforms included increasing leadership positions and re-
organizing the bureaus into distinct geographic regions: Western Europe, the Near East, 
the Far East, Latin America.  Additional bureaus were established for trade relations and 
information management.  As necessity warranted over time, and particularly in the post-
World War I period, this 1909 bureau system would be amended to support the 
burgeoning organization.  In 1938, for example, reforms led to the emergence of new 
entities for international communications and cultural relations (Office of the Historian 
ND).   
In 1944, Secretary Edward Stettinius led what would be the final robust 
reorganization of the Department.  Stettinius looked to empower the war-weary 
Department and augment its relevancy alongside the increasingly powerful Department 
of Defense.  His efforts broadened the institutional hierarchy and paved the way for the 
contemporary bureau system (Office of the Historian ND).  Archival research in the U.S. 
National Archives and Records Administration’s State Department Central Files revealed 
that regional divisions at this time tended to mirror colonial arrangements; the Europe 
                                                
20Between the period of 1898 and 1910, the Department’s employee roster grew from 82 to 234.  The 
annual budget for expenditures both domestically and abroad increased from $3.4 million in 1900 to $4.9 
million in 1910 (Office of the Historian ND).	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bureau included the entire British dominion for instance and Central Asia’s Soviet 
Socialist Republics were long grouped under the Europe (and Eurasia) bureau alongside 
the USSR (Division of European Affairs 1942, U.S. Embassy Paris 1952, Chadbourne 
1961).  Headquarters infrastructure in Washington, too, came to reflect Stettinius’ 
expanded hierarchical structure.  A new Department facility was completed in early 1961, 
the building the Department continues to occupy today in the Foggy Bottom 
neighborhood of northwest Washington.  The seven-floor structure was four times as 
large as the previous War building and was designed theoretically as a pyramid: “the 
higher the job, the higher the office” with Assistant Secretaries occupying their bureaus’ 
“front offices” on the sixth floor and the Secretary of State’s suite above on the seventh.  
While the contemporary arrangement of offices in the building doesn’t follow the 
pyramid to a tee, we see most bureaus still have their Assistant Secretaries on the sixth 
floor (see Table 7, note the privileged location of regional bureau front offices, Office of 
the Historian ND). 
The final bureau, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, emerged in late 
1992 following a six-year-long push.  (Table 8 provides a summary of this concise 
history, noting the ways in which the regional formations were framed over time.)  Prior 
to that, the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs existed as a much larger 
regional entity. It was not until 2006 that the bureau absorbed the Office of Central Asian 
Affairs from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, which led to it being the 
smallest of all the geographic-regional bureaus with a portfolio of just thirteen states 
(Office of the Historian ND, see Figure 14).   
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Deconstructing the Meso-Regional World 
 
The advent of the American Century made management of global 
geography an increasingly vital endeavor, and over the decades the 
U.S. government built an elaborate if inchoate bureaucracy for the 
task… Yet the very success of this American globalism, built in no 
small part upon powerful geographical intelligence, has spawned a 
quite contradictory public reality, namely the eclipse of geography as a 
discourse of global power… Geography here survives as nostalgia 
(Smith 2003: 3). 
 
The contemporary bureau system, with its emphasis on regional differentiation, 
highlights a particularly interesting paradox.  On the one hand, the ordering of the world 
into discrete units is essential to organizational efficiency, especially as a means to 
administer an institution as robust and far-reaching as the Department of State.  On the 
other hand, that very organizational scheme, rooted and sustained over decades, often 
limits policymakers’ ability to see beyond its entrenched meta-geographical divisions.  
Neil Smith, in the passage quoted above, goes farther; he argues that the very collection 
and organization of geographical knowledge over time has led to a discourse of 
spaceless-ness and unevenness, which obscures fundamental realities about the world.  
Calling attention to this paradox and “the eclipse of geography as a discourse of global 
power,” as Smith contends, points to the need to consider the forces that reify the 
Department’s bureau system and problematize the regional boundaries that it delimits.   
This section works to deconstruct the bureau system by calling attention to 
mundane practices that reinforce the bureau structure and, in particular, the divide 
between regional and functional bureaus.  A series of vignettes are explored to examine 
the role of individuals in maintaining the status quo while others follow the flow of 
knowledge-claims throughout the Department (Kuus 2011).  Despite the usefulness of 
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regional formations in organizing the everyday work of the U.S. diplomatic corps, it is 
worth considering how such formations impact, and potentially constrain, banal 
processes.  If today’s highly connected and stratified world is best explained through 
relationships and flows, mobility and fluidity, unevenness and inequality (Jones 2009), 
how can American policymakers possibly make sense of the most pressing issues under 
the existing bureau system with its regional containers?  
Before I begin, a brief word about methods is needed.  The following draws 
primarily on informal ethnographic data gleaned from several years of experience (on and 
off since late 2007) working in the Department as a civil servant in two offices: the 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs’ Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs (i.e. 
the Cuba desk) and the Executive Secretariat’s Operations Center.  My positionality as an 
insider-outsider has contributed significantly to this research, particularly with respect to 
the nuances of Department culture and shifting attitudes of Department operatives.  From 
my work on the Cuba desk I was privy to the internal organization of a regional bureau, 
while the Operations Center, a more top-down-focused office, exposed me to flows of 
information at the highest levels of the Department.  Most of the findings below then 
relate to informal observations over the last several years and reflect on the daily, lived 
experiences of those working within the Department to support U.S. foreign policy. 
 
Privileging the regional bureau 
 As the story goes, Colin Powell, during his tenure as Secretary of State under 
President George W. Bush, would routinely call down to desk officers to ask for details, 
context, and analysis of pressing issues, jumping the immense hierarchy between the 
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Secretary’s suite and the desk officer’s cube.  Should Powell have reached out to the 
Liberia desk officer for nuance into that country’s violent political crisis of 2003, by way 
of example, he would have circumvented four rungs of the institutional ladder: the 
Director of the Office of West African Affairs (AF/W), the desk officer’s immediate 
supervisor; the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, whose portfolio includes 
AF/W;  the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs; and finally the Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, the high-ranking umbrella office under which all the regional bureaus 
are gathered.  Apart from the surprising and unconventional act of a Secretary calling a 
desk officer (to my knowledge Secretaries Rice, Clinton, and Kerry have not acted 
similarly), note who Powell was calling: not the officer in the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor with the west Africa portfolio nor her colleagues in the Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs or the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 
The country desk officer is, albeit informally, in a privileged position within the 
Department of State.21  It is therefore useful to analyze the work, portfolio, and 
responsibilities of desk officers to understand the ways they contribute to and reinforce 
the Department’s organizational structure and its meta-regional divisions.  While desk 
officer jobs are held by both Foreign and Civil Service Officers, the Foreign Service 
makes up the majority of the desk officers in regional bureaus, whereas most of the 
positions in functional bureaus are held by the Civil Service.22  And while desk officers 
may work odd hours given the time change between Washington and their area of 
                                                
21  I use country desk officer here to refer to an individual responsible solely for one state, as is most often 
the case.  However, regional bureaus maintain entire offices (on average 10-20 individuals) for a smattering 
of more high-profile and/or geopolitically significant states.  Examples of these include China, Russia, 
Cuba, Mexico, Canada, and Korea (for both the ROK and DPRK).  In addition, many country desks have 
more than one officer to manage the portfolio with a Senior Desk Officer and a Junior Desk Officer.   
22 The divisive relationship between the Foreign and Civil services complicates and potentially enhances 
the divide between regional and functional bureaus.  Nevertheless, I elected to leave a lengthier discussion 
of that relationship aside in order to streamline the argument.	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responsibility, they also regularly work exceedingly long hours during crises or in the 
lead up to large policy announcements or high-profile visits (either from the host country 
to the United States or vice versa).  This workload is largely a product of their job 
descriptions; country desk officers function predominantly as synthesizers.  Their 
principal responsibility is managing the relationship between their designated country and 
Washington.  This implies a near constant stream of communication between the desk 
and the U.S. mission abroad—an embassy and perhaps consulates as well—as well as 
between the desk and the state’s respective diplomatic mission to the United States.  The 
desk officer further serves as the point of contact for reporting and analysis from the 
interagency process (NSC, intelligence community, etc.), as well as the myriad functional 
bureaus within the Department.  The desk officer drafts interdepartmental memos, press 
releases, and responses to public and Congressional inquiries, and must “clear” material 
drafted by other bureaus that reference the state.   
The ‘Emergency Message’ provides a useful window into a desk officer’s life.  
The Bureau of Consular Affairs uses the message to alert U.S. citizens traveling or living 
abroad to exercise caution while traveling around in particular places.  They are most 
often released in advance of elections, mass demonstrations, and inclement weather as e-
mail to a listserv of registered Americans as well as part of a wider press announcement.  
In constructing the message, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (or the Operations Center’s 
Crisis Management Services after-hours) works with the desk and Post abroad to draft, 
clear, and release the message.  No other bureaus are consulted and a unique message is 
typically distributed for each individual state (although worldwide emergency messages 
are not uncommon for warnings of large-scale terrorist activity). 
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Country desk officers then serve predominantly as collectors and connectors.   
They maintain relationships and networks within the Department, interagency, and 
diplomatic community that tend to outweigh those of functional officers, whose 
relationships are more often confined to their specific bureau and the regional bureau 
corresponding to their portfolio.  In my experience, the privileging of regional bureau 
expertise holds even at the Assistant Secretary level, the highest position in a bureau.  
While the Secretary of State, or a proxy, hosts near daily staff meetings with most 
bureaus in attendance, outside of these meetings the Secretary maintains relationships and 
communicates far more readily with regional rather than functional Assistant Secretaries.  
This practice arguably stems from the Secretary’s concern with high-profile activities that 
potentially make or break their legacy (e.g., “peace in the Middle East” or the recent 
breakthroughs with Iran and Cuba).  These sorts of global political issues occupy the time 
and attention of the Secretary as well as that of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
who oversees the regional bureaus.  If you were familiar with any Department official 
besides the Secretary, it would be the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who often 
leads U.S. delegations or accompanies the Secretary at high-profile bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations.  
The Secretary is in routine communication with the Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs and a smattering of other Under Secretaries and regional Assistant Secretaries 
(though personalities and existing relationships are certainly a factor).  That the Secretary 
maintains routine communication with regional Assistant Secretaries more than 
functional Assistant Secretaries is likely due to the fact that regional Assistant Secretaries 
occupy a more visible and powerful position in the global arena.  While all Assistant 
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Secretaries travel extensively, more often than not it is regional Assistant Secretaries who 
work alongside the Secretary on his or her trips, rather than their functional counterparts.  
Consider the following press release from Secretary Kerry’s recent trip to Europe for a 
series of ministerial meetings: 
“Secretary Kerry is on travel to Munich, Germany. He is accompanied by Under 
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller, 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Anne Patterson, Assistant Secretary 
for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs John Kirby, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Michael Ratney, Special Envoy 
for Libya and Senior Advisor for MEK Resettlement Jonathan Winer, Special 
Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, 
North Africa, and the Gulf Region, National Security Council Robert Malley, 
National Security Council Advisor Ahmed Salman, Assistant to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Admiral Frank Pandolfe, and Chief of Staff Jon 
Finer.” 
 
It is, of course, no surprise that the Secretary of State travels with an extensive team of 
advisers, subject-matter experts, and aides.  (The Secretary always travels with the 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs as well as NSC and JCS personnel.)  Apart from 
Under Secretary Gottemoeller, who accompanied the Secretary to discuss weapons 
conventions issues in Syria, the other high-level travelers were regional Assistant 
Secretaries or Special Envoys and Representatives (more on this later).  
 Another way to highlight the privileging of regional bureaus is to consider how 
information flows upward in the Department.  Information finds its way into the 
Department from myriad sources, most notably embassy and consulate posts abroad 
(cables, e-mails, teleconferences), the interagency process (reports, intelligence briefs, 
memos), and media sources (news coverage, public commentary).  I call attention here to 
two processes of organizing, distilling, and moving information up in the hierarchical 
chain to decision makers.  The first is the Assistant Secretary’s Daily Activity Report 
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(ASDAR) and the second is the Secretary’s Overnight and Afternoon Briefs.  By 
examining the flow of knowledge claims throughout the Department, it is possible to 
trace the way regional bureau containers dictate who has access to information and who 
does not, as well as what types of information are funneled up for the attention of key 
decision makers. 
Most bureaus have some ASDAR process, though perhaps under a different 
name, whereby the Assistant Secretary is delivered a concise report in bite-sized 
(typically ordered by state) chunks.  The process calls for front office bureau staffers to 
collect a series of short blurbs by the end of the day from all bureau offices to include in a 
one- or two-page brief for the attention of the A/S.  Some nuggets of this information are 
then shared with the wider senior staff during the following morning meeting chaired by 
the Secretary.  ASDAR submissions are typically to-the-point and hit on some new 
development.  Against that backdrop, temporally and spatially broad trends often are 
ignored in favor of tangible and discrete developments (e.g. the sacking of a minister or 
an NGO report announcing updated refugee numbers).  Further, what actually makes the 
ASDAR cut at the end of the day is at the discretion of both the office director, who may 
choose not to submit particular items sent forward by their desk officers, and the front 
officer staffers and perhaps Deputy Assistant Secretaries who see all the material.   
The Briefs, on the other hand, are the result of a hectic, eight-hour process 
whereby Watchstanders in the Operations Center, the so-called ‘nerve center’ of the 
Department, reach out to embassies, consulates, and desks (depending on the time of day) 
for nuance and insight into the newest political and economic developments around the 
world, the same threshold of noteworthy items as in the ASDAR.   The Briefs, again a 
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strict one- or two-“pager,” are released at 5:30 in the morning and 3:00 in the afternoon 
wherever the Secretary is in the world (i.e. ‘S time’) via extensive e-mail listserv to the 
Department and interagency with printed copies for the Secretary and other senior 
personnel.  The material is again presented in brief, bite-sized chunks and organized by 
country and region.  In fact, as a rule, the title of each individual brief piece must include 
a state and/or international organization. 
From even my own limited experience I can see how critical information and 
information gathering are to the day-to-day activities of the Department and, more 
broadly, to the conduct of United States diplomacy.  In an effort to manage the onslaught 
of information flowing through the Department at all hours of the day, a complex process 
exists, as in every institution, whereby material is hacked and sawed and repackaged into 
palatable synopses that then move up the chain to key policymakers.  If Assistant 
Secretaries and Under Secretaries receive abbreviated notes on the latest happenings 
around the world, what ends up on the Secretary’s desk is distilled further still.  As a 
word of caution, I am not implying that long-term strategic thinking and analysis does not 
make its way to the desk of the Secretary and other upper-level officials—quite the 
contrary—but it is fair to say that the majority of information that flows upward is 
condensed and filtered through a system that places the state and region above other 
classifiers.  And while it is important to recognize that condensing data is part and parcel 
to the Information Age, funneling data in this way—predominantly through state-centric 
regional bureaus—often leads to a disconnect between thematic relationships and 
processes that transcend meso-regional boundaries.  These processes therefore sustain 
and empower the dominant statist and regional narratives that underlie the Department’s 
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bureaucratic structure.  This all-too-brief focus on human resources and information flow 
details the extent to which the bureau system, far from opening new spaces through 
which Department operatives communicate and share knowledge, actually limits the 
exchange of resources both horizontally and vertically within the organization. 
 
The ‘square peg-round hole’ problem  
 There are significant limitations to affixing a regional pattern onto the diverse, 
complex global map, however useful that structure might be as an organizing scheme.  
This section highlights the implications of relying on the contemporary bureau model—
with its emphasis on macro-scale regional constructs—for complex problem solving at 
multiple scales.  I refer to this as the ‘square peg-round hole’ problem, whereby the 
Department cordons off Earth’s surface into tidy (square peg) containers that often do not 
neatly address the cross-cutting, global issues (round hole) that occupy policymakers’ 
time and attention.  In an effort to probe deeper, I ask what ideas and assumptions are 
both hidden and revealed through the prism of this containerized geopolitical imaginary.  
I use the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) as a narrower case study to 
explore the implications of the bureau system and regional bureaus on Department 
cohesion.  Recall that the SCA bureau emerged in the early 1990s, pulling states from the 
bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR).  
Today, SCA is the smallest regional bureau with just thirteen states, but it arguably 
manages the United States’ most geopolitically significant relationships (again, see 
Figures 13 and 15).  This brief case study points to SCA’s marginalization under the 
Department’s bureau system, despite the fact that the territory framed by SCA is among 
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the most geostrategic spaces on earth’s surface (i.e. Mackinder’s Heartland-Pivot thesis) 
and one that has been jockeyed over by Great Powers for centuries.   
Perhaps most significantly, an emphasis on meso-regional constructs potentially 
limits officers’ ranges of understanding of holistic, global processes.  It is easier under the 
bureau system and its regional configurations to lose sight of historical political patterns 
and geographic complexity.  One way of looking at this problem is to examine colonial 
relationships against the backdrop of this regional framework.  A first glance at the 
bureau map (Figure 13), with its stark contrasts between regions, each denoted by a 
distinct color, might generate false assumptions.  For example, one could assume that 
Latin America and Africa each developed under unique, independent political-geographic 
conditions.  Indeed, the bureau system (the map of which illustrates this problem well) 
too often obscures important political, historical, cultural and economic pathways 
between contemporary states in these regions and their colonial occupiers.  The former 
Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia present perhaps the best example here, where 
the longstanding, historic ties between the ‘Stans’ and Russia has been diminished as a 
result of the partitioning of the five states within SCA’s umbrella, as opposed to EUR.  
Despite the fact that significant economic resources—labor, migrants, oil and gas 
resources to name but a few—continue to flow between Central Asia and Russia (or 
Central Asia and China for that matter) or that Russian is still widely spoken and taught 
in several Central Asian states, the inclusion of the ‘Stans’ in SCA tends to hide those 
important connections.  Other significant processes may be ignored or underscored in 
analyses of global patterns through the prism of the Department’s regional divisions, 
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including the vitally important economic pathways—for goods and unskilled labor—
connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia and to the Gulf states.   
The regional divisions also end up privileging flows, patterns, networks, and 
relationships within regional constructs, as opposed to those between different world-
regions and across regional divides.  In the context of SCA, this type of insular thinking 
has led bureau officials towards a preoccupation with higher profile India, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan at the expense of the on-goings in the ten other SCA states.  From January to 
March 2016, for example, the bureau published 16 press releases, almost all related to 
upcoming trips to the region of high-level U.S. government officials.  Eleven of the 16 
releases are concerned with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.  Three others relate to ISIL, 
extremist terrorism, and religious freedom across the region more generally.  Of the last 
two, one involves a phone call to the Nepali prime minister and one is on U.S.-
Uzbekistan annual bilateral consultations.  
These regional-geographic divides are further entrenched in Department culture.  
It is common, for instance, to hear employees speak of themselves as an “NEA-hand,” 
that is, an individual who works in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs or serves primarily 
in posts in the Middle East.  While the Department in recent decades has encouraged 
personnel to specialize in multiple regions, most officers still maintain a degree of loyalty 
to a region.  And even while FSOs are encouraged to develop a “major” and a “minor” 
with respect to their regional expertise, most civil servants are employed in regional 
bureaus for longer periods of time—thus contributing to bureaus’ institutional memory 
and potentially enhancing regional divisions.  Many employees refer to their bureau as a 
family unit, the “EUR family” for instance.  Bureau affiliations are enhanced through 
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holiday celebrations and awards ceremonies (NEA and WHA are known to have the best 
parties).  As such, a profound cultural barrier exists in the Department between different 
geographic bureaus (and functional bureaus as well), though some officers are better than 
others at navigating those divides.   
Returning to SCA again, which as a relatively new bureau does not maintain a 
longstanding “family” culture, the bureau is often disadvantaged by policymakers’ 
preoccupation with the well-established, flashier, and more inwardly focused regional 
neighbors.  To the north SCA is bordered by EUR, a bureau preoccupied with a Europe 
that is still reeling from Cold War divisions.  To the west, NEA is fixated predominantly 
on combatting instability in the Arab world.  EAP, on the other side of SCA, is much 
more pivoted towards the east, with large offices for Chinese, Japanese, and Korean 
affairs.  And EUR, NEA, and EAP were included in the earliest incarnations of the 
Department’s bureau system.  It is no surprise then that SCA often gets lost in the shuffle 
amid these larger regions with powerful states and important bilateral relationships 
between them.   
SCA’s regional cohesion has been further destabilized through the designation of 
powerful Special Envoys, appointed by the Secretary of State, and Special 
Representatives, appointed by the President, notably the Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP).  Special Envoys and Representatives are intended to 
be stopgaps on the one hand, further enhancing U.S. understanding and coverage of a 
particular issue by bringing stakeholders to the table, and symbols on the other, showing 
a commitment on the part of the United States to a particular region and/or state.  At the 
end of the day, however, these designations further compartmentalize an already 
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entangled bureaucracy.  Far from being synthesizers, Special Envoys and Representatives 
often widen the divide between offices and personnel with a country portfolio and those 
working on thematic matters.  And SRAP is arguably the most important Special Envoy 
or Special Representative in the Department, closely followed by the Special Envoy to 
the Middle East Peace Process.  In my experience, the physical disconnect, uneven power 
dynamics, and, at that time, personality clashes between SCA’s Pakistan desk and SRAP 
lowered morale and further entangled an already convoluted bureaucratic system.  
 
‘Right-Sizing’ the Bureau System 
It is clear the world has changed dramatically from the one into which the bureau 
system was introduced in the nineteenth century.  Global political developments are now 
regularly manifested at the local scale and a vast telecommunications infrastructure has 
enabled peoples around the world to engage with one another in real time.  Moreover, 
broad global issues like climate change and extremist terror have brought peoples more 
closely together than every before.  Against this backdrop, it is worth considering 
whether the State Department must reform to remain relevant.  The QDDR, in fact, was 
an attempt to do just that.  However, few changes were made to the bureau structure or its 
regional/functional divide.  Further, there are signs other U.S. government agencies are 
thinking more critically about reforming their geographic organizational schema.  
Harman (2015) noted CIA Director John Brennan’s “ambitious” plans for “a wholesale 
reorganization of the agency, one that would combine operational and analytical divisions 
into ‘hybrid units’ dedicated to specific regions and threats” (p. 99).  
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A Department of State without dominant regional bureaus is difficult to imagine.  
In my opinion, however, eventual right-sizing efforts ought to dismantle the longstanding 
power arrangements that pit functional bureaus as lower order offices in the general 
Department hierarchy.  I envision a bureau system with prominent functional bureaus 
charged with designing policy to address broad-scale topical issues, and lower-order 
regional bureaus to handle policy roll out, continued implementation, and the day-to-day 
administrative functions necessary to manage bilateral and multilateral relationships.  A 
system that prioritizes topical/thematic issues could potentially alter how the Department 
acknowledges and gives attention to global problems.  It would further do work to 
dismantle the territorial tropes reinforced by the existing bureau system.  Hypothetically, 
a more powerful functional bureau contingent might encourage the Department to speak 
out more harshly against human rights violations, the plight of refugees, or environmental 
conditions in different parts of the world, where now diplomatic spats and geopolitical 
sensitivities often get in the way and temper U.S. rebukes of world leaders and their 
policies. 
 
Conclusion 
It is natural and inevitable for humans to want to order the world around them.  
One manifestation of this tendency towards geographical organization, and a powerful 
one, is the U.S. Department of State’s bureau system, which divides the world into 
discrete, meso-scale regional containers.  I use this paper to critique this system, and, in 
particular, the privileging of regional bureaus at the expense of more topically-oriented 
functional bureaus.  Two key findings have emerged from this study.  First, the 
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contemporary bureau system and its emphasis on meso-regional constructions is 
reinforced and sustained through mundane, institutionalized practices.  I highlight 
processes of communication and information management to this end.  Second, the 
‘cordoning off’ of meso-regions potentially favors insular, statist thinking within regional 
bureaus at the expense of broad-based functional expertise of networks and flows across 
space and scale.  I believe the hasty examination of the SCA bureau does well to show 
how entrenched this partitioning could become.  That is not to say regional bureaus have 
no place in the twenty-first-century U.S. Department of State.  Rather, this paper seeks to 
begin a conversation on the extent to which regional bureaus should be privileged over 
their functional counterparts.  I believe any future overhaul of the Department’s bureau 
system should limit the extent to which regional bureaus serve as decision makers and 
bring more analysis and information from functional bureau offices towards decision-
making and policy-planning efforts.  A re-emphasis on functional bureaus might be 
perceived abroad as a broader commitment to democracy, human rights, and multilateral 
cooperation in line with the priorities laid out in the 2016 NSS and QDDR.   
Lastly, it is imperative to consider why the Department’s organizational structure 
has not been subject to much study in the past.  This is likely due to the fact that we 
rarely find cause to question the macro-regional narratives that drive understanding of 
broad, global processes, narratives that exist far beyond the confines of the State 
Department (see, e.g. Murphy 2013).  From the Department of Defense’s entrenched 
Combatant Command divisions to corporations’ Theaters of Operation, vast meso-scale 
regions operate all around us in a complex, overlapping web.  From studies of continents 
in primary school to area studies majors at universities, the world is divided up into 
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macro-regional units all around us.  Yet we spend so little time actually considering how, 
why, and by whom these regional systems emerged, or what they actually do to our 
understanding of political, social, and economic processes across space and scale.   
 This analysis of the Department’s bureau system and its state-centric regional 
bureaus represents one small effort to critically evaluate and consider the role of such 
macro-regional narratives on broader political processes.  The regional bureau system 
might mimic how Department operatives make sense of the world, but how much does 
this understanding rely on the assumptions of a pre-determined regional systematic?  The 
contemporary regional breakdown is useful, but if we stop at that we’re missing some 
key points.   
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FIGURE 12: Department organization (U.S. Department of State 2014). 
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FIGURE 13: Official U.S. Department of State map, 2014.  Map reflects regional bureau 
configurations, all Department diplomatic posts, and time zones.  This map hangs in 
nearly every office within the Department and at diplomatic posts abroad (Global 
Publishing Solutions 2014). 
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TABLE 7: The location of bureau front offices in Main State (Global Information 
Services 2016). 
 
*The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) has an office for dual-hatted Assistant 
Secretary/Spokesperson John Kirby on both the 6th and 2nd floors.  The second floor 
office reflects his role as spokesperson as members of the press corps have limited access 
to the building.  
 
 
 
TABLE 8: The Department’s regional bureau system and geographic responsibilities over 
time (Office of the Historian ND). 
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FIGURE 14: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (Bureau of South and 
Central Asian Affairs ND). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This dissertation has sought to contribute to an understanding of why the United 
States continues to prioritize a widespread and nearly universal diplomatic footprint, the 
largest of any state, even as diplomatic processes are becoming leaner and more mobile 
against the backdrop of twenty-first-century technological advancements.  Towards that 
end, the preceding chapters have focused on how a complex assortment of discourses, 
objects, bodies, networks, and power arrangements have together worked to mutually 
reinforce U.S. diplomatic norms.  These norms structure the very foundation of the U.S. 
diplomatic establishment and account for the way practitioners and policymakers make 
sense of the world, understand America’s role in it, and frame the organizational structure 
of the Department of State and its satellite installations.   
Each discrete article of this dissertation has worked to pick apart some aspect of 
the broader U.S. diplomatic assemblage.  The first article identified and examined the 
powerful universality principle, what I found to be the driving force behind the United 
States’ entrenched commitment to this network of 285 embassies, consulates, and 
exceptional diplomatic facilities.  The dogma of universality has its roots in geo-political 
and geo-economic conditions and the linked neocolonial ambitions that guided U.S. 
foreign policy maneuvers over the course of the last 250 years.  As the Department of 
State moved away from hundreds of small consulates and towards grandiose embassy 
structures (in line with America’s larger role in the global arena), the idea that the United 
States should have representatives in as many sites as possible endured.   
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The second article moved the narrative to the present day, exploring the continued 
influence of universality on the contemporary diplomatic posture.  In probing what 
reasons policymakers give for diplomatic representation, the paper provides a window 
into not only why embassies and consulates exist but into what the facilities themselves 
actually do to support foreign policy endeavors.  Conceptually, this paper suggests a 
treatment of the diplomatic network as an assemblage lends more nuance to an 
understanding of how the networked infrastructure of objects, bodies, and discourses 
work to reinforce the universal diplomatic footprint. 
The third and final article shifts the focus of the dissertation back to Washington, 
DC, where I suggest the longstanding bureau system in place to organize Department of 
State functions limits the ability of practitioners to craft innovative policy solutions in an 
increasingly dynamic world.  I critique the geographical assumptions that empower 
regional bureaus at the expense of lower order functional bureaus.  Such assumptions 
work in tandem with the universality principle to guide Department behavior and 
institutional reform.  
 
Key Findings 
 Three dominant findings emerged from this study.  The first, hinted at above, 
concerns the universality principle.  Even as I found that universality has dictated the 
‘siting’ of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure for some time, the concept itself is surprisingly 
absent from the academic literature, archival material, and present-day records and 
documentation.  Instead, the idea endures in the minds of policymakers and practitioners, 
several of whom I interviewed over the course of this research.  Phantom it may be, but 
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universality, as I said in the introduction, “is built into the very fabric of the U.S. 
diplomatic institution.”  Over the course of the last 250 years, the Department routinely 
augmented its diplomatic footprint around the world and was loathe to consider closing 
embassy and consulate properties, only doing so when prompted by austerity measures or 
concerns about the safety of employees.   
On a deeper level, the universality principle is intrinsically linked to U.S. foreign 
relations history.  The ideas of widespread diplomatic representation first emerged as 
lone consuls sought to secure U.S. access to (and later control) markets around the world.  
As the isolationist era gave way to an increasingly active foreign policy, the United States 
moved to install legations, and later embassies, in foreign capitals.  In the Cold War era, 
ideological warfare led the United States to swiftly place new embassies in newly 
emerging states.  Today, the deeply entrenched notion of universality is evidenced by 
high-level practitioners’ inability to imagine a world in which the United States did not 
have a presence in nearly every capital and large urban population center. 
 The second key finding to emerge throughout the course of this study is closely 
connected to the first.  As I have documented in the above articles, attention to diplomatic 
representation is critical to any study of diplomatic processes, behavior, and objectives.  
In the case of the United States, it is impossible to understand U.S. ambitions in the 
global arena without noting the value policymakers place on maintaining well-staffed 
embassy and consulate compounds in 169 countries.  These facilities render the globe 
legible to decision makers and become active, force-full participants in negotiating 
diplomatic outcomes and mediating geopolitical disputes.   
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Thirdly, this dissertation calls attention to the multiplicity of diplomacies that 
exist at any one moment.  It is my hope that this paper will contribute theoretically to 
erasing the boundaries between what are alternately considered formal and informal 
diplomatic practices, actors, and spaces.  Over the course of this research, I found that 
while the path-dependent nature of rusty state diplomatic institutions make reform efforts 
difficult, new tools, technologies, and partnerships may potentially alter how diplomacy 
is practiced in the years to come.  Innovation comes in many shapes and sizes, and I hope 
to see the Department of State take advantage of opportunities to create a more mobile 
diplomatic corps that crafts policy solutions at different scales and in different places.  In 
fact, I seek to be part of this change and will make every effort to enhance and encourage 
the cross-fertilization of ideas between the Academy and diplomatic practitioners by 
publishing this research. 
 
 
Moving Forward 
 
As noted in the introduction, this dissertation idea emerged from my experiences 
working in the Department of State’s Operations Center at the time of the Benghazi 
mission attack.  What began as an inquiry into where the United States was placing 
diplomatic facilities in the urban landscape, subsequently evolved into a study of why the 
Department continues to prioritize the near-universal diplomatic network.  Over the 
course of this transition, I realized that it wasn’t enough to study three or four discrete 
embassy sites around the world.  I would not be satisfied, for example, asking why the 
heavily fortified U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, was located on the outskirts of 
the city (incidentally next door to the Russian embassy).  I first had to generate a 
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historical understanding of the placement of embassies and consulates around the world.  
Only then could I capture why the United States would rather have an imposing, costly, 
ill-suited, and out-of-the-way facility in Dushanbe than nothing at all.    
Attending to this broader institutional picture meant that many more 
circumscribed questions were left answered.  However, my hope is that this project will 
pave the way for stronger and more transformative research at the intersection of political 
geography and diplomacy studies, notably related to diplomatic representation.  In fact, a 
number of future research directions emerge from this study.  One might want to examine 
the myriad themes related to how diplomatic facilities blend in to (or stick out of) the 
urban system.  Another potential project could look comparatively at other states’ 
diplomatic networks.  As attention to diplomatic processes has broadened in recent years 
across a number of disciplines, including geography, there are growing opportunities to 
explore diplomatic themes as they relate to political geographic processes. 
 
Universality Revisited 
In this final subsection, I find it imperative to revisit the universality principle and 
my critique of it throughout this dissertation.  All three articles comment on, in one way 
or another, how the United States’ longstanding diplomatic posture premised on 
universality has enabled policymakers to pursue an increasingly expansive and 
interventionist foreign policy platform, which has been widely criticized at home and 
abroad.  The value of this dissertation has been to shed light on the myriad ways the U.S. 
diplomatic landscape serves to promote this particular geopolitical strategy characterized 
by U.S. efforts to coerce and control foreign governments and economic markets, an 
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argument I laid out in the first article.  Far from being a static landscape upon which 
diplomatic processes play out, I have conceptualized the collection of U.S. facilities 
throughout this study as a force-full enterprise: a networked assemblage where nodal 
embassy and consulate facilities empower the enmeshed peoples, thing-objects, and ideas 
that are embedded within them.  Through this theoretical lens, diplomatic installations 
serve as essential components of promoting and reinforcing the U.S.-led world order.  In 
failing to recognize the central assumptions embedded within universality, namely that 
the United States ought to have as widespread and robust a network as possible, 
policymakers will likely equally fail to probe for new ideas related to the diplomatic 
posture.  Innovation could dramatically alter not just how the United States places, 
designs, and maintains embassies and consulates but also the policies and worldviews 
that emanate beyond this networked architecture to alter everyday political, economic, 
and cultural currents across space and scale in arguably adverse ways. 
As I mentioned in Chapter IV, most interviewees were unable to imagine the 
United States moving away from the contemporary network and “pulling back” from the 
front lines of global affairs.  Doing so, they argued, would signal to host governments 
around the world that the United States no longer had faith in the country’s role as a 
dominant international actor.  States would further assume that the United States would 
no longer be willing to provide the type of aid and other resources that has been the norm 
over the past generation.  And, as a result of reciprocity, a hallmark of diplomatic 
representation, if the United States were to close embassy and consulate installations, 
host government states might well pull back from their own diplomatic positions in 
Washington and other U.S. cities.  Thus, the symbolism alone would do significant 
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damage to bilateral relationships.  Further, drawing on Chapter IV again, closing embassy 
and consulate positions would likely hinder the ability of the United States to have an ear 
on the ground in as many sites as possible, a professed goal of the contemporary U.S. 
diplomatic footprint.  
Of course it is possible to imagine a world in which the United States maintained 
far fewer compounds and many more multi-accredited ambassadors (say, an ambassador 
accredited to all Balkan states).  As I have mentioned in several places throughout this 
dissertation, other states and some U.S. policymakers have considered alternate 
conceptions of diplomatic representation, attempting to imagine a leaner and more mobile 
institution taking advantage of technological advances.  It is possible, for instance, to 
conduct multilateral meetings over secure video telecommunications platforms and 
collect information from a wide swath of intelligence sources.  Although not 
insurmountable, consular operations present the largest roadblock when considering an 
alternate diplomatic posture.  In the case of the United States, a foreign national who 
wants a non-immigrant visa (NIV) to visit the United States (by far the bulk of U.S. 
consular work) must fill out forms online, make an appointment to visit their local 
consulate, and appear for an in-person interview with a Foreign Service Officer.  
Consular officers regularly conduct 60 to 80 such interviews a day.  Efforts have been 
made to streamline the consular process; Australia’s NIV program, for example, is 
conducted entirely online.  And one colleague told me a story of current U.S. 
Ambassador to the UK Matthew Barzun, who, when serving as the U.S. Ambassador to 
Sweden, outfitted a van with a mobile consular platform to test out offering local visa 
services around the country.  Such inroads, however, have attracted very little interest 
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from high-level U.S. policymakers and practitioners who, as this research illuminated, 
value on-the-ground insight and face-to-face contact above all else. 
While it certainly is possible to design a smaller, less present diplomatic posture, 
at the end of the day diplomacy is about people-to-people contact.  Sending envoys 
abroad to represent the interests of the state is a mainstay of the modern state system and 
will exist, in some form or another, as long as the state remains the dominant form of 
political-territorial organization.  Contemporary embassies and consulates and the 
seemingly banal processes that occur within them are simply the latest manifestation of 
this longstanding practice of formal diplomatic representation.  Whatever the financial 
burden, the United States will likely maintain as robust a diplomatic footprint as possible 
in the foreseeable future, making only minor adjustments to the size and internal structure 
of these facilities.  Longstanding, permanent diplomatic representation is ingrained in the 
U.S. foreign policy establishment; it would take a significant ideological shift and much 
time to break away from the legacy and endurance of universality.  If this were possible, 
drawing on this research, the ideal representational posture would see the maintenance of 
only hub-like diplomatic facilities in key geostrategic locations (perhaps twenty to thirty), 
with smaller, temporary pop-up sites as needed in the lead up to significant elections (for 
monitoring and reporting purposes), mass events (i.e. World Cup, Olympic Games), 
natural disasters, and other crises.  Briefly, in this scenario, Main State headquarters in 
Washington, DC, would absorb much of the functionality of a present-day embassy or 
consulate with most processes shifting to web-based platforms, principally visa 
processing.  Key officials and country officers would still be expected to maintain 
working, positive relationships with local government officials and civil society leaders 
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in country through periodic travel and making greater use of telecommunications 
systems.  A leaner, more mobile footprint would have the advantage of allowing the 
United States to rebrand its global reputation by, to employ a favorite phrase of the 
Obama administration, “leading from behind” while also assuaging contemporary 
concerns for the security and safety of Department of State personnel and cost of 
maintaining the broad diplomatic apparatus.  Lastly, such a radical departure from the 
representational norm would need to occur as part of a total policy re-orientation to 
protect existing bilateral relationships.   
The “hub” proposal is just one way the Department might more fully and 
efficiently harness its capabilities to reposition itself in a more positive way around the 
world.  Others will emerge as universality comes under further critique, beginning with 
the findings presented in this study.  This dissertation has sought to call attention to the 
prevailing norms and powerful ideas that support and reinforce the U.S. diplomatic 
apparatus.  Although the contemporary diplomatic footprint and organizational structure 
of the Department of State will prove difficult to dismantle and reform, particularly given 
the advantages of the current system, there are better ways to use the existing network to 
confront the issues of the day.  A critical analysis of the diplomatic network yields insight 
into myriad ways the Department might enhance efficiencies and reduce redundancies.  
Policymakers should more fully harness technological advances and take advantage of 
right-sizing measures to streamline operations both abroad and at Main State 
headquarters.  Reforms efforts ought to include empowering functional bureaus to take a 
larger policy and planning role, revamping the unwieldy cable and reporting system, 
moving consular operations to online platforms, broadening social media opportunities, 
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and evaluating human resources.  Further, Department operatives must work better to 
balance security mandates and the needs of a diplomatic mission.  Even if the United 
States remains committed to an embassy in every country, the Department should no 
longer be in the business of building imposing, compound-like embassy and consulate 
facilities.   
The world has changed dramatically since the first U.S. envoys were sent abroad 
in the eighteenth century.  The contemporary diplomatic network with its nearly universal 
reach is a product of an outdated understanding of global political and economic 
processes.  If the United States wishes to remain a global leader and relevant moving 
forward, the Department of State needs to make itself and its installations more effective 
to confront twenty-first century realities and the global challenges that work against the 
norms of the territorial system. 
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APPENDIX A: GEODATABASE.   
 
Publicly available georeferenced data on U.S. diplomatic posts (n=230) organized in a 
“.csv” format for easy importing ease into ArcMap cartography software. Data are 
organized by region in the following format: Post name (city name), type (embassy, 
consulate, etc.), address, and MGRS (military grid reference system).  Information culled 
from public/open sources. 
 
 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
Buenos Aires, Embassy, 4300 C1425GMN Av. Colombia CABA Argentina, 
21HUB6980073000 
 
Nassau, Embassy, Queen St Nassau Bahamas, 18RTN6320075500 
 
Bridgetown, Embassy, U.S. Embassy Rd Bridgetown 14006 Barbados, 
21PTQ1960048800 
 
Belmopan, Embassy, Belmopan Belize, 16QCE1140008800 
 
Hamilton, Consulate, Crown Hill 16 Middle Rd DV 03 Bermuda, 20SLA3350074500 
 
La Paz, Embassy, Cordero La Paz Bolivia, 19KEB9370074000 
 
Brasilia, Embassy, Av. Das Nações Quadra 801 Lote 03, s/n – Asa Sul Brasília – DF 
70403-900 Brazil, 23LJC9220050500 
 
Rio De Janiero, Consulate, Av. Pres. Wilson 147 – Castelo Rio de Janeiro – RJ 20030-
020 Brazil, 23KPQ8720065100 
 
Recife, Consulate,  R. Gonçalves Maia 163 – Boa Vista, Recife – PE 50070-060 Brazil, 
25LBM9130008800 
 
Sao Paolo, Consulate, Rua Henri Dunant 500 Chácara Santo Antônio São Paulo- SP  
04709-110, 23KLP2680085700 
 
Ottawa, Embassy, 490 Sussex Dr Ottawa ON K1N 1G8 Canada, 18TVR4550030700 
 
Calgary, Consulate, 615 Macleod Trail SE Calgary AB T2G 4T8 Canada, 
11UQS0610059100 
 
Halifax, Consulate, 1969 Upper Water St #904 Halifax NS B3J 3R7 Canada, 
20TMQ5440044400 
 
Montreal, Consulate, 1155 Rue St-Alexandre Montréal QC H3B 3Z1 Canada, 
18TXR1200040000 
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Quebec, Consulate, 2 rue de la Terrasse Dufferin Ville de Québec QC G1R 4T9 
Canada, 19TCM3170086400 
 
Toronto, Embassy, 360 University Ave Toronto ON M5G 1S4 Canada, 
17TPJ3000034500 
 
Vancouver, Consulate, 19 1095 W Pender St Vancouver BC V6E 2M6 Canada, 
10UDV9130059400 
 
Winnipeg, Embassy, 201 Portage Ave Winnipeg MB R3B 3K6 Canada, 
14UPA3360028600 
 
Santiago, Embassy, Avenida Andres Bello 2800 Santiago Las Condes Región 
Metropolitana Chile, 19HCD5080001800 
 
Bogota, Embassy, Avenida Calle 26 Bogotá Colombia, 18NXL0030012500 
 
San Jose, Embassy, Vía 104 Calle 98 San José Costa Rica, 16PHS1530000400 
 
Santo Domingo, Embassy, Av. República de Colombia 57 Santo Domingo Dominican 
Republic, 19QCA9820046800 
 
Quito, Embassy, y De los Guayacanes Quito EC170124 Ecuador, 17MQV8180084600 
 
Guayaquil, Consulate, Av Rodriguez Bonin Guayaquil 090616 Ecuador, 
17MPT1790057700 
 
San Salvador, Embassy, Residencial Santa Elena El Salvador, 16PBA5580011700 
Guatemala City, Embassy, Zona 10 Guatemala, 15PYS6770016300 
 
Port-au-Prince, Embassy, Boulevard du 15 Octobre Port-au-Prince Haiti, 
18QYF9030054800 
 
Tegucigalpa, Consulate, Colonia San Carlos Tegucigalpa Honduras, 
16PDA7940059100 
 
Kingston, Embassy, 142 Old Hope Road Kingston 6 Jamaica, 18QUE1310093100 
 
Mexico City, Embassy, Paseo de la Reforma 305 Cuauhtémoc 06500 Ciudad de 
México D.F. Mexico, 14QMG8350048100 
 
Ciudad Juarez, Embassy, Paseo de la Victoria 3650 Col. Fraccionamiento Partido 
Senecú 32543 Cd Juárez Chih. Mexico, 13RCR6680006700 
 
Guadalajara, Consulate, Libertad 1920 Americana 44160 Guadalajara Jal Mexico, 
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13QFC7010086800 
 
Hermosillo, Consulate, Av Monterrey 141 Esqueda El Centenario 83260 Hermosillo 
Son Mexico, 12RWT0390016600 
 
Matamoros, Embassy, Calle Primera 2002 Jardín 87330 Matamoros Tamps Mexico, 
14RPP5030064200 
 
Merida, Consulate, Calle 60 No 338-K x 29 y 31 Alcala Martin Alcalá Martín 97050 
Mérida YUC Mexico, 16QBJ2760023100 
 
Monterrey, Consulate, Av Venustiano Carranza 2076 Interior 41 Polanco Burocratas 
78220 San Luis S.L.P. Mexico, 14QKK9290050600 
 
Nogales, Consulate, El Greco 84000 Nogales Son. Mexico, 12RWV0570061500 
 
Nuevo Laredo, Consulate, Av Allende 3330 Jardín 88260 Nuevo Laredo Tamps. 
Mexico, 14RMR4940038300 
 
Puerto Vallarta, Consulate, Libertad 1920 Americana 44160 Guadalajara Jal. Mexico, 
13QFC7010086800 
 
Tijuana, Consulate, Paseo De Las Culturas S/N Bosque de las Araucarias Mesa de Otay 
22425 Tijuana B.C. Mexico, 11SNR0440098400 
 
Curacao, Consulate, Schottegatweg Zuid Willemstad Curaçao, 19PEP0800038500 
 
Managua, Embassy, Barrio Batahola Sur Managua Nicaragua, 16PEU7510041100 
 
Panama City, Embassy, Cardenas Panama City Panama, 17PPK5820095000 
 
Lima, Embassy, La Encalada Santiago de Surco 15023 Peru, 18LTM8570061500 
 
Paramaribo, Embassy, Dr. Sophie Redmond Straat 129 Paramaribo Suriname, 
21NYG0270044400 
 
Port of Spain, Embassy, 15 Queen’s Park W Port of Spain Trinidad & Tobago, 
20PPS6220079400 
 
Montevideo, Embassy, Embajada de los Estados Unidos Dr. Lauro Müller 1776 
Montevideo 11200 Uruguay, 21HWB7520036200 
 
Caracas, Embassy, F Caracas 1080 Venezuela, 19PGM3290059000 
 
EUROPE 
Tirana, Embassy, Elbasan Street Albania, 34TDL0180074900 
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Yerevan, Embassy, 1 American Avenue Yerevan 0082 Armenia, 38TMK5580046200 
 
Vienna, Embassy, 1010 Parkring 12A 1010 Wien Austria, 33UXP0230039900 
 
Baku, Embassy, 111 Azadlıq prospekti Bakı AZ1007 Azerbaijan, 39TVE0180071300 
 
Minsk, Embassy, Staravilyenskaya Vulitsa 46 Minsk Belarus, 35UNV3660073900 
 
Brussels, Embassy, Boulevard du Régent 27 1000 Bruxelles Belgium, 
31UES9620033400 
 
Sarejevo, Embassy, Roberta C. Frasurea 1 Sarajevo 71000 Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
34TBP9100059200 
 
Sofia, Embassy, ul. “Kozyak” 16 1407 Sofia Bulgaria, 34TFN8950026400 
 
Zagreb, Embassy, Ul. Thomasa Jeffersona 2 10000 Zagreb Croatia, 
33TWL7800065900 
 
Prague, Embassy, Tržiště 366/13 118 00 Praha 1-Malá Strana Czech Republic, 
33UVR5710048400 
 
Tallinn, Embassy, Kentmanni 20 10116 Tallinn Estonia, 35VLF7240090100 
 
Helsinki, Embassy, Itäinen Puistotie 14 A 00140 Helsinki Finland, 35VLG8680070600 
 
Paris, Embassy, 4 Avenue Gabriel 75008 Paris France, 31UDQ5010012900 
 
Bordeaux, Consulate, 89 Quai des Chartrons 33000 Bordeaux France, 
30TXQ9220069600 
 
Lyon, Embassy, 1 Quai Jules Courmont 69002 Lyon France, 31TFL4290069300 
 
Rennes, Embassy, 30 Quai Duguay Trouin 35000 Renne France, 30UWU9790029300 
 
Toulouse, Consulate, 25 Allée Jean Jaurès 31000 Toulouse France, 31TCJ7480029300 
 
Marseille, Consulate, 12 Boulevard Paul Peytral 13006 Marseille France, 
31TFH9300095800 
 
Strasbourg, Consulate, 15 Avenue d’Alsace 67000 Strasbourg France, 
32UMU0860082200 
 
Tbilisi, Embassy, 11 George Balanchini St Tbilisi Georgia, 38TMM8130026300 
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Berlin, Embassy, Pariser Platz 2 10117 Berlin Germany, 33UUU8990019600 
 
Dusseldorf, Consulate, Düsseldorf-Oberbilk 40227 Düsseldorf Germany, 
32ULB4600076400 
 
Frankfurt, Consulate, Gießener Str. 30 60435 Frankfurt am Main Germany, 
32UMA7810054400 
 
Hamburg, Consulate, 20354 Hamburg Germany, 32UNE6600035200 
 
Leipzig, Consulate, Wilhelm-Seyfferth-Straße 4 04107 Leipzig Germany, 
33UUS1660090200 
 
Munich, Consulate, Königinstraße 5 80539 München Germany, 32UPU9210035600 
 
Athens, Embassy, Βασ. Σοφίας 91 Αθήνα 10160 Αθήνα 115 21 Greece, 
34SGH4200007400 
 
Budapest, Embassy, Budapest Szabadság tér 12 1054 Hungary, 34TCT5320063000 
 
Reykjavik, Embassy, 21 101 Reykjavík Iceland, 27WVM5430013300 
 
Dublin, Embassy, 42 Elgin Rd Dublin 4 Ireland, 29UPV8420012500 
 
Rome, Embassy, Via Vittorio Veneto 121 00187 Roma Italy, 33TTG9180042400 
 
Florence, Consulate, Lungarno Amerigo Vespucci 38 50123 Firenze Italy, 
32TPP8030049100 
 
Milan, Consulate, Via Principe Amedeo 2/10 20121 Milano Italy, 32TNR1510035700 
 
Naples, Consulate, Piazza della Repubblica 80122 Napoli Italy, 33TVF3470020300 
 
Pristina, Embassy, Ahmet Krasniqi Prishtinë 10000, 34TEN1230023200 
 
Riga, Embassy, Samnera Velsa iela 1 Zemgales priekšpilsēta Rīga LV-1046 Latvia, 
35VLD1920013500 
 
Vilnius, Embassy, Akmenų g. 6 Vilnius 03106 Lithuania, 35ULA8850061000 
 
Luxembourg, Embassy, 22 Boulevard Emmanuel Servais 2535 Luxembourg, 
32UKA9260000200 
 
Skopje, Embassy, U.S. Embassy – Embassy Samoilova 21 Skopje 1000 Macedonia 
(FYROM), 34TEM3500050000 
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Valletta, Embassy, Attard Malta, 33SVV4820071900 
 
Chisinau, Embassy, Strada Alexei Mateevici 103 Chișinău 2009 Moldova, 
35TPN3820009100 
 
Podgorica, Embassy, 12 Vaka Đurovića Podgorica 81000 Montenegro, 
34TCN5700000000 
 
The Hague, Embassy, Lange Voorhout 102 2514 EJ Den Haag Netherlands, 
31UET9010071000 
 
Amsterdam, Consulate, Museumplein 19 1071 DJ Amsterdam Netherlands, 
31UFU2810002300 
 
Oslo, Embassy, Henrik Ibsens gate 48 0244 Oslo Norway, 32VNM9630043200 
 
Warsaw, Embassy, Aleje Ujazdowskie 29-31 Warszawa Poland, 34UEC0150086000 
 
Krakow, Consulate, Stolarska 9 Kraków Poland, 34UDA2400045800 
 
Lisbon, Embassy, Av. Das Forças Armadas 1600-081 Lisboa Portugal, 
29SMC8580088300 
 
Bucharest, Embassy, Bulevardul Dr. Liviu Librescu 4-6 București 015118 Romania, 
35TMK2740029300 
 
Moscow, Embassy, Bolshoy Devyatinskiy pereulok 8 Moscow Russia 121099, 
37UDB1080079800 
 
St. Petersburg, Consulate, Фурштатская ул. 15 Санкт-Петербург Ленинградская 
область Russia 191028, 36VUM5220048200 
 
Vladivostok, Consulate, Vladivostok Primorsky Krai Russia 690001, 
52TGN3660077700 
 
Yekaterinburg, Consulate, ul. Gogolya, 15 Yekaterinburg Sverdlovsk Oblast Russia 
620075, 41VLD5410001400 
 
Belgrade, Embassy, Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karađorđevića 92 Beograd Serbia, 
34TDQ5670057800 
 
Bratislava, Embassy, Hviezdoslavovo námestie 811 02 Bratislava-Staré Mesto 
Slovakia, 33UXP5680034100 
 
Ljublkana, Embassy, 1000 Prešernova cesta 31 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia, 
33TVM0000000000 
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Madrid, Embassy, Calle de Serrano 75 28006 Madrid Spain, 30TVK4170076200 
 
Barcelona, Consulate, Passeig de la Reina Elisenda de Montcada 23 08034 Barcelona 
Spain, 31TDF2620083200 
 
Bern, Embassy, Sulgeneckstrasse 19 3007 Bern Switzerland, 32TLT8110000000 
 
Stockholm, Embassy, Dag Hammarskjölds väg 31 115 89 Stockholm Sweden, 
34VCL3530080700 
 
Ankara, Embassy, Remzi Oğuz Arık 06540 Çankaya/Ankara Turkey, 
36SVK8760017600 
 
Adana, Consulate, Dede Korkut Girne Bulv. No:212 01285 Yüreğir/Adana Turkey, 
36SYF1000095900 
 
Istanbul, Embassy, İstinye No:2 34460 Sarıyer/Istanbul – Europe Turkey, 
35TPF7170053900 
 
Kiev, Embassy, Sikorskoho St 4 Kiev Ukraine, 36UUA1770093500 
 
London, Embassy, 24 Grosvenor Square Mayfair London W1A 2LQ, 
30UXC9750010500 
 
Belfast, Embassy, 223 Stranmillis Rd Belfast County Antrim BT9 5GR, 
30UUF0980050900 
 
Edinburgh, Consulate, 3 Regent Terrace Edinburgh EH7 5BW, 30UVH8880001000 
 
MIDDLE EAST 
Algiers, Embassy, 05 Chemin Cheikh Bachir El Ibrahim El Biar 16030 Algeria, 
31SEA0340067700 
 
Manama, Embassy, Bu Ghazal Manama Bahrain, 39RVJ5710098400 
 
Cairo, Consulate, 5 Tawfik Diab Street Garden City Qasr Ad Dobarah Qasr an Nile 
Cairo Governorate Egypt, 36RUU2960024700 
 
Baghdaad, Embassy, Al-Kindi Street Baghdad 217 Iraq, 38SMB4370084500 
 
Basrah, Embassy, Basrah Iraq, 38RQU7440077000 
 
Tel Aviv, Embassy, Ha-Yarkon St 71 Tel Aviv-Yafo 63903 Israel, 36SXA6670050200 
 
Amman, Embassy, Al Hidab Amman Jordan, 36RYA7220037900 
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Kuwait City, Embassy, Masjid Al Aqsa St Kuwait City Kuwait, 39RTN1310043900 
 
Beirut, Embassy, El Metn Lebanon, 36SYC4010057900 
 
Rabat, Embassy, Avenue Mohamed VI Rabat 10170 Morocco, 29SQT0100059300 
 
Casablanca, Consulate, Boulevard Moulay Youssef Casablanca 20250 Morocco, 
29SPT2740017600 
 
Doha, Embassy, Doha Qatar, 39RWH4740098600 
 
Riyadh, Embassy, Cir 8 As Safarat Riyadh 12523 Saudi Arabia, 38RPN6400030600 
 
Dhahran, Consulate, US Consulate Driveway KFUPM Dhahran 34464 Saudi Arabia, 
39RVK1550009600 
 
Jeddah, Consulate, Falastin, Al-Hamra’a Jeddah 23323 Saudi Arabia, 
37QED1690080400 
 
Damascus, Embassy, Abo Jafaar Al Mansour Damascus Syria, 37SBT4740012400 
 
Tunis, Embassy, La Goulette Tunisia, 32SPF1320079000 
 
Abu Dhabi, Embassy, Airport Road at Rabdan (29th) Street Embassies District Plot 38 
Sector W59-02 Street No. 4, 40RBN3980003600 
 
Dubai, Consulate, Al Seef Road Unmmu Hurair 1 Bur Dubai, 40RCN2970094600 
 
Sana’a, Embassy, Sana’a Yemen, 38PMB1730099700 
 
AFRICA 
Luanda, Embassy, Miramar Luanda Angola, 33LUL0700025600 
 
Cotonou, Embassy, Rue 914 Cotonou Benin, 31NDH3380002000 
 
Gaborone, Embassy, Mmaraka Extension 1 Gaborone Botswana, 35JLN8950072100 
 
Ouagadougou, Embassy, Ouaga 2000 Ouagadougou Burkina Faso, 30PXU6340060700 
 
Bujumbura, Embassy, Bujumbura Burundi, 35MQS6450027600 
 
Praia, Embassy, R. Abílio Macedo Praia Cape Verde, 27PTS3030051100 
 
Bangui, Embassy, Bangui Central African Republic, 34NBK3130082300 
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N’Djamena, Embassy, N’Djamena Chad, 33PWP0520037800 
 
Kinshasa, Embassy, Avenue De l’Hotel Kinshasa Congo (DRC), 33MWR3470024600 
 
Brazzaville, Embassy, Brazzaville Congo (Republic), 33MWR2840027400 
 
Abidjan, Embassy, D 33 Abidjan Côte d’Ivoire, 30NUL9180089700 
 
Malabo, Embassy, Malabo Equatorial Guinea, 32NMK7270014600 
 
Asmara, Embassy, 179 Ala Street 179 171-9 St Asmara Eritrea, 37PDS9300094700 
 
Addis Ababa, Embassy, Algeria St Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 37PDL7400001200 
 
Libreville, Embassy, Libreville Gabon, 32NNF4390053400 
 
Accra, Embassy, No. 24 Fourth Circular Rd Accra Ghana, 30NZM1350017400 
 
Conakry, Embassy, Conakry Guinea, 28PFR4960060900 
 
Maseru, Embassy, 254 Kingsway Maseru Lesotho, 35JNH4540057900 
 
Monrovia, Embassy, 502 Benson St Monrovia Liberia, 29NKG9930098500 
 
Antananarivo, Embassy, 4 Antananarivo Madagascar, 38KQE6100013600 
 
Lilongwe, Embassy, 16 Jomo Kenyatta Road, Lilongwe 3 Lilongwe Malawi Lilongwe 
Malawi, 36LWK8480056200 
 
Bamako, Embassy, Rue 243 Porte 297 Bamako Mali, 29PPP0650096300 
 
Nouakchott, Embassy, La Capitale Nouakchott Mauritania, 28QCF9700000800 
 
Port Louis, Embassy, Rogers House 4th Floor P.O. Box 544 President John Kennedy St 
Port Louis Mauritius, 40KEC5230070500 
 
Maputo, Embassy, Av. Kenneth Kaunda Maputo Mozambique, 36JVS5990028700 
 
Windhoek, Embassy, 14 Lossen Street Ausspanplatz Windhoek Central Namibia 
Namibia Windhoek Namibia, 33KYR1450001900 
 
Niamey, Embassy, Goudel Niamey Niger, 31PCQ9920095600 
 
Abuja, Embassy, 1075 Diplomatic Dr Abuja Nigeria, 32PLQ3250099600 
 
Kigali, Embassy, No 2756 Avenue de la Gendarmerie Kacyiru Kigali Rwanda Kigali 
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Rwanda, 36MSC7480085600 
 
Dakar, Embassy, B.P. 49 Route des Almadies Dakar Senegal, 28PBB2790031600 
 
Freetown, Embassy, Conakry Guinea, 28PFR4960060900 
 
Pretoria, Embassy, 877 Pretorius St Pretoria 0083 South Africa, 35JPM2270051800 
 
Juba, Embassy, Kololo Road adjacent to the European Union’s compound Juba South 
Sudan, 36NUL4320036800 
 
Khartoum, Embassy, Kilo 10 Soba Khartoum Sudan Khartoum Sudan, 
36PVC4830024900 
 
Dar es Salaam, Embassy, Msasani Dar es Salaam Tanzania, 37MEN2940051300 
 
Banjul, Embassy, U.S. Embassy Kairaba Avenue P.M.B. 19 Kairaba Ave Banjul 
Gambia, 28PCV1730088800 
 
Lome, Embassy, U.S. Embassy 4332, Blvd Eyadema Lome Togo BP 852 Lome Togo, 
31NCG0240084000 
 
Kampala, Embassy, Plot 1577 Ggaba Road Kampala Uganda Kampala Uganda, 
36NVF5460033000 
 
SOUTH-CENTRAL ASIA 
Kabul, Embassy, Bibi Mahru Kabul Afghanistan, 42SWD1750021200 
 
Dhaka, Embassy, Shahzadpur Dhaka Bangladesh, 46QBM3740034000 
 
New Delhi, Embassy, E-3 Nyaya Marg Chanakyapuri Chanakyapuri New Delhi Delhi 
110021 Malcha New Delhi Delhi 110021 India, 43RGM1370065300 
 
Chennai, Consulate, Gemini Circle Gopalapuram Chennai Tamil Nadu 600006 India, 
44PMV1880043000 
 
Hyderabad, Consulate, 1-8-323 Paigah Palace Chiran Fort Lane Begumpet Indian 
Airlines Colony Patigadda Begumpet Secunderabad Telangana 500003 India, 
44QKE3170030200 
 
Calcutta, Consulate, 5/1, Ho Chi Minh Sarani Park Street area Kankaria Estates Park 
Street area Kolkata West Bengal 700071, 45QXE3890094000 
 
Mumbai, Embassy, C-49 G-Block Bandra Kurla Complex Bandra East G Block BKC 
Bandra Kurla Complex Bandra East Mumbai Maharashtra 400051 India, 
43QBB7560009300 
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Astana, Embassy, Almaty District Astana 010000 Kazakhstan, 42UXB7260067100 
 
Almaty, Embassy, Almaty District Astana 010000 Kazakhstan, 42UXB7260067100 
 
Bishkek, Embassy, Bishkek Kyrgyzstan, 43TDH6580041600 
 
Kathmandu, Embassy, Maharajgunj Rd Kathmandu 44606 Nepal, 45RUL3600069300 
 
Islamabad, Embassy, Diplomatic Enclave Islamabad 44000 Pakistan, August 15 1947, 
43SCT2560033100 
 
Karachi, Consulate, Plot 3 4 5 New TPX Area Mai Kolachi Road Karachi Mai Kolachi 
Bypass Karachi Pakistan, 42RTN9880048800 
 
Lahore, Embassy, 50 Empress Road Lahore Pakistan, 43RDQ3700091800 
 
Peshawar, Consulate, U.S. Consulate 11 General Bakht Khan Rd Peshawar Pakistan, 
42SYC3420065700 
 
Colombo, Embassy, No: 210 A2 Colombo 00300 Sri Lanka, 44NLN7280064200 
 
Dushanbe, Embassy, M41 Dushanbe 734019 Tajikistan, 42SVH7490070100 
 
Ashgabat, Embassy, Ashgabat Turkmenistan, 40SFH2190000200 
 
Tashkent, Embassy, 3 Maykurgan Str. Тошкент 100093 Uzbekistan, 
42TWL2270079500 
 
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 
Canberra, Embassy, Moonah Pl Yarralumla ACT 2600 Australia, 55HFA9240090900 
 
Melbourne, Consulate, 553 St Kilda Rd Melbourne VIC 3004 Australia, 
55HCU2230009200 
 
Perth, Consulate, 16 St Georges Terrace Perth WA 6000 Australia, 50JLK9260063700 
 
Sydney, Embassy, Homemaker City Castlereagh St Sydney NSW 2000 Australia, 
56HLH3430051000 
 
Bandar Seri Begawab, Embassy, Jalan Kebangsaan Simpang 336-52-16-9 Bandar Seri 
Begawan Brunei, 50NKL7340044100 
 
Rangoon, Embassy, 110 University Avenue Road Yangon Myanmar (Burma), 
47QJU9560062400 
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Phnom Penh, Embassy, 1 Christopher Howes Phnom Penh Cambodia, 
48PVT9130079500 
 
Beijing, Embassy, 55 Anjialou Rd SanYuan Qiao Chaoyang Beijing China 100028, 
50SMK5440022800 
 
Chengdu, Consulate, 4 Linshiguan Rd Wuhou Chengdu Sichuan China 610041, 
48RVU1070088300 
 
Guangzhou, Consulate, Huajiu Rd Tianhe Guangzhou Guangdong China 510620, 
49QGF3740058200 
 
Shanghai, Consulate, Wulumuqi S Rd Xuhui Shanghai China 200031, 
51RUQ5200053700 
 
Shenyang, Consulate, 14th Latitude Rd Heping Shenyang Liaoning China 110003, 
51TWG3540025800 
 
Suvi, Embassy, 158 Princess Road Tamavua Suva Fiji, 60KXE5220096200 
 
Hong Kong, Consulate, 26 Garden Rd Central Hong Kong, 50QKK0710066300 
 
Jakarta, Embassy, No. 3-5 Jl. Medan Merdeka Sel. Gambir Kota Jakarta Pusat Daerah 
Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 10110 Indonesia, 48MYU0250016300 
 
Surabaya, Consulate, Jl. Citra Raya Niaga No.2 Sambikerep Kota SBY Jawa Timur 
60217 Indonesia, 49MFM8190094500 
 
Tokyo, Embassy, 〒107-8420 Tokyo Minato Akasaka 1 Chome−10, 
54SUE8620047900 
 
Fukuoka, Consulate, 〒810-0052 Fukuoka Prefecture Fukuoka Chūō-ku Ōhori 2 
Chome−5, 52SFC2740017300 
 
Nagoya, Consulate, 1 Chome-47-1 Nagono Nakamura Ward Nagoya Aichi Prefecture 
450-0001 Japan, 53SPU7210093800 
 
Osaka, Consulate, U.S. Consulate Osaka 7F 2-11-5 Nishitenman アメリカ ??? ? 
 ? ?? 2 Chome-11 Nishitenma Kita-ku Osaka Kita-ku 530-8543 Japan, 
53SNU4590039500 
 
Sapporo, Consulate, 28 Chome-3-1 Kita 1 Jonishi Chuo Ward Sapporo Hokkaido 
Prefecture 064-0821 Japan, 54TWN2550067100 
 
Naha, Consulate, Japan 〒901-2104 Okinawa Prefecture Urasoe Tōyama 2 Chome−1 
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当山２－１－１, 52RCQ7390004300 
 
Seoul, Embassy, 188 Sejong-daero Sejongno Jongno-gu Seoul South Korea, 
52SCG2140060300 
 
Vientiane, Embassy, Rue Bartholonie Vientiane Laos, 48QTE4700087900 
 
Kuala Lumpur, Embassy, 376 Jalan Tun Razak Taman U Thant 50400 Kuala Lumpur 
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, 47NRD0260049100 
 
Manila, Embassy, 1201 Roxas Blvd Ermita Manila 1000 Metro Manila Philippines, 
51PTS8210012500 
 
Ulaanbaatar, Embassy, Khoroo 7 Ulaanbaatar Mongolia, 48TXU4410010100 
 
Wellington, Embassy, 29 Fitzherbert Terrace Thorndon Wellington 6011 New Zealand, 
60GUV1390028500 
 
Port Moresby, Embassy, U.S. Embassy c/o Cuthberston Street Douglas St Port 
Moresby 121 Papua New Guinea, 55LEK1620052100 
 
Koror, Embassy, Airai Palau, 53NMJ5040013500 
 
Manila, Embassy, 1201 Roxas Blvd Ermita Manila 1000 Metro Manila Philippines, 
51PTS8210012500 
 
Apia, Embassy, Apia Samoa, 2LMK1760070500 
 
Bangkok, Embassy, 120-122 Wireless Rd Khwaeng Lumphini Khet Pathum Wan 
Krung Thep Maha Nakhon 10330 Thailand, 47PPR6700019100 
 
Chiang Mai, Consulate, 387 Witchayanon Road Chang Moi 50300 Mueang Chiang 
Mai Chiang Mai Mueang Chiang Mai District Chiang Mai 50300 Thailand, 
47QMA9980078000 
 
Dili, Embassy, Díli Timor-Leste, 51LYL8070054300 
 
Hanoi, Embassy, 7 Láng Hạ Thành Công Ba Đình Hà Nội Vietnam, 
48QWJ8500024700 
 
Ho Chi Minh City, Consulate, Bến Nghé District 1 Ho Chi Minh Vietnam, 
48PXS8590092400 
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APPENDIX B: CRITERIA FOR OPENING NEW FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS. 
 
March 20, 1958.  The following is adapted from Tabs 1-3 of the “Criteria for Opening 
New Foreign Service Posts” forms prepared by the Committee for New Foreign Service 
Posts for the attention of the State Department’s Regional Bureaus and Missions.   
 
Reference: Campbell, H.K., Executive Secretary, Committee on New Foreign Service 
Posts, to Mr. Scott, Bureau of Administration, Mar. 20, 1958, file 120.2/3-2758, 1955-
1959 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. 
National Archives at College Park, MD. 
 
*** 
 
I. AREA VITAL STATISTICS 
a. Country 
i. Population 
ii. Language 
iii. Climate 
iv. Political Status (independent, colony, protectorate, etc.) 
b. Post District 
i. State or provincial government or governments. 
ii. Population 
iii. Language 
iv. Climate 
c. City 
i. Population 
ii. Language 
iii. Climate 
iv. Nearest large city and/or capital 
d. Other comments. 
 
II. PRECEDENTS 
a. History of previous American establishments in area, including reasons for 
opening or closing. 
b. Representation maintained by other governments in the locality, including 
number, rand and functions of such offices. 
c. Representation maintained by the host government in the United States, 
including number, rank and functions of such offices. 
d. Number of other U.S. Government posts in host country: 
i. Diplomatic 
ii. Consular 
iii. Number of separate USIS, ICA or other special offices (need not 
list). 
e. Other comments. 
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III. CONSULAR NEEDS 
a. Estimated number of resident U.S. citizens. 
b. Estimated number (annual) of transient U.S. citizens. 
c. Anticipated annual visa load: 
i. Immigration 
ii. Non-Immigration 
d. Anticipated trade which might affect A, B or C. 
e. If port, estimated average number of U.S. flag ships calling (including 
naval visits). 
f. Anticipated local public activity involving invoices, etc. 
g. Presence of military bases (U.S.) in area, for which special consular 
services might be required. 
h. Estimate number of U.S. veterans resident in district. 
i. Other comments. 
 
IV. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (where possible to evaluate) 
a. Orientation of country vis-à-vis United States. 
b. Orientation of country vis-à-vis Communist Bloc. 
c. Orientation of country vis-à-vis “Neutralist” countries. 
d. Expressed interest of governing authority in the maintenance of U.S. 
representation in the locality. 
e. Stability of government. 
f. Disruptive Communist or other competitive activities in host country. 
g. Need for following types of political reporting: 
i. Country’s foreign relations. 
ii. Domestic politics. 
iii. Biographic. 
iv. Map and Procurement. 
v. Labor, legal, etc. 
vi. Peripheral reporting on neighboring countries. 
h. Other comments.  (Such as significance of proposed district in country’s 
political, economic and schol scheme of things.) 
 
V. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
a. Economic stability of country and its relationship to U.S. political and 
economic interests. 
b. Main industries and their importance as markets for U.S. exports or as 
suppliers of U.S. imports. 
c. Presence of strategic materials. 
d. Other strategic economic considerations. 
e. Economic defense requirements (East-West trade, etc.). 
f. Need for following types of economic reporting: 
i. General reporting on conditions and trends 
ii. Commodity 
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iii. Industrial 
iv. Banking and Finance 
v. Govermental finance 
vi. Progress of economic development 
vii. Other 
g. Other comments. 
 
VI. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
a. General Economic Assistance Program 
i. Now in existence 
ii. Planned 
b. Technical Assistance Program 
i. Now in existence 
ii. Planned 
c. Military Assistance Program 
i. Now in existence 
ii. Planned 
d. Other comments. 
 
 
VII. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 
a. Extent of American capital investments. 
b. Extent of American commercial interests; e.g., volume of trade with U.S. 
c. Number of American firms with established branches or agents. 
d. Trade and investment potential. 
e. Competitive activities of other nations. 
f. Need for following types of commercial reporting and services: 
i. Trade lists 
ii. WTDs 
iii. Trade and investment opportunities 
iv. Trade complaints 
v. General reporting on trade and investment conditions 
vi. Other 
g. Other comments. 
 
VIII. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS 
(The following questions to not relate to the possible existence of U.S. Military 
Assistance Programs or U.S. military bases in the area, but rather to conventional 
service attache type requirements.) 
a. Attache type requirements 
i. Reporting 
1. Army  
2. Navy 
3. Air Force 
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ii. Other 
1. Anticipated naval visits, if a port. 
2. Amount of U.S. civil air traffic. 
3. Other 
b. Number and type of service attaches expected. 
c. Other comments. 
 
IX. INFORMATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE POTENTIAL 
a. USIS Program  
i. Now in existence or planned by the United States Information 
Agency. 
ii. Desirability from State Department point of view. 
iii. Acceptability to host government. 
iv. Targets 
1. Approximate number of newspapers in district. 
2. Approximate number of radio stations. 
3. Estimated ratio of radio sets to population. 
4. Literacy of population in district. 
5. Approximate number of universities and colleges. 
b. Exchange of Persons Program 
i. Now in existence o[r] planned by IES. 
ii. Desirability from State Department view. 
iii. Acceptability to host government. 
c. Proposed size of USUS staff (including IES activities). 
d. Other comments. 
 
X. OTHER AGENCY REQUIREMENTS (Beyond those indicated in previous 
sections) 
Expressed interest of the following agencies in the establishment or 
maintenance of an attache or representative at post; with staff size indicated: 
** 
a. Department Agriculture 
b. Department of Labor 
c. Bureau of Mines (Department of Interior) 
d. Fish and Wildlife Service 
e. Atomic Energy Commission 
f. [Blank] 
g. [Blank] 
h. Other 
i. Other comments. 
**(Note: - as may already be known to the Department or Mission.  Agencies 
should not be solicited for views at this stage.)  
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XI. PERSONNEL 
a. Estimated total number of non-State Department personnel (Officers, 
employees and locals). 
b. Proposed number of State Department personnel.  (For listing of positions, 
grades and salaries, see Section XIV.) 
c. If hardship post, recommended percentage. 
d. Cost of living class. 
e. Privileges and immunities host government may be expected to extend to 
United States representative. 
f. Availability of qualified locals. 
g. If post demands unique language or other professional skills, expectation 
of finding suitable personnel (not to be answered by recommending post, 
but rather by regional bureau). 
h. Other comments. 
 
XII. BUILDING NEEDS 
a. Attache report, or summary of report of site survey by nearest 
Administrative Officer or Bureau Officer, preferably accompanied by 
regional FBO representative.  (Survey may be restricted if undesirable 
publicity might result.)   
 
(Estimated costs for following items summarized in Section XIV.) 
b. Office Space 
i. Number of buildings required (does USIS or other agency actually 
desire separate building.) 
ii. Terms for each 
1. Short-term lease 
2. Long-term lease 
3. Purchase 
4. United States Government construction required 
iii. Furniture to be acquired locally of United States supplied? 
c. Housing 
i. Number of units required (principal officer, senior officers, staff) 
ii. Terms for each  
1. Short-term lease 
2. Long-term lease 
3. Purchase 
4. United States Government construction required 
iii. For each to be government furnished, furniture to be acquired 
locally or United States supplied? 
d. Other comments 
 
XIII. OPERATING FACILITIES  
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a. Attach report, or summary of report of location survey by nearest 
Administrative Officer or Bureau Officer (see Section XII). 
 
(Estimated costs for following items summarized in Section XIV.) 
 
b. Communications facilities available in city 
i. Access to existing courier route 
ii. Commercial telegraph facilities 
iii. Commercial telephone facilities 
iv. Local Postal facilities 
c. Transportation facilities 
i. Commercial airlines 
ii. United States Military air service 
iii. Commercial shipping 
iv. United States Military transports  
v. Railroads 
vi. Buses 
vii. Highways 
d. Medical facilities 
i. Nearest United States military hospital 
ii. Proficiency of local doctors and surgeons 
iii. Proficiency of local dentists 
iv. Conditions in local hospitals 
v. Municipal sanitation factors to be considered 
e. Food 
i. Percentage which can be acquired locally 
ii. Approximate relationship to United States cost of living index 
f. Recreational facilities 
i. Those immediately accessible 
ii. Available by travel within country or region 
g. Supplies and equipment 
i. Number and type of vehicle required 
ii. Any unusual supply or equipment items, or quantities thereof 
iii. Percentage of supplies and equipment acquired locally 
 
XIV. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL PLAN (Show State costs only) 
 
[In chart form. Calculate “personnel services, “class,” “salary,” “cost (first FY, Field 
& Dept),” and “cost (succeeding FYs, Field & Depart) for each: “Americans,” 
“Locals.”  Calculate “allowances,” “travel,” “ORA,” “communications,” 
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“automotive,” “buildings operating expenses,” “contractual & miscellaneous,” 
“household furniture.”  Total expenses.] 
 
XV. COMMITTEE CHECKLIST […] 
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APPENDIX C: RANKING OF EUR CONSULAR POSTS BY 
INDISPENSABILITY VIA COEFFICIENT SCORE. 
 
The following pages are scanned images of a May 13, 1960 memorandum (in full) titled 
“Status of Foreign Service Posts,” which details how the Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs ranked its consular posts according to indispensability using a 
coefficient score.  The ranking was requested during a time of austerity when the 
Department was forced to close constituent posts.  Note that Tab B, page 4 is missing. 
 
Reference: Gallman, W.J., Director General of the Foreign Service, to Mr. Parsons, 
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, May 13, 1960, file 120/2/5-1360, 1960-1963 Central 
Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National 
Archives at College Park, MD. 
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